Unlawful Detainer

CIVIL LAW (PROPERTY)

LEGAL TRIMMINGS OF “TOLERANCE” IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES,

AND LENGTH OF DISPOSSESSION AS GAUGE FOR DISTINCTION BETWEEN

FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES VERSUS

ACCION PUBLICIANA

For: University of San Agustin School of Law

General Luna Street, Iloilo City

SY 2016-2017, 1^st Semester

By: Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III

i.Foreword.

            This article is a humble attempt at un-tangling the legal cobwebs that the many Supreme Court decisions seem to have created on issues of possession based on “tolerance”, and the seeming “twilight zone” in terms of jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC anent and surrounding these issues.

            More importantly, this article is a lecture intended for the author’s ebullient students in Property for the semester above-indicated.     

I.“TOLERANCE” conundrum

Generally, in accordance with BP 129, jurisdiction over cases “involving title to, or possession over real property” falls with the RTC.

However, by way of exception, Republic Act 7691 which amended BP 129, confers jurisdiction to MTCs in cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Startlingly, such cases also “involve possession over real property”.

But what is the rationale for such exception?

It is the issue of “material or physical possession” which must be resolved with dispatch in order to avert that dire scenario where a person might take the law into his own hands just so he could get back possession of the property. Thus explains the reason why forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases should be cognizable by the MTC and should be decided through mere summary procedure where the case is decided minus testimonies in open court, but only via submission of position papers.

There seems to be no problem when the dispossession is quite fresh because in any case, the one-year period for filing a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case commences from the employment of force, intimidation, strategy or stealth and date of last demand, respectively.

The trouble starts to rear its ugly head when the complaint avers that the defendant had been in possession which had lasted for a very long period of time, like more than twenty (20) years, for instance, and then the plaintiff just sends a demand to vacate and within a year, files the unlawful detainer case.

On this account, doctrinal jurisprudence[1] stresses that “tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession sought to be recovered”. Because if the initial entry was by FISTS, then it had long prescribed. Thus-

“To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained in Sarona v. Villegas:

But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.

If right at the incipiency defendants possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.

x x x x

A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word tolerance confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress in theinferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable.Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action. (Underlining supplied)

            Here, it is therefore primordial that the nature of the initial entry into the land should be ascertained. If it was by FISTS, then the prescriptive period for a forcible entry case ipso jure starts to run. If the 1- year period has lapsed, it could not be cured by the expedient of the plaintiff sending a demand to vacate and file an unlawful detainer case within one year.

II. When the Dispute involving Possession

Is Anchored on Ownership

There is a bedeviling issue however as to which action should be filed and which court has jurisdiction over a case which seeks to recover possession when both parties likewise claim rights of ownership.

Of course, the dispute should be resolved by determining whether the possession involved is mere material or physical possession, or a better right to possession which should be enforced through an accion publiciana case.

The litmus test to determine whether possession is DE FACTO, MATERIAL, or PHYSICAL POSSESSION as distinguished from DE JURE POSSESSION is the length of time of DISPOSSESSION.

Thus, in a 2014 case law, the settled rule was enunciated as follows: “Accordingly, what determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of dispossession. If the dispossession has not lasted for more than a year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the MTC acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession lasted for more than a year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper RTC  x x x”[2]. 

In an earlier 2009 case, it was likewise held that “Moreover, the complaint was filed (August 6, 2001) within one year from the demand to vacate was made (March 2, 2001). Petitioners dispossession had thus not lasted for more than one year to justify resort to the remedy of accion publiciana”[3].

            And this is further consistent with an even earlier 2008 ruling involving a case with a parallel factual situation, whereby it was ruled that “En passant, the Court notes that respondents’ cause of action accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The dispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four months thereafter or on February 7, 1997. Respondents’ exclusion from the property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of accion publiciana”[4].

