OBLIGATIONS
AND CONTRACTS
Part
1
Atty. EDUARDO T. REYES, III
Civil Law Review Lecture Series
College of Law
University of San Agustin
(Prelim Lecture
Outline - Part 1)
BOOK IV
Obligations and Contracts
Obligations and Contracts
TITLE I
Obligations
Obligations
Preliminary comments:
1. 3 parts of study
of subject “obligations”
a. Principles
b. kinds of
obligations
c. mode of
extinguishment
2. Classifications of
Obligations
a. Pure or
Conditional (Arts. 1179- 1192)
b. With a Period
(Arts. 1193-1198)
c. Facultative or
Alternative (Arts. 1199-1206)
d. Joint or Solidary
(Arts. 1207-1222)
e. Divisible and
Indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225)
f. With a Penal
Clause (Arts. 1226-1230)
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
General Provisions
Article
1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do.
(n)
Comments:
1.
Requisites
of an OBLIGATION. "An obligation is a juridical necessity to give,
to do or not to do (Art. 1156, Civil Code). The obligation is constituted upon
the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz.: (a) The vinculum Juris
or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by the various
sources of obligations (law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and
quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is the prestation or conduct, required to
be observed (to give, to do or not to do); and (c) the subject-persons who,
viewed from the demandability of the obligation, are the active (obligee) and
the passive (obligor) subjects”.
–
Manuel C. Ubas, Sr. v. Wilson Chan, G.R.
No. 215910, February 06, 2017.
1.1.
Distinctions
among Obligations TO GIVE, TO DO OR NOT TO DO.
Co-relate with Arts. 1266 and 1267 to clearly see
the distinctions.
“Article 1266. The debtor in obligations to do
shall also be released when the prestation becomes legally or physically
impossible without the fault of the obligor.
Void Transactions
Produce No Legal Effect
We grant the
Petition. Indeed, the RTC did not comply with our ruling in Urban Bank when it
refused to restore to petitioner the actual ownership of his club shares on the
mere pretext that these had already been sold by Pefia to his
successor-in-interest. 9 Id. at 289-298. 10 Id. at 330-335. 11 Id. at 337;
Proof of Service of the Resolution of this Court dated 28 June 2016 reiterating
compliance with the requirement to file a separate comment per Resolution dated
23 February 2015. r Resolution 5 G.R. No. 214303 As stated in this Court's
Decision dated 19 October 2011, the RTC was bound to comply with this relevant
directive: 12 b. If the property levied or garnished has been sold on execution
pending appeal and Atty. Magdaleno Pena is the winning bidder or purchaser, he
must fully restore the property to Urban Bank or respondent bank officers, and
if actual restitution of the property is impossible, then he shall pay the full
value of the property at the time of its seizure, with interest; (Emphasis
supplied) There is no factual dispute that Pefia acquired the ACCI shares of
petitioner by virtue of a winning bid in an execution sale that had already
been declared by this Court, with finality, as null and void. In no uncertain
terms, we declared that the "concomitant execution pending appeal is
likewise without any effect. x x x. Consequently, all levies, garnishment and
sales executed pending appeal are declared null and void, with the concomitant
duty of restitution xx x." 13 Void transactions do not produce any
legal or binding effect, and any contract directly resulting from that
illegality is likewise void and inexistent. 14 Therefore, Peña could not have
been a valid transferee of the property. As a consequence, his
successor-in-interest, Vera, could not have validly acquired those shares. 15
The RTC thus erred in refusing to restore the actual ACCI shares to petitioner
on the basis of their void transfer to Vera. Neither was the RTC correct in its
characterization of the actual restitution of the ACCI shares to petitioner as
"impossible." For the obligation to be considered
impossible under Article 1266 of the Civil Code, its physical or legal
impossibility must first be proven. 16 Here, the RTC did not make any finding
on whether or not it was physically impossible to effect the actual restitution
of the property. On the other hand, petitioner correctly points out
that since the shares are movable by nature, the same can be transferred back
to Gonzalez, Jr. by recording the transaction in the stock and transfer book of
the club. 17 12 Urban Bank, Inc. v. Pena, 675 Phil. 474, 584(2011 ). 13 Urban
Bank, Inc. v. Pena, 675 Phil. 474, 555(2011 ). 14 Conjugal Partnership[1]
X x x
Article 1267. When the service has become so
difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties, the
obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part. (n)
Rebus sic stantibus principle;
Article 1267, New Civil Code
To evade responsibility, Comglasco explained that by virtue
of Article 1267, it was released from the lease contract. It cited the existing
global and regional economic crisis for its inability to comply with its
obligation.
Comglasco's position fails to impress because Article 1267
applies only to obligations to do and not to obligations to give. Thus,
in Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[29] the
Court expounded:
Petitioner cannot, however, successfully take refuge in the
said article, since it is applicable only to obligations "to do," and
not to obligations "to give." An
obligation "to do" includes all kinds of work or service; while an
obligation "to give" is a prestation which consists in the delivery
of a movable or an immovable thing in order to create a real right, or for the
use of the recipient, or for its simple possession, or in order to return it to
its owner.
The obligation to pay rentals or deliver
the thing in a contract of lease falls within the prestation "to
give"; xxx
The principle of rebus sic stantibus neither
fits in with the facts of the case. Under this theory, the parties stipulate in
the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions cease to
exist, the contract also ceases to exist. xxx
This article, which enunciates the doctrine of unforeseen
events, is not, however, an absolute application of the principle of rebus
sic stantibus, which would endanger the security of contractual relations.
