University of San
Agustin
School of Law
General Luna Street,
Iloilo City
Pre-Lim Examination in Civil Law Review
Law 4-A
1st Semester, SY 2017-2018
PART 1
By:
Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III
Lecturer
(Answers to Obligations and Contracts found
in Older Posts)
NOTE:
Each Roman numeral number is assigned 10 points for a total of 100 points.
I.
Distinguish
Civil Law from Common Law. Discuss their respective essential features.
Answer:
Article
1. This Act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article
8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Article
9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Article
10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
Civil Law v. Common Law system
Civil
Law- Mass of precepts that determine or regulate relations among members of
family, society for the protection of private interests.
· Written
law as basis for civil law
· Justice
Ginsburg of US Supreme Court opines that : “there is no such thing as stare decisis in civil law
regimes”. Courts look not to prior decisions as precedents but to the statute
itself with its inexorably one interpretation. (No alternative interpretation.)
· “Although
Holmes once famously said that the law is not a great brooding omnipresence
waiting to be discovered, in European countries, that is exactly the case.
There can only be one correct interpretation, and any opinion by a member of
the court disagreeing with the proper conclusion would be seen not as an
alternative interpretation but as an error. If the interpretation of the court wreaks hardship, then the solution
lies in the hands of lawmakers, not judges”.[1]
· France,
Germany, all courts of continental Europe
Common
law system- evolved from jurisprudence.
· Great
Britain, Commonwealth members and the United States
· “The life
of the law had not been logic but experience. The felt necessities of the
times, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by
which men should be governed”[2].
· SOCIOLOGICAL
JURISPRUDENCE- Belief that judges had to take into account economic, social,
and political facts in addition to legal theory when determining a case.
· LEGAL
REALISM- many factors influence legal outcomes, of which the law itself was but
one.
II.
Arguing
before the Supreme Court in a case of National importance and when confronted
with settled doctrinal jurisprudence that is clearly contrary to the position
she was taking, Attorney Julia, a bar topnotcher in the recent Bar Examinations,
proferred two (2) arguments, viz: (1)
That she is presenting an alternative
interpretation of the law; and, (2) assuming that her contention
contravenes prevailing jurisprudence, she begs leave of the court to apply her
interpretation in a pro hac vice fashion
in light of the National significance of the issues that the case before the
Court presents. Rule on the two (2) contentions of Attorney Julia.
Answer:
1. Article
8 of the New Civil Code ;
Stare Decisis
The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere is fully applicable.
The
doctrine means -
"[T]o adhere to
precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established." Under the
doctrine, when this Court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to
all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of whether
the parties and property are the same. The doctrine of stare decisis is based
upon the legal principle or rule involved and not upon the judgment, which
results therefrom. In this particular sense, stare decisis differs from res
judicata, which is based upon the judgment.
The doctrine of stare
decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions, thus:
Time and again, the
Court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial practice that
when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in
which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply
means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same
event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue .
-
Hon. Jonathan A. De la Cruz v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, G.R. No. 219683, January
23, 2018
“Pro Hac Vice” ruling
Pro hac vice means a specific decision
does not constitute a precedent because the decision is for the specific case
only, not to be followed in other cases. A pro hac vice decision violates
statutory law - Article 8 of the Civil Code - which states that "judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws I or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines." The decision of the Court in
this case cannot be pro hac vice because by mandate bf the law every decision
of the Court forms part of the legal system of the Philippines. If another case
comes up with the same facts as the present case, that case must be decided in
the same way as this case to comply With the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the law. Thus, a pro hac vice decision also violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
-KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner, EN BANC
G.R. No. 213948 Present: SERENO, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, PERALTA, 1 - versus - I DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS,
INC., CITY OF MANILJ\., NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CUJ, TURE AND THE ARTS,
NATIONAL MUSEUM, and : NATIONAL HISTORICAL BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, MENDOZA,
REYES, PERLAS-BERNABE, LEONEN, JARDELEZA, CAGUIOA, MARTIRES, and TIJAM,JJ.
COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated: Respondents. April 2 5 2O1 7
III.