            Thus, even when the possession involved is anchored on ownership, it is not correct to posit that it is no longer possession de facto but is already possession de jure. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence teaches that “even a registered owner of land must follow the conditions imposed by law in order that the action to recover would prosper”. In effect, it is humbly submitted that there is no twilight zone where the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over cases for accion publiciana (where the assessed value of course of the real property complies with the Php50,000.00 in the Metropolitan areas and Php20,000.00 in other areas requirement) that it can choose to take cognizance of a case involving dispossession which had not lasted for more than a year, on the chimera that the possession involved is “anchored on ownership”, because existing jurisprudence is visceral in ejectment cases as it takes into account all cases whether anchored on ownership or not, as the only point of reference is the length of dispossession, and nothing else.

The rationale for the doctrinal threshold of “more or less than one-year length of time of dispossession” was doctrinally explained in a 2012 case law[5], thus:

“One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is “accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court.”^[6][14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.^[7][15]

X x x

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,^[8][23] which reads thus:

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.

In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven.”

            Inevitably, it is the rule that when the dispossession has not lasted for more than a year, the proper action should be forcible entry or unlawful detainer because if the dispossession is fresh and therefore urgent, the possession involved is DE FACTO, PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL POSSESSION only.

            Necessarily, it follows that when the dispossession had exceeded one year, then the possession involved is no longer mere physical, material or de facto possession but DE JURE or REAL RIGHT OF POSSESSION. It is then and only then that an accion publiciana case may be deemed proper. “The accion publiciana is intended for the recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding before a Court of First Instance (now RTC) (Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6. Phil 286); and must be brought within a period of ten years otherwise the real right of possession is lost. (See Art. 555, No. 4). The issue is not possession de facto but possession de jure.[9]”

            In the end, the moral of the story is that a torrens title is not an absolute guarantee that the registered owner can evict any person in actual possession of the property.

            He must take into account and follow all the nuances and niceties of the different ejectment actions in order that his case can succeed.

---

[1] Sps. Valdez v. the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132424, May 2, 2006 (citations omitted)

[2] See Sergio R. Mendoza v. Mun. of Pulila, Bulacan etc., G.R. No. 200244, September 15, 2014

[3] Sps. Lydia Flores Cruz et al v. Spouses Leonardo and Iluminada Goil-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009

[4] Fernando Geonzon Vda. De Barrera and Johnny Oco, Jr. v. Heirs of Vicente Legaspi, represented by Pedro Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, September 12, 2008

[5] Ruben Corpuz rep by Atty In Fact  Wenfreda C. Agullana v. Sps. Hilarion Agustin and Justa Agustin, GR No. 183822,  January 18, 2012

^[6][14] Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium I (7^th rev. ed. 2007).

^[7][15] David v. Cordova, 502 Phil. 626 (2005).

[8][23] G.R. No. 177637, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 461.

[9] See p. 102 Civil Code of the Philippines by Paras Book II, Fourteenth Edition 1999

Welcome!!!

We welcome Attorneys John Leo Solinap and Sheila Mae Asorio, both Augustinian lawyers, who recently joined us to lend their legal knowledge and talent to the Law Firm and its clients.

This year, we also welcome the addition of Realyn Sarabia and Jenelex Palsario to our Staff.

We look forward to growing and hurdling more milestones with you.

Lecture 2

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I LECTURE SERIES

Articles 37 to 51, New Civil Code

            Articles 1 to 26, Family Code of the Philippines

For: University of San Agustin School of Law

General Luna Street, Iloilo City

SY 2016-2017, 1^st Semester

By: Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III

Article 37.

II. Juridical Capacity v. Capacity to Act

Juridical Capacity- the FITNESS to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.

Capacity to Act- which is the POWER to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.

Restrictions on Capacity to Act.

1)     Minority

2)    Insanity or imbecility

3)    The state of being a deaf-mute;

4)   Prodigality; and,

5)    Civil Interdiction

Circumstances that MODIFY or LIMIT Capacity to Act

1)     Age

2)    Insanity

3)    Imbecility

4)   The state of being a deaf-mute

5)    Penalty

6)   Prodigality

7)    Family relations

8)   Alienage

9)   Absence

10) Insolvency; and

11)  Trusteeship

PERSONS

Natural Persons. Birth determines personality.