The parties to the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable
developments. It is therefore only in absolutely exceptional changes of
circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor.[30] [Emphases
and Underscoring supplied]
Considering that Comglasco's obligation of paying rent is
not an obligation to do, it could not rightfully invoke Article 1267 of the
Civil Code. Even so, its position is still without merit as financial struggles
due to an economic crisis is not enough reason for the courts to grant reprieve
from contractual obligations.
In COMGLASCO Corporation/Aguila Glass v. Santos Car
Check Center Corporation,[31] the Court ruled that the
economic crisis which may have caused therein petitioner's financial problems
is not an absolute exceptional change of circumstances that equity demands
assistance for the debtor. It is noteworthy that Comglasco was also the
petitioner in the above-mentioned case, where it also involved Article 1267 to
pre-terminate the lease contract.
Thus, the RTC was correct in ordering Comglasco to pay the
unpaid rentals because the affirmative defense raised by it was insufficient to
free it from its obligations under the lease contract. In addition, Iloilo Jar
is entitled to attorney's fees because it incurred expenses to protect its
interest. X x x “
-ILOILO JAR
CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V. COMGLASCO CORPORATION/AGUILA GLASS, RESPONDENT, [
G.R. No. 219509, January 18, 2017 ]
2.Is
an obligation synonymous with a right? In Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.
et al. v. Miguel V. Campos, et al.[1], it was enunciated that “A
right is a claim or title to an interest in anything whatsoever that is
enforceable by law. An obligation is defined in the Civil Code as a juridical
necessity to give, to do or not to do. For every right enjoyed by any person,
there is a corresponding obligation on the part of another person to respect
such right.”
3.
See Article 1169. On the need for judicial or extrajudicial demand in order to
render the debtor in delay or default. This reinforces the rule that the
obligee may choose to waive the due date because it is a right and not an
obligation. In sum, while a right may be waived, an obligation cannot be waived
by the debtor. (Villegas v. Capistrano, 9 Phil. 416).
4.
Illustration of the rule. The right of legal redemption is a right and not an
obligation. So the redemptioner need not consign the tendered amount in court
because mere tender is enough. This is different in case of a DEBT which is an
obligation. In order to extinguish the obligation through payment, mere tender
is not enough as it must be coupled with consignation. – Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. et al., v. Miguel V. Campos, et al., G.R.
No. 138814, April 16, 2009
Article
1157. Obligations arise from:
(1)
Law;
(2)
Contracts;
(3)
Quasi-contracts;
(4)
Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5)
Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
Comment:
Only the “law” as a source of obligation CREATES a right. All the others
are merely DERIVED from, or RECOGNIZED by law.
Article
1158. Obligations derived from law are not presumed. Only those expressly
determined in this Code or in special laws are demandable, and shall be
regulated by the precepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what has
not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. (1090)
Article
1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. (1091a)
Article
1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contracts shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, of this Book. (n)
Comment:
1.
Is a quasi-contract an “implied contract”?
Article
1161. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed
by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of article 2177, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and
of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. (1092a)
Article
1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, and by special laws.
Comment:
1.
As a rule, In quasi-delict, or tort, there must be NO PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS between the parties because if there is, the violation constitutes as
a breach of contract and not a tort. However, by way of exception, when the act
or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort, independently of
the contract, then there could be a tort notwithstanding the subsistence of a
contract between the parties[2].
CHAPTER 2
Nature and Effect of
Obligations
Article
1163. Every person obliged to give something is also obliged to take care
of it with the proper diligence of a good father of a family, unless the law or
the stipulation of the parties requires another standard of care. (1094a)
Comments:
1.
“Protectiveness” of Pater Familias in Roman Law.
2.
This article refers to an “obligation to give a DETERMINATE OBJECT” because if
INDETERMINATE, genus nunquam perit.
3.
“Ordinary diligence”. Is there a “ fixed standard”? No. In Francisco v.
Chemical Bulk Carriers Inc.,[3] the Court ruled that “to determine
the diligence which must be required of all persons, we use as basis the
ABSTRACT AVERAGE STANDARD corresponding to a normal orderly person.
Article
1164. The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time
the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right
over it until the same has been delivered to him. (1095)
Comments:
1.
Personal right v. Real Right.
- First. We
hold that, as creditors, petitioners do not have such material interest as to
allow them to sue for rescission of the contract of sale. At the outset,
petitioners right against private respondents is only a personal right to
receive payment for the loan; it is not a real right over the lot subject of
the deed of sale.
A
personal right is the power of one person to demand of another, as a definite
passive subject, the fulfillment of a prestation to give, to do, or not to
do. On the other hand, a real right is the power belonging to a person
over a specific thing, without a passive subject individually determined, against
whom such right may be personally exercised.[5] In
this case, while petitioners have an interest in securing payment of the loan
they extended, their right to seek payment does not in any manner attach to a
particular portion of the patrimony of their debtor, Francisco Bareng.”
-
Adorable v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119466, November 25, 1999
2.Pursuant
to the second paragraph of Article 712, thus: “Ownership and other real
rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in
consequence of certain contracts, by tradition”.
IN
CONTRAST. Check out Article 1477 which states that: “The ownership
of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof”. Thus, a sale is only a
“title” but the mode of transmitting ownership “as a consequence of such
contract of sale”, is by tradition or delivery.