Romeo and Juliet, both Filipinos, got married. After a few years, Juliet
got word from her mother that she can go to the United States for
naturalization. Juliet promised she will be back the moment she becomes an
American. After sometime, Romeo learned from a friend that Juliet already
became a U.S. citizen and even divorced him to marry a wealthy American
businessman. Romeo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court praying
that an order be issued authorizing him to remarry pursuant to Article 26 of
the Family Code. Decide the petition with reasons. (2016 Bar Exam Question)
Answer:
Romeo is
getting ahead of himself. It is a rule in Philippine jurisdiction that Divorce
is contrary to law and public policy. It is only in cases strictly governed by
Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code
that divorce is recognized. However, said provision of law presupposes that there
must be competent proof of divorce and that the foreigner spouse is capacitated
to remarry under his/ her new country. Here, Romeo cannot just rely on patchy
details which are hearsay at best. There is no competent proof that Juliet has
indeed already embraced US Citizenship. And granting that such is the case,
there is no proof that she is capacitated to remarry under her National law
because Romeo did not secure a copy of the law on divorce in the country where
Juliet obtained a divorce. Lastly, These documents must be duly authenticated
by the Philippine embassy. In the absence of compliance with these
requirements, Romeo cannot just seek authority to remarry from Philippine
courts. Sadly, the general rule that divorce is not recognized in the
Philippines, applies to Romeo’s case.
IV.
Leo married Lina and they begot a son. After the bitth of their child, Lina
exhibited unusual behavior and started to neglect her son; she frequently went
out with her friends and gambled in casinos. Lina later had extra-marital
affairs with several men and eventually abandoned Leo and their son. Leo was
able to talk to the psychiatrist of Lina who told him that Lina suffers
from dementia praecox, a form of psychosis where the afflicted
person is prone to commit homicidal attacks. Leo was once stabbed by Lina but
fortunately he only suffered minor injuries. Will a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage filed with the court prosper? Explain. (2016 Bar Exam
Question)
Answer:
Article 36 of the Family Code on
Psychological Incapacity, as well as the string of cases decided by the Supreme
Court on such malady, demands for exacting standards of “inability to perform
marital obligations” and not just mere refusal. “Dementia praecox” as a condition whereby a person has homicidal
tendencies appears to be very serious as no husband would still stay close to a
wife who is afflcited of the same. That being the case, as a wife, Lina would
definitely fall short of her marital duty to provide love, care and support to
her husband Leo.
V.
Bernard and Dorothy lived together as common-law spouses although they are
both capacitated to marry. After one year of cohabitation, Dorothy went abroad
to work in Dubai as a hair stylist and regularly sent money to Bernard. With
the money, Bernard bought a lot. For a good price, Bernard sold the lot.
Dorothy came to know about the acquisition and sale of the lot and filed a suit
to nullify the sale because she did not give her consent to the sale.
[a] Will
Dorothy's suit prosper? Decide with reasons.
[b] Suppose
Dorothy was jobless and did not contribute money to the acquisition of the lot
and her efforts consisted mainly in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, is her consent to the sale a prerequisite to its validity? Explain. (2016 Bar Exam Question)
Answer:
[a]The
property regime of Bernard and Dorothy is govered by Article 147 of the Family
Code. As such, pursuant to said provision of law, the “properties acquired by
both parties including their wages are owned by them in common” . A presumption
of joint efforts is also embodied in Article 147. Article 147 further provides
that the consent of both spouses is required for encumbering or disposing of
the properties owned in common by acts inter vivos. It is a mandatory
provision.Here, applying the joint-ownership presumption, the sale made only by
Bernard, an act inter vivos, is void for being violative of Article 147 which
as already said is a mandatory provision of law. Thus, Dorothy’s suit will
prosper.
[b] Yes,
Article 147 provides that when the participation of the other spouse consists
in the care and maintenance of the household, the joint ownership presumption
also applies to him/ her as if he/ she made actual contributions.
VI.