Exception: Presumptive personality. A conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it provided it be born alive.

For civil purposes, the fetus (with intra-uterine life of at least seven months) is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb.

However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months- it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.

BAR QUESTION (1999)- A donation is made in favor of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. Is the donation valid? Discuss.

-         Quimiguing v. Icao, 34 SCRA 132- Suit was filed for support of an unborn child which resulted from seduction.

NEW FAMILY CODE (R.A. No. 6809, December 18, 1989).

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with the law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

-        No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were.”(Justice Anthony Kennedy (On Decision upholding same-sex marriage in the United States).

·       Marriage as a civil contract

·       Petitioner filed for annulment of marriage on ground of “failure of consideration” because he only wanted to give a name to the child in respondent’s womb, which however was never born.

·        “It is not possible to have a marriage for one purpose and no marriage at all for other purposes, for marriage is not only a contract but a status and a kind of fealty to the State as well x x x”.[1]

·       Thus, rules governing rescission of civil contracts do not obtain in the annulment of marriage conundrum

·       The reservations kept in the deep recesses of the heart of the spouse at the time of entering into marriage are of no consequence for as long as he knows that what he is entering into is a  marriage

·       Art. 1351, NCC- “The particular motives of the parties in entering into a contract are different from the cause thereof”.

·       Marriage in jest v. Marriage for financial consideration

·       Republic v. Albios[2]. “limited-purpose marriage”. Marriage for convenience. For Immigration purposes

·       “Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right to marital privacy allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship. Money, status and title provided that they comply with all the legal requisites are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.    

Marriage is insulated against:

Ø Discriminatory policies such as: (1)terminating a female employee who contracts marriage (PT&T v. NLRC, 272 SCRA 596) (2) PAL cases on female flight attendants becoming pregnant

Ø Jealous wife rummages through office files of husband and discovers damning evidence of infidelity. (Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, 253SCRA 699).

Ø BUT, is there something in the Constitution that prohibits Absolute divorce?

Ø In Sta. Barbara, California, USA, a website was put-up for struggling college students who can barely make it through college where they could post their profiles and find a “sugar-daddy” who will finance their tuition in exchange for companionship and sex.

Ø “States that attempt to close that loophole fail, says Scott Cunningham, an Economics professor at Baylor University in Texas who has studied prostitution markets. Proposed legislation against the practice might, he says, inadvertently prohibit marriage- which could, after all, be defined as intercourse for financial support”[3].

Article 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present:

1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and

2)Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

Article 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

1)Authority of the solemnizing officer;

2)A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

3)A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Article 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

            A defect in any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

            An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

Article 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.

Article 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to personally appear before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer.

            In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which facts shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.

Article 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction;

x x x”

-        Marriage must be between male and female. This is a statutory requirement, not Constitutional

-        Effect of Sex Change

-        Silverio v. Republic[4] doctrine v. Republic v. Cagandahan[5] ruling

Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)

·       Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ 06-1088, July 19, 1996

·       “Where judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.”

·       “Just an obiter-dictum. Non observance of this rule is not a mere irregularity because it generally makes the marriage void”.

Article 22. The marriage certificate, x x x”

  

-Proof of Marriage. Circado-Belison v. Circado, Jr. (2015)[6]

-Contrato Matrimonial issued by Church of Filipino Independiente, Sec. 20, Rule 132- Is a private document

-Earlier baptismal certificate v. Later Certificate of Marriage from Local Civil Registrar

Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

            Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Gen. Rule- Lex Loci Celebrationes 

 Exception: nationality principle & Article 17 on Prohibitive Laws, and Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

- minor, bigamous marriage, mistake in identity, subsequent void marriage, psychological incapacity, bigamous, incestuous marriages and contrary to public policy.