-See Articles 429 & 430, NCC on the Doctrine of Self-Help.
Article
1165. When what is to be delivered is a determinate thing, the creditor,
in addition to the right granted him by article 1170, may compel the debtor to
make the delivery.
If
the thing is indeterminate or generic, he may ask that the obligation be
complied with at the expense of the debtor.
If
the obligor delays, or has promised to deliver the same thing to two or more
persons who do not have the same interest, he shall be responsible for any
fortuitous event until he has effected the delivery. (1096)
Comment: The 3rd paragraph enunciates an
instance where an obligor becomes liable for “any fortuitous event”. The
general rule is that no person shall be liable for a fortuitous event.
“Fortuitous
event” has been held to mean as:
“Article
1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art.
1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could
not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous
events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It
is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee
or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility
to foresee the same. [22]
To
constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur: (a) the
cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it
must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or,
if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a
normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury or loss. [23]
The
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who
invokes it.[24] And, in order for a fortuitous
event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. [25]
It has
been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a
loss. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing
damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or
proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt
one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a
person's participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable
to acts of God. [26] (ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA G.R.
NO. 159617 de R.C. SICAM, INC.,- versus - LULU V.
JORGE and CESAR JORGE, August 8, 2007)
-
Article
1166. The obligation to give a determinate thing includes that of
delivering all its accessions and accessories, even though they may not have
been mentioned. (1097a)
Comments:
In
Civil law, with its progeny in Roman law, the rule is that “The accessory
follows the principal”.
“Accessions” – Article
440, New Civil Code provides that: “Article
440. The ownership of property gives the right of accession to everything which
is:
“
produced thereby”, - ex. Fruits, natural increase in area of
land which adjoins a river by accretion
or
which is incorporated – ex. Trees planted,
naturally-growing shrubs on land, buildings, houses
or
attached thereto, - same
either
naturally or artificially”. - Either with human intervention or not.
“Accessories” – Those
which are added for embellishment or better use of the principal thing.
Article
1167. If a person obliged to do something fails to do it, the same shall
be executed at his cost.
This
same rule shall be observed if he does it in contravention of the tenor of the
obligation. Furthermore, it may be decreed that what has been poorly done be
undone. (1098)
Comments:
1.
This appertains to an “obligation to do” as opposed to an obligation
“to
give”.
2.There
could be no legal compulsion to compel the debtor to perform a specific act
because that would amount to involuntary servitude.
3.
Check out Art. 1165 on an obligation to “deliver a determinate thing” (not an
obligation to give), the debtor may be compelled to so deliver.
4.
Remedy: “The activity shall be performed at the debtor’s expense or
cost”.
5.
In the PERFORMANCE of the obligation, the debtor is required to comply with: a. Identity
of obligation. This means that obligations must be complied with precisely.
What is obliged and what is performed must be IDENTICAL. b. Integrity
of obligation. Means that compliance must be complete.
Article
1168. When the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor does what has been
forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense. (1099a)
Article
1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur in delay from the
time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the
fulfillment of their obligation.
However,
the demand by the creditor shall not be necessary in order that delay may
exist:
(1)
When the obligation or the law expressly so declare; or
(2)
When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that
the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is
to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract;
or
(3)
When demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his
power to perform.
In
reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not
comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon
him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the
other begins. (1100a)
Comments:
1.
Rule: Default can only arise upon demand, judicially or extrajudicially.
2. For
exception to apply, “law must EXPRESSLY SO DECLARE”. “In order that
the debtor may be in default, it is necessary that : (a) the obligation be
demandable and already liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; (c) the
creditor requires the performance judicially or extra judicially, unless demand
is not necessary—i.e., when there is an express stipulation to that effect;
where the law so provides then the period is the controlling motive or the
principal inducement for the creation of the obligation; and where demand would
be useless. Moreover, it is not sufficient that the law or obligation fixes a
date for performance; it must further state expressly that after the period lapses,
default will commence.
Thus, it is only when demand to pay is unnecessary in case of the
afore-mentioned circumstances, or when required, such demand is made and
subsequently refused that the mortgage can be considered in default and the mortgagee
obtain the right to file an action to collect the debt or foreclose the
mortgage.
It is ESSENTIAL that the mortgage contract is in accord with Article 1169 of
the Civil Code to expressly declare that: (a) demand shall not be necessary in
order that the mortgagor may be in default; (b) that default shall commence
upon mere failure to pay on maturity date of the loan”[4].
Article
1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages. (1101)
Comments:
1.
Phrase “those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof”
is a catch- all provision.
2.
“Fraud”. “While fraud cannot be presumed, it need not be proved by direct
evidence and can well be inferred from attendant circumstances. Fraud by its
nature is not a thing acceptable of ocular observation or readily demonstrable
physically; it must of necessity be proved in many cases by inferences from
circumstances shown to have been involved in the transaction in question”[5].
Fraud;
Article 1170 of New Civil Code
Jurisprudence
defines "fraud" as the voluntary execution of a wrongful act, or a
willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and
necessarily arise from such act or omission. In its general sense, fraud is
deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts and
omissions and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust,
or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an
undue and unconscientious advantage is taken of another. Fraud is also
described as embracing all multifarious means which human ingenuity can device,
and which are resorted to by one individual to secure an advantage over another
by false suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all surprise,
trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated. 96
Under
Article 1170 of the New Civil Code, those who in the performance of their
obligations are guilty of fraud are liable for damages. The fraud referred to
in this Article is the deliberate and intentional evasion of the normal
fulfillment of obligation. 97 Clearly, this provision is applicable in the case
at bar. It is beyond quibble that Wincorp foisted insidious machinations upon
Ng Wee in order to inveigle the latter into investing a significant amount of
his wealth into a mere empty shell of a corporation.