Adolf is a German National who married Marites, a Filipina, in 2016. Using
all the money exclusively owned by Adolf, they purchased a parcel of land in
Boracay and built a beautiful sprawling mansion on a hilly portion of the
world-famous island that afforded them a priceless view of the sunset. Regrettably, no amount of money in the world
could buy love and when both Adolf and Marites realized this, they separated
and filed a petition to nullify their marriage on account of lack of marriage
license which was granted by court. [a] As a consequence of the dissolution of
their marriage, how should the beautiful sprawling mansion on a hilly portion
and the tract of land where it stands, be partitioned? Discuss. [b] If Adolf
wants to return to Germany, is he entitled to get reimbursement of any kind for
his purchase of the properties mentioned in Boracay? Explain.
Answer:
No
Entitlement to Reimbursement under Article 22, for
Violation
of Prohibition on Aliens from Owning Lands
Prohibition
However, Does not Apply to Improvements;
Conjugal
Partnership
Dissolution
“The issue to be resolved is not of first
impression. In In Re: Petition
For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller23
the Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of
purchased parcels of Philippine land
instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller,
against his former Filipina spouse, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that
Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on
the ground of equity where it
is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of
Philippine land24 enshrined under
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that
he “is well aware of the
[above-cited] constitutional prohibition”25
and even asseverated that,
because of such prohibition, he and
respondent registered the subject
properties in the latter’s name.26 Clearly,
petitioner’s actuations showed his
palpable intent to skirt the constitutional
prohibition. On the basis of such
admission, the Court finds no reason why it
should not apply the Muller
ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s
claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the
time-honored principle is that he who
seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with
clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has
done inequity shall not be
accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on
the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful. 27
In this case, petitioner’s statements
regarding the real source of the
funds used to purchase the subject parcels
of land dilute the veracity of his
claims: While admitting to have previously
executed a joint affidavit that
respondent’s personal funds were used to
purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise
claimed that his personal disability funds
were used to acquire the same.
Evidently, these inconsistencies show his
untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner
has come before the Court with unclean
hands, he is now precluded from
seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the
grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established
that equity as a rule will follow the law
and will not permit that
to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done
directly. Surely, a contract that violates
the Constitution and the law is null
and void, vests no rights, creates no
obligations and produces no legal effect
at all. Corollary thereto, under Article
1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner
cannot have the subject properties deeded to
him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
The law will not aid either
party to an illegal contract or agreement;
it leaves the parties where it finds
them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any
rights from an unconstitutional
transaction knowingly entered into.
28 Id. at 82.
29 Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July
11, 2003, 406 SCRA 55, 70. 30 Id. at 69-70, citing Chavez s. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, 307 SCRA 394 (1998). 31 Re: Art. 1412. If the
act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a
criminal offense, the following rules shall
be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both
contracting parties, neither may recover what he
has given by virtue of the contract, or
demand the performance of the other's
undertaking
x x x x 32 Id., citing Rellosa v. Hun, 93
Phil. 827 (1953).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 195670
Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s
claim for reimbursement on
the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As held in
Frenzel v. Catito, a case also
involving a foreigner seeking monetary
reimbursement for money spent on
purchase of Philippine land, the provision
on unjust enrichment does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the
Constitution, to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on
Article 22 of the New Civil
Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of
performance
by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into
possession of something at the expense of
the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him.
The provision is expressed in the maxim:
"MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An
action for recovery of what has
been paid without just cause has been
designated as an accion in rem
verso. This provision does not apply if, as
in this case, the action is
proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto
doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar
the petitioner from filing an
accion in rem verso over the subject
properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the
early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral
or illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times
very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It
is not for his sake, however, that
the objection is ever allowed; but it is
founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the
advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the
plaintiff."34 (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to
an injustice based on his
foreign citizenship.Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates
the rights of citizens and non-citizens in
owning Philippine land. To be sure,
the
constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine
land and not to the improvements built thereon, such as the two
(2)
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to
be co-owned by the parties subject to
partition. Needless to state,
the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony and it is this policy
which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, the assailed
October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24,
201I Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are
AFFIRMED.
-WILLEM BEUMER v. AVELINA AMORES,
G.R. No. 195670, DEC 03, 2012
VII.
A
grandfather made out a donation in favor of his expected progeny- a fetus
inside the womb of his daughter-in-law. [a] Is the donation valid? [b]Discuss
the legal requirements that must be complied with in order that the donation
would have a legal effect.