-        Mixed-Marriage

-        RECKONING POINT. “For purposes of Article 26 therefore, the DETERMINATIVE POINT when the foreigner is at THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE and not at the time of marriage”[7].

-        Dual Citizen. “In the event that the former Filipino spouse who has been naturalized as a foreign citizen decides to return to the Philippines and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the divorce decree will still be recognized here because at the time of the issuance of the decree of divorce and at the time of the issuance of the decree of divorce, he or she was not a citizen of the Philippines”[8].

-        May the foreigner spouse avail of the benefits of the 2^nd paragraph of Article 26?

-        Hypotheticals:

1)     X, an American; and Y, a Filipino, got married. If X obtains a divorce decree abroad which capacities him to remarry. May X file a petition to dissolve his marriage in the Philippine courts?

2)    A and B, both Filipinos, are spouses. They emigrated to the US, embraced US citizenship and there obtained a Divorce decree.  A, the husband, returns to the Philippines and meets and falls in love with a Filipino. When he wanted to marry the Filipina, he presented the divorce decree to the local civil registrar who refused to accept it and required him to present a court order from a Philippine court which dissolves his marriage with B before a marriage license will be issued. Is the Local Civil Registrar correct?

3)    In question No. 1, if it is Y, the Filipino spouse, who will file the petition, what legal provision should she invoke? In which court should she file her petition?

4)   In question No. 2, where will A file his petition? And what procedure will be applied by the court once such petition is filed?  

-         Read: Corpus v. Sto. Tomas[9], Bayot v. Court of Appeals[10], Roehr v. Rodriguez[11].

---

[1] Prof. Sta. Maria, pp. 99-100 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS 2015 citing Bove v. Pinciotti, 46 Pa D & C [C.P. 1942])

[2] G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013

[3] “Paying for College, A teaspoon of sugar”, See pp. 38-39, The Economist June 20^th 2015

[4] G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007

[5] G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

[6] G.R. No. 185374, March 11, 2015

[7] P. 181, Prof. Sta Maria, Id. , citing Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005

[8] Prof. Sta. Maria, Ibid.

[9] G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

[10] G.R. No. 155635/ 163979, November 7, 2008

[11] G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I LECTURE SERIES

Articles 1 to 36, New Civil Code

For: University of San Agustin School of Law

General Luna Street, Iloilo City

SY 2016-2017, 1^st Semester

By: Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III

Article 1. This Act shall be known as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. 

Civil Law v. Common Law system

Civil Law- Mass of precepts that determine or regulate relations among members of family, society for the protection of private interests.

·       Written law as basis for civil law

·       Justice Ginsburg of US Supreme Court opines that : “there is no such thing as stare decisis in civil law regimes”. Courts look not to prior decisions as precedents but to the statute itself with its inexorably one interpretation. (No alternative interpretation.)

·       “Although Holmes once famously said that the law is not a great brooding omnipresence waiting to be discovered, in European countries, that is exactly the case. There can only be one correct interpretation, and any opinion by a member of the court disagreeing with the proper conclusion would be seen not as an alternative interpretation but as an error. If the interpretation of the court wreaks hardship, then the solution lies in the hands of lawmakers, not judges”.[1]

·       France, Germany, all courts of continental Europe  

Common law system- evolved from jurisprudence.

·       Great Britain, Commonwealth members and the United States

·       “The life of the law had not been logic but experience. The felt necessities of the times, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed”[2].

·       SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE- Belief that judges had to take into account economic, social, and political facts in addition to legal theory when determining a case.

·       LEGAL REALISM- many factors influence legal outcomes, of which the law itself was but one.

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines[3],  unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after publication.

·       Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446

·       Nagkaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. v. Military Shrine Services, G.R. No. 187587, June 5, 2013.

·       THE CLAUSE “UNLESS IT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED”. – solely refers to the 15 day period and not to the requirement of publication. Publication is an indispensable requirement.

·       A. Law is silent; B. Law provides for shorter or longer period; and, C. Law says it shall take effect “immediately”.