And
instead of guarding the investments of its clients, Wincorp executed Side
Agreements that virtually exonerated Power Merge of liability to them;
Side
Agreements that the investors could not have been aware of, let alone
authorize.
The
summation of Wincorp's actuations establishes the presence of actionable fraud,
for which the company can be held liable. In Jason vs. People, the Court upheld
the ruling that where one states that the future profits or income of an
enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be
none, or that they will be substantially less than he represents, the
statements constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and
relies on the statement to his injury. 98
Just
as in Jason, it is abundantly clear in the present case that the profits which
Wincorp promised to the investors would not be realized by virtue of the Side
Agreements. The investors were kept in the dark as regards the existence of
these documents, and were instead presented with Confirmation Advices from
Wincorp to give the transactions a semblance of legitimacy, and to convince, if
not deceive, the investors to roll over their
investments
or to part with their money some more.
-
-
HON. MYLYN P. CAYABYAB, in her capacity as the
Municipal Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, and ANGELITO L. DAVID, in his capacity as
the Barangay Chairman of Prado Siongco, Lubao, Pampanga, represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact, EMMANUEL SANTOS, Petitioners, - versus - JAIME C. DIMSON,
represented by his Attorneys-in-Fact, · CARMELA R. DIMSON and Respondents.
IRENE R. DIMSON, G.R. No. 223862, July
10, 2017
Article
1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations.
Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. (1102a)
-This is because of the legal truism that “fraud”
being so abhorrent
Article
1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every
kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by
the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103)
Article
1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the
place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and
2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.
If
the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the
performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be
required. (1104a)
Article
1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires
the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a)
Article
1175. Usurious transactions shall be governed by special laws. (n)
Comments:
1.
Usury is now legally non-existent. Parties may agree on rate of interest.
2.
However, courts have the power to declare an interest rate agreed upon if
unconscionable. Examples: Medel v. CA[6], 66% p.a. or 5.5% per month on a P500,000
loan; Toring v. Spouses Ganzon-Olan[7], 3.81% per month on a P10 Million loan;
Chua v. Timan[8]
3.
Legal interest is only chargeable when:
3.1. There is an agreement that interest will be paid but there is no agreement
as to the rate thereof
3.2. From the time of delay or default in an obligation consisting of payment
of sum of money, even if no interest was agreed upon
3.3. From the time decision in favour of creditor for enforcement of obligation
for sum of money becomes final and executory
3.4. Interest due shall also earn legal interest from the time it has been
judicially or extra judicially demanded.
Article
1176. The receipt of the principal by the creditor without reservation
with respect to the interest, shall give rise to the presumption that said
interest has been paid.
The
receipt of a later installment of a debt without reservation as to prior
installments, shall likewise raise the presumption that such installments have
been paid. (1110a)
Article
1177. The creditors, after having pursued the property in possession of
the debtor to satisfy their claims, may exercise all the rights and bring all
the actions of the latter for the same purpose, save those which are inherent
in his person; they may also impugn the acts which the debtor may have done to
defraud them. (1111)
Comments:
1. Principal
remedies: a. Specific performance (Arts. 1165 to 1167) b.
Substitute Performance (Art. 1165) and c. Equivalent Performance (Arts. 1168
and 1170)
2. Subsidiary
Remedies.
2.1.
Subrogatory action or accion subrogatoria. (Art. 1177)The creditor will file
a case in behalf of the debtor with respect to another obligation that is due
to the debtor.
2.2.
Rescissory action or accion pauliana. (Arts. 1177 & 1381 [3]). – the
creditor will impugn the acts of the debtor that is in fraud of creditors.
3.
DISTINGUISHED from SUBROGATION in Novation per Arts. 1291 (3) & 1300. In
novation, the third person steps into the shoes of the creditor; In Art. 1177,
creditor steps into the shoes of DEBTOR to sue a third person.
4.
Requisites of SUBROGATORY ACTION.
4.1. The creditor has a right of credit against the debtor
4.2. The credit must be due and demandable
4.3. There must be failure of the debtor to collect from third persons (debtor
of the debtor), whether wilfully or through negligence
4.4. The assets in the hands of the debtor are INSUFFICIENT – the creditor
need not bring a separate action to show this exhaustion or insolvency of the
debtor but he can prove the same in the very action to exercise the subrogatory
action; and,
4.5. The right and actions are not purely personal or inherent in the person of
the debtor.
5.
Requisites of RESCISSORY ACTION (Action Pauliana)
5.1. That plaintiff asking for rescission, has a credit prior to the
alienation, although demandable later. (Credit or transaction must PRECEDE the
alienation).
5.2. That debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit
to a third person
5.3. That creditor has NOT OTHER LEGAL REMEDY (subsidiary remedy) to satisfy
his claim, but would benefit by rescission of the conveyance to the third
person
5.4. That the act being impugned is FRAUDULENT
5.5. That third person who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title,
has been an accomplice in the fraud.
6.