VIII. 8.1. X, an American, and Y, a Filipina,
got married. If X obtains a divorce decree abroad which capacitates him to
remarry, may X file a petition to dissolve his marriage in the Philippine
courts?
8.2. A and B, both Filipinos, are
spouses. They emigrated to the US, embraced US citizenship and there obtained a
Divorce decree. A, the husband, returns to the Philippines and meets and
falls in love with a Filipino. When he wanted to marry the Filipina, he
presented the divorce decree to the local civil registrar who refused to accept
it and required him to present a court order from a Philippine court which
dissolves his marriage with B before a marriage license will be issued. Is the
Local Civil Registrar correct?
8.3. In question No. 1, if it is
Y, the Filipino spouse, who will file the petition, what legal provision should
she invoke? In which court should she file her petition?
8.4. In
question No. 2, in which court must A file his petition, in the Family Court or
the Regular court? And what procedure will be applied by the court once such
petition is filed?
Answer:
(Note: To be able to answer the question, you must read all of the relevant cases on
the subject.)
Important Features of
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Divorce
Article 26. All
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Gen. Rule- Lex Loci Celebrationes
Exception: nationality principle &
Article 17 on Prohibitive Laws, and Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
- minor, bigamous marriage, mistake in identity,
subsequent void marriage, psychological incapacity, bigamous, incestuous
marriages and contrary to public policy.
- Mixed-Marriage
- RECKONING
POINT. “For purposes of Article 26 therefore, the DETERMINATIVE POINT when
the foreigner is at THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE and not at the time of marriage”[7].
- Dual
Citizen. “In the event that the former Filipino spouse who has been naturalized
as a foreign citizen decides to return to the Philippines and reacquire
Philippine citizenship, the divorce decree will still be recognized here
because at the time of the issuance of the decree of divorce and at the time of
the issuance of the decree of divorce, he or she was not a citizen of the
Philippines”[8].
- May the
foreigner spouse avail of the benefits of the 2nd paragraph of
Article 26?
- Hypotheticals:
1) X, an
American; and Y, a Filipino, got married. If X obtains a divorce decree abroad
which capacities him to remarry. May X file a petition to dissolve his marriage
in the Philippine courts?
2) A and B,
both Filipinos, are spouses. They emigrated to the US, embraced US citizenship
and there obtained a Divorce decree. A, the husband, returns to the Philippines
and meets and falls in love with a Filipino. When he wanted to marry the
Filipina, he presented the divorce decree to the local civil registrar who
refused to accept it and required him to present a court order from a
Philippine court which dissolves his marriage with B before a marriage license
will be issued. Is the Local Civil Registrar correct?
_ Answer: Corpus v Sto Tomas G.R.
No. 186571, August 11, 2010
The alien
spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino
spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective
marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time
of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the
dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.[17] Our
family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to
its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In
both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already
severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van
Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x
x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse].
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly
stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[23] The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his
or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.[24] Without
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as
a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article
17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion
of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally,
an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No
court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the
alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was
correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only
the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign
divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient
basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:
SEC.
48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In
case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final
order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In
case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors
in interest by a subsequent title.
In either
case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.[28] This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.[29] The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by
(1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept
in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a
copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but
failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under
this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for
insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent
with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes
(Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome
a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment,
once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by
the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides.
Considerations
beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree.[34] We
consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and
judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal
capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal
qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a
foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry:
Sec.
1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for
recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments
of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment
of natural children;
(i) naturalization;
and
(j) changes
of name.
x x x x
Sec. 4. Civil
Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their
offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper
entries concerning the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death
register;
(2) Marriage
register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized
but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation,
acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.
But while
the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law
and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decrees registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the
foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted
totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength
alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of
the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
of 1982,[36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both
of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without
the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by
itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry
in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is
not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a
civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that
must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires,
among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;[38] that
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made
parties to the proceedings;[39] and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As
these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case,
we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a
foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign
decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover,
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding[41] by
which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in
terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for
review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October
30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order
the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this
Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