·       Farinas v. Exec. Secretary (417 SCRA 503, 2003)- law shall become effective 15-days after completion of publication

·       La Bugal B’ Laan v. Ramos (421 SCRA 148, 2004)- Immediately upon its publication 

Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Exceptions:

1)     Mistake upon a difficult or doubtful question of law may be the basis of good faith (Art. 526 [3], NCC)

2)    Mutual Error as to the legal effect of agreement (Art. 1334, NCC)

3)    Payment by reason of a mistake in the construction or application of a doubtful or difficult question of law (Art. 2155, NCC)

Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Exceptions:

1)     When the law expressly provides for retroactivity, i.e., Family Code, Art. 256

2)    When the law is curative or remedial

3)    When the law is procedural

4)    When the law is penal in nature and favourable to the accused.

Article 5. – Self-explanatory

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

·       RIGHT must be in existence and exercised by a duly capacitated person.

·       Right v. Obligation

Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom, or practice to the contrary.

-self-explanatory

Articles 11, 12 and 13. –Self-explanatory

-        Law speaks of years, months, days or nights.

Article 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.

Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

-Nationality rule.

- related to 2^nd para. Article 26, New Family Code 

Article 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

Exceptions:

1)     The order of succession

2)    Amount of successional rights

3)    Intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions

4)    Capacity to succeed

Article 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.

            When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

            Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgment promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

-See Revised Penal Code, Act 3815, as amended, Article 2.

-“Application of its provisions.- Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:

1)     Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship;

2)    Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;

3)    Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number;

4)    While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or

5)    Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.” 

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

·       Manuel Go Cinco v. CA et al., G.R. No. 151903, October 9, 2009

·       A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.

·       “The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another x x x”.[4]

·       There is a common element under Arts. 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional. However, Art. 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either wilfully or negligently.

·       “Is not a panacea for all hurts and pains”.

Article 22. Every person who through an act or performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Article 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefitted.

·       Requisites: (1)An enrichment; (2) a corresponding deprivation; and (3) Absence of any juristic reason for the enrichment

·       “Palm-tree justice doctrine”

·       Driving force is spirit of neighbourliness and should not be borne out of avarice or gain

·       Republic v. Ballocanog,[5]-  a person in good faith invested money to develop and grow fruit-bearing trees on land which he believed as his own but turned out to be timberland which belonged to the State.

Articles 24, 25 , 26 and 27. Self-explanatory.

Nevertheless,

·       Alienation from friends impacts a person psychologically and socially

Article 28. Unfair competition.

Article 29. Civil Action.

Article 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable for damages: x x x x”.

Civil Liberties.

·       Good faith not a defense.

·       Malice or bad faith not a requisite.

·       However, Judges. “The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute”[6].

Justice Louis Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States (1928) otherwise known “Alcohol Prohibition case on wiretapping”: “The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding”.

Articles 30 to 36.

·       Basic rule: Criminal proceedings occupy a higher tier in the order of priority.

·       When civil action is filed first, and criminal action is subsequently filed, the civil action has to be suspended.

·       When criminal action was filed ahead, civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action.

·       Exception: Articles 32,33,34 and 2176. Independent Civil Actions.

·       Prejudicial question. (1) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (2) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

·       Note: Civil Code does not distinguish as to whether civil action must have been “previously instituted”. BUT, See Sec. 7, Rule 111 of 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure. 

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[1] P. 333, DISSENT AND THE SUPREME COURT, ITS ROLE IN THE COURT’S HISTORY AND THE NATION’S CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE, by Melvin I. Urofksy

[2] THE COMMON LAW (1881) , by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Legal Philosopher, US Supreme Court Justice).

[3] Amended by Exec. Order No. 200 by Pres. Corazon Aquino

[4] Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. CA, 217 SCRA 16

[5] G.R. No. 163794, November 28, 2008

[6] Esguerra v. Gonzales-Asdala, G.R. No. 168906, December 4, 2004