3 kinds of RESCISSION under the Civil Code
a. Accion Pauliana
b. Article 1191 (Resolution)
c. Arts. 1380 & 1381- which are based on prejudice or economic damage
7.
“The accion pauliana is an action of LAST RESORT. For so long as the creditor
still has a remedy at law for the enforcement of his claim against the debtor,
the creditor will not have any cause of action against the debtor for
rescission of the contracts entered into by and between the debtor and another
person or persons. Indeed, an accion pauliana presupposes a judgment and the
issuance by the trial court of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the
judgment and the failure of the Sheriff to enforce and satisfy the judgment of
the court[9]”.
Similarly, in Adorable v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119466, November 25, 1999, it was held that:
“Nor can we sustain petitioners claim that the
sale was made in fraud of creditors. Art. 1177 of the Civil Code provides:
The creditors, after
having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their claims,
may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the
same purpose, save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn
the actions which the debtor may have done to defraud them. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, the following successive measures must be
taken by a creditor before he may bring an action for rescission of an
allegedly fraudulent sale: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor
through levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the
debtor, except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the
rights and actions of the debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek
rescission of the contracts executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana). Without availing
of the first and second remedies, i.e., exhausting
the properties of the debtor or subrogating themselves in Francisco Barengs
transmissible rights and actions, petitioners simply undertook the third
measure and filed an action for annulment of the sale. This cannot be
done.
Indeed, an action for rescission is a subsidiary
remedy; it cannot be instituted except when the party suffering damage has no
other legal means to obtain reparation for the same.[6] Thus,
Art. 1380 of the Civil Code provides:
The following contracts are
rescissible:
. . . .
(3) Those undertaken
in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them;
Petitioners have not shown
that they have no other means of enforcing their credit. As the Court of
Appeals pointed out in its decision:
In this case,
plaintiffs-appellants had not even commenced an action against
defendants-appellees Bareng for the collection of the alleged
indebtedness. Plaintiffs-appellants had not even tried to exhaust the
property of defendants-appellees Bareng. Plaintiffs-appellants, in seeking
for the rescission of the contracts of sale entered into between defendants-appellees,
failed to show and prove that defendants-appellees Bareng had no other
property, either at the time of the sale or at the time this action was filed,
out of which they could have collected this (sic) debts.”
Article
1178. Subject to the laws, all rights acquired in virtue of an obligation
are transmissible, if there has been no stipulation to the contrary. (1112)
CHAPTER 3
Different Kinds of Obligations
Different Kinds of Obligations
SECTION 1
Pure and Conditional Obligations
Pure and Conditional Obligations
Article
1179. Every obligation whose performance does not depend upon a future or
uncertain event, or upon a past event unknown to the parties, is demandable at
once.
Every
obligation which contains a resolutory condition shall also be demandable,
without prejudice to the effects of the happening of the event. (1113)
Article
1180. When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do
so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the
provisions of article 1197. (n)
Article
1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the
happening of the event which constitutes the condition. (1114)
Article
1182. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of
the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be void. If it depends upon chance
or upon the will of a third person, the obligation shall take effect in
conformity with the provisions of this Code. (1115)
Article
1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public
policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends
upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is not
affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid.
The
condition not to do an impossible thing shall be considered as not having been
agreed upon. (1116a)
Comments:
1.
Here, the effect of an impossible, etc. condition shall be to ANNUL the
obligation which depends upon them. Compare with Articles 727 & 873, NCC.
Article
1184. The condition that some event happen at a determinate time shall
extinguish the obligation as soon as the time expires or if it has become
indubitable that the event will not take place. (1117)
Article
1185. The condition that some event will not happen at a determinate time
shall render the obligation effective from the moment the time indicated has
elapsed, or if it has become evident that the event cannot occur.
If
no time has been fixed, the condition shall be deemed fulfilled at such time as
may have probably been contemplated, bearing in mind the nature of the
obligation. (1118)
Comments:
1.
Positive obligation (Art 1184). Obligation is EXTINGUISHED : a. When time
expires and b. It becomes indubitable that the event will not take place
2.
Negative obligation (Art. 1185). Obligation BECOMES EFFECTIVE: a. When time
elapses and b. It is evident that the event will not occur.
Article
1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment.
This is a
folktale involving an oral contract which is subject to a condition. You may
treat it as hearsay or not. But the wily lawyer here was able to OUTWIT the
devil. Here’s how-
There
once was a poor widow woman, and she had three children: two sons and a daughter.
She loved her children very much but because she was impoverished, she could
hardly send them to school.
One
day, the devil himself dropped by to offer her a loan if she would mortgage her
very soul. She agreed to pay with her soul after twenty years.
With
the money, the poor widow was able to pay for the schooling of her children and
so the first son became a priest, the second one a doctor and the youngest
female, became a lawyer.
Twenty
years fast forward, the poor widow woman lay in bed dying. It was the first
son, the priest who was by her bedside. Suddenly, thunder and lightning roared
and the devil appeared. The priest-son blocked the devil, went down on his
knees and begged for extension. The devil yielded and granted the poor widow a year
of extension.
A
year after, the devil came back to foreclose on his mortgage. This time, the
son-doctor begged for another extension and perhaps the devil with his devilish
mind was thinking of needing the services of the doctor in the future and so he
allowed a last extension.
Finally,
on the year after, the devil came back. He found the lawyer-daughter beside her
mother, the poor widow. The devil told her, that she cannot use legalistic
acrobatics on him. Indeed, according to the lawyer-daughter, I will not ask for
any extension. However, only one small thing, before the devil will take their
mother, she asked if they could wait for his brothers to arrive and it will not
be until the stub of candle BURSN AWAY. The devil stared hard at the candle and
it was a miniscule stub which would burn away in no time. So he agreed. The
daughter-lawyer then, poker-faced and unperturbed, stood up, approached the
burning candle and blew it off. Since the candle will never burn away anymore,
the devil, dumbfounded, scratched his head and walked away.[2]
Article
1187. The effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition
has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation. Nevertheless, when the obligation imposes reciprocal prestations
upon the parties, the fruits and interests during the pendency of the condition
shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated. If the obligation is
unilateral, the debtor shall appropriate the fruits and interests received,
unless from the nature and circumstances of the obligation it should be
inferred that the intention of the person constituting the same was different.
In
obligations to do and not to do, the courts shall determine, in each case, the
retroactive effect of the condition that has been complied with. (1120)
Comment:
Rule:
In reciprocal obligations- mutual compensation.
This
rule applies only to consensual contract not to real contracts such as deposit
or commodatum which are perfected only by delivery.
Exception:
a. Unilateral obligations- debtor gets the fruts
Article
1188. The creditor may, before the fulfillment of the condition, bring the
appropriate actions for the preservation of his right.
The
debtor may recover what during the same time he has paid by mistake in case of
a suspensive condition. (1121a)
Article
1189. When the conditions have been imposed with the intention of
suspending the efficacy of an obligation to give, the following rules shall be
observed in case of the improvement, loss or deterioration of the thing during
the pendency of the condition:
(1)
If the thing is lost without the fault of the debtor, the obligation shall be
extinguished;
(2)
If the thing is lost through the fault of the debtor, he shall be obliged to pay
damages; it is understood that the thing is lost when it perishes, or goes out
of commerce, or disappears in such a way that its existence is unknown or it
cannot be recovered;
(3)
When the thing deteriorates without the fault of the debtor, the impairment is
to be borne by the creditor;
(4)
If it deteriorates through the fault of the debtor, the creditor may choose
between the rescission of the obligation and its fulfillment, with indemnity
for damages in either case;
(5)
If the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the improvement shall inure
to the benefit of the creditor;
(6)
If it is improved at the expense of the debtor, he shall have no other right
than that granted to the usufructuary. (1122)
Article
1190. When the conditions have for their purpose the extinguishment of an
obligation to give, the parties, upon the fulfillment of said conditions, shall
return to each other what they have received.
In
case of the loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing, the provisions
which, with respect to the debtor, are laid down in the preceding article shall
be applied to the party who is bound to return.
As
for the obligations to do and not to do, the provisions of the second paragraph
of article 1187 shall be observed as regards the effect of the extinguishment
of the obligation. (1123)
Article
1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in
case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The
injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the
obligation, with the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek
rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible.
The
court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause
authorizing the fixing of a period.
This
is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have
acquired the thing, in accordance with articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage
Law. (1124)
Comments:
1.
“reciprocal obligations” meaning, must have arisen from the same cause.
2.As
a rule, Article 1191 refers to a JUDICIAL RESCISSION ( properly RESOLUTION).
The default should be remedied via a court action. This can be
judged from 3rd paragraph of Art. 1191 which mentions that
“ the court shall decree the rescission x x x”.
3.
However, “there is nothing in Article 1191 which prohibits the parties from
entering into an agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would
cause its cancellation even without court intervention[10]”.
Article
1192. In case both parties have committed a breach of the obligation, the
liability of the first infractor shall be equitably tempered by the courts. If
it cannot be determined which of the parties first violated the contract, the
same shall be deemed extinguished, and each shall bear his own damages. (n)
SECTION 2
Obligations with a
Period
Article
1193. Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has been fixed,
shall be demandable only when that day comes.
Obligations
with a resolutory period take effect at once, but terminate upon arrival of the
day certain.
A
day certain is understood to be that which must necessarily come, although it
may not be known when.
If
the uncertainty consists in whether the day will come or not, the obligation is
conditional, and it shall be regulated by the rules of the preceding Section.
(1125a)
Article
1194. In case of loss, deterioration or improvement of the thing before
the arrival of the day certain, the rules in article 1189 shall be observed.
(n)
Article
1195. Anything paid or delivered before the arrival of the period, the
obligor being unaware of the period or believing that the obligation has become
due and demandable, may be recovered, with the fruits and interests. (1126a)
Article
1196. Whenever in an obligation a period is designated, it is presumed to
have been established for the benefit of both the creditor and the debtor,
unless from the tenor of the same or other circumstances it should appear that
the period has been established in favor of one or of the other.
Comment:
In
a contract of lease, could it be legally possible that the term of lease shall
be one year at the option of the lessee only and not the lessor?
Contract
of Lease; Provisions of a Contract are Presumed to be for the Benefit of Both
Parties
In a contract of lease, one of the
parties binds himself to give to
another the enjoyment or use of a thing
for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. 19
Being a consensual contract, a lease is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing and the cause or consideration which are to
constitute the contract. Thereafter, the lessor is obliged to deliver the thing
which is the object of the contract in such a condition as to render it fit for
the use intended, and the lessee is obliged to use the thing leased as a
diligent father of a family, devoting it to the use stipulated or that which
may be inferred from the nature of the thing leased.21
x x x
In
a reciprocal contract like a lease, the period must be deemed to have been
agreed upon for the benefit of both parties, absent language showing that the
term was deliberately set for the benefit of the lessee or lessor alone. 37 The
continuance, effectivity, and fulfillment of a contract of lease cannot be made
to depend exclusively upon the free and uncontrolled choice of the lessee.38
Mutuality does not obtain in such a contract of lease and no equality exists between the lessor and the lessee since the
life of the contract would be dictated solely by the lessee. 39
-
HILLTOP
MARKET FISH VENDORS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, - versus - G.R. No. 188057,
HON. BRAULIO YARANON, City Mayor, Bagui~ City, HON. GALO WEYGAN, City Councilor
and Chairman Anti-Vice Coordinating Task Force, and the Promulgated: CITY
GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, 12 July 2017
Article
1197. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its nature and the
circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix
the duration thereof.
The
courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will
of the debtor.
In
every case, the courts shall determine such period as may under the
circumstances have been probably contemplated by the parties. Once fixed by the
courts, the period cannot be changed by them. (1128a)
Article
1198. The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period:
(1)
When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he
gives a guaranty or security for the debt;
(2)
When he does not furnish to the creditor the guaranties or securities which he
has promised;
(3)
When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their
establishment, and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he
immediately gives new ones equally satisfactory;
(4)
When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the
creditor agreed to the period;
(5)
When the debtor attempts to abscond. (1129a)
Comment:
1. Under para. 1, “insolvency” refers to mere failure to pay and not technical
insolvency.
SECTION 3
Alternative Obligations
Alternative Obligations
ARTICLE
1199. A person alternatively bound by different prestations shall completely
perform one of them.
The
creditor cannot be compelled to receive part of one and part of the other
undertaking. (1131)
Article
1200. The right of choice belongs to the debtor, unless it has been
expressly granted to the creditor.
The
debtor shall have no right to choose those prestations which are impossible,
unlawful or which could not have been the object of the obligation. (1132)
Article
1201. The choice shall produce no effect except from the time it has been
communicated. (1133)
Article
1202. The debtor shall lose the right of choice when among the prestations
whereby he is alternatively bound, only one is practicable. (1134)
Article
1203. If through the creditor's acts the debtor cannot make a choice
according to the terms of the obligation, the latter may rescind the contract
with damages. (n)
Article
1204. The creditor shall have a right to indemnity for damages when,
through the fault of the debtor, all the things which are alternatively the
object of the obligation have been lost, or the compliance of the obligation
has become impossible.
The
indemnity shall be fixed taking as a basis the value of the last thing which
disappeared, or that of the service which last became impossible.
Damages
other than the value of the last thing or service may also be awarded. (1135a)
Article
1205. When the choice has been expressly given to the creditor, the
obligation shall cease to be alternative from the day when the selection has
been communicated to the debtor.
Until
then the responsibility of the debtor shall be governed by the following rules:
(1)
If one of the things is lost through a fortuitous event, he shall perform the
obligation by delivering that which the creditor should choose from among the
remainder, or that which remains if only one subsists;
(2)
If the loss of one of the things occurs through the fault of the debtor, the
creditor may claim any of those subsisting, or the price of that which, through
the fault of the former, has disappeared, with a right to damages;
(3)
If all the things are lost through the fault of the debtor, the choice by the
creditor shall fall upon the price of any one of them, also with indemnity for
damages.
The
same rules shall be applied to obligations to do or not to do in case one, some
or all of the prestations should become impossible. (1136a)
Article
1206. When only one prestation has been agreed upon, but the obligor may
render another in substitution, the obligation is called facultative.
The
loss or deterioration of the thing intended as a substitute, through the
negligence of the obligor, does not render him liable. But once the
substitution has been made, the obligor is liable for the loss of the
substitute on account of his delay, negligence or fraud. (n)
SECTION 4
Joint and Solidary Obligations
Joint and Solidary Obligations
Article
1207. The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors
in one and the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a
right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire
compliance with the prestation. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation
requires solidarity. (1137a)
Article
1208. If from the law, or the nature or the wording of the obligations to
which the preceding article refers the contrary does not appear, the credit or
debt shall be presumed to be divided into as many shares as there are creditors
or debtors, the credits or debts being considered distinct from one another,
subject to the Rules of Court governing the multiplicity of suits. (1138a)
-Gen Rule: Obligation is “joint”
Exception: When the law itself or the obligation
provides explicitly or implicitly that the obligation is “Solidary”
Ex.
1.
Joint-Tort-feasors
2. Liability for
violation of Arts. 19, 20, 21, 22 of New Civl; Code
3. Article
927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate, they shall be
solidarily liable for the loss or destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed,
even though only one of them should have been negligent.
- Note this down as one of the
instances under the Civil Code where the law itself considers the obligation as
solidary.
Article
1209. If the division is impossible, the right of the creditors may be
prejudiced only by their collective acts, and the debt can be enforced only by
proceeding against all the debtors. If one of the latter should be insolvent,
the others shall not be liable for his share. (1139)
Article
1210. The indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise
to solidarity. Nor does solidarity of itself imply indivisibility. (n)
Article
1211. Solidarity may exist although the creditors and the debtors may not
be bound in the same manner and by the same periods and conditions. (1140)
Article
1212. Each one of the solidary creditors may do whatever may be useful to
the others, but not anything which may be prejudicial to the latter. (1141a)
Article
1213. A solidary creditor cannot assign his rights without the consent of
the others. (n)
Article
1214. The debtor may pay any one of the solidary creditors; but if any
demand, judicial or extrajudicial, has been made by one of them, payment should
be made to him. (1142a)
Article
1215. Novation, compensation, confusion or remission of the debt, made by
any of the solidary creditors or with any of the solidary debtors, shall
extinguish the obligation, without prejudice to the provisions of article 1219.
The
creditor who may have executed any of these acts, as well as he who collects
the debt, shall be liable to the others for the share in the obligation
corresponding to them. (1143)
Article
1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or
some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall
not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the
others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected. (1144a)
Article
1217. Payment made by one of the solidary debtors extinguishes the
obligation. If two or more solidary debtors offer to pay, the creditor may choose
which offer to accept.
He
who made the payment may claim from his co-debtors only the share which
corresponds to each, with the interest for the payment already made. If the
payment is made before the debt is due, no interest for the intervening period
may be demanded.
When
one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his
share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his
co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. (1145a)
Article
1218. Payment by a solidary debtor shall not entitle him to reimbursement
from his co-debtors if such payment is made after the obligation has prescribed
or become illegal. (n)
Article
1219. The remission made by the creditor of the share which affects one of
the solidary debtors does not release the latter from his responsibility
towards the co-debtors, in case the debt had been totally paid by anyone of
them before the remission was effected. (1146a)
Article
1220. The remission of the whole obligation, obtained by one of the
solidary debtors, does not entitle him to reimbursement from his co-debtors.
(n)
Article
1221. If the thing has been lost or if the prestation has become
impossible without the fault of the solidary debtors, the obligation shall be
extinguished.
If
there was fault on the part of any one of them, all shall be responsible to the
creditor, for the price and the payment of damages and interest, without
prejudice to their action against the guilty or negligent debtor.
If
through a fortuitous event, the thing is lost or the performance has become
impossible after one of the solidary debtors has incurred in delay through the
judicial or extrajudicial demand upon him by the creditor, the provisions of
the preceding paragraph shall apply. (1147a)
Article
1222. A solidary debtor may, in actions filed by the creditor, avail
himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of the obligation and
of those which are personal to him, or pertain to his own share. With respect
to those which personally belong to the others, he may avail himself thereof
only as regards that part of the debt for which the latter are responsible.
(1148a)
SECTION 5
Divisible and Indivisible Obligations
Divisible and Indivisible Obligations
Article
1223. The divisibility or indivisibility of the things that are the object
of obligations in which there is only one debtor and only one creditor does not
alter or modify the provisions of Chapter 2 of this Title. (1149)
Article
1224. A joint indivisible obligation gives rise to indemnity for damages
from the time anyone of the debtors does not comply with his undertaking. The
debtors who may have been ready to fulfill their promises shall not contribute
to the indemnity beyond the corresponding portion of the price of the thing or
of the value of the service in which the obligation consists. (1150)
Article
1225. For the purposes of the preceding articles, obligations to give
definite things and those which are not susceptible of partial performance
shall be deemed to be indivisible.
When
the obligation has for its object the execution of a certain number of days of
work, the accomplishment of work by metrical units, or analogous things which
by their nature are susceptible of partial performance, it shall be divisible.
However,
even though the object or service may be physically divisible, an obligation is
indivisible if so provided by law or intended by the parties.
In
obligations not to do, divisibility or indivisibility shall be determined by
the character of the prestation in each particular case. (1151a)
SECTION 6
Obligations with a Penal Clause
Obligations with a Penal Clause
Article
1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the
indemnity for damages and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if
there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless,
damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of
fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The
penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the
provisions of this Code. (1152a)
Article
1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the
obligation by paying the penalty, save in the case where this right has been
expressly reserved for him. Neither can the creditor demand the fulfillment of
the obligation and the satisfaction of the penalty at the same time, unless
this right has been clearly granted him. However, if after the creditor has
decided to require the fulfillment of the obligation, the performance thereof
should become impossible without his fault, the penalty may be enforced.
(1153a)
Article
1228. Proof of actual damages suffered by the creditor is not necessary in
order that the penalty may be demanded. (n)
Article
1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if
there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if
it is iniquitous or unconscionable. (1154a)
Article
1230. The nullity of the penal clause does not carry with it that of the principal
obligation.
The
nullity of the principal obligation carries with it that of the penal clause.
(1155)
Comments:
- Read Teresita I.
Buenaventura v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 167082, August
03, 2016
1. Verily,a
penal clause is an accessory undertaking attached to a principal obligation. It
has for its purposes, firstly, to provide for liquidated damages; and secondly,
to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the threat of greater
responsibility in the event of breach of obligation. Under Article 1226 of the
Civil Code, a penal clause is a substitute indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of non-compliance, unless there is a stipulation
to the contrary.
2. Difference between
“stipulated monetary interest v. Stipulated penalty charge or “compensatory
interest”.
[4] Maybank
Philippines, Inc. v. Spouses Oscar and Nenita Tarrosa, G.R. No. 213014, October
14, 2015
[5] See Republic of
the Philippines v. Mega Pacific e Solutions, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 184666, June
27, 2016
[10] Heirs of the Late Justice J.B.L.
Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 282 (2000); Pangilinan v. Court of Appeals,
279 SCRA 590 (1997); Jison v. Court of Appeals, 164 SCRA 339
