CIVIL LAW (PROPERTY)
LEGAL TRIMMINGS OF “TOLERANCE” IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
CASES,
AND LENGTH OF DISPOSSESSION AS GAUGE FOR DISTINCTION
BETWEEN
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES VERSUS
ACCION PUBLICIANA
For: University of
San Agustin School of Law
General Luna Street,
Iloilo City
SY 2016-2017, 1st
Semester
By: Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III
i.Foreword.
This article is a humble attempt at
un-tangling the legal cobwebs that the many Supreme Court decisions seem to
have created on issues of possession based on “tolerance”, and the seeming
“twilight zone” in terms of jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC anent and
surrounding these issues.
More importantly, this article is a
lecture intended for the author’s ebullient students in Property for the
semester above-indicated.
I.“TOLERANCE” conundrum
Generally, in accordance with BP 129,
jurisdiction over cases “involving title to, or possession over real property”
falls with the RTC.
However, by way of exception, Republic Act
7691 which amended BP 129, confers jurisdiction to MTCs in cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer. Startlingly, such cases also “involve possession
over real property”.
But what is the rationale for such exception?
It is the issue of “material or physical possession”
which must be resolved with dispatch in order to avert that dire scenario where
a person might take the law into his own hands just so he could get back
possession of the property. Thus explains the reason why forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases should be cognizable by the MTC and should be decided
through mere summary procedure where the case is decided minus testimonies in
open court, but only via submission
of position papers.
There seems to be no problem when the
dispossession is quite fresh because in any case, the one-year period for
filing a forcible entry or unlawful detainer case commences from the employment
of force, intimidation, strategy or stealth and date of last demand,
respectively.
The trouble starts to rear its ugly head when
the complaint avers that the defendant had been in possession which had lasted
for a very long period of time, like more than twenty (20) years, for instance,
and then the plaintiff just sends a demand to vacate and within a year, files
the unlawful detainer case.
On this account, doctrinal jurisprudence[1]
stresses that “tolerance must be present right from the start of the possession
sought to be recovered”. Because if the initial entry was by FISTS, then it had
long prescribed. Thus-
“To justify an action for unlawful
detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
to be recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start,
an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy. As explained
in Sarona v. Villegas:
But even where possession preceding the
suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendants
possession was with plaintiffs tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may
require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under
Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the
concept of the word tolerance confirms our view heretofore expressed
that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer -
not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a
dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible
entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress
in theinferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year
from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the
remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to
have waived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if
a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the
lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of
forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is
in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the
inferior court upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription
to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is
unreasonable.Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one
year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. (Underlining supplied)
Here, it is therefore primordial that
the nature of the initial entry into the land should be ascertained. If it was
by FISTS, then the prescriptive period for a forcible entry case ipso jure starts to run. If the 1- year
period has lapsed, it could not be cured by the expedient of the plaintiff
sending a demand to vacate and file an unlawful detainer case within one year.
II. When the Dispute involving Possession
Is Anchored on Ownership
There is a
bedeviling issue however as to which action should be filed and which court has
jurisdiction over a case which seeks to recover possession when both parties
likewise claim rights of ownership.
Of course, the
dispute should be resolved by determining whether the possession involved is
mere material or physical possession, or a better right to possession which
should be enforced through an accion
publiciana case.
The litmus test
to determine whether possession is DE FACTO, MATERIAL, or PHYSICAL POSSESSION
as distinguished from DE JURE POSSESSION is the length of time of DISPOSSESSION.
Thus, in a 2014
case law, the settled rule was enunciated as follows: “Accordingly, what determines the proper action to be filed for the
recovery of the possession of the property is the length of time of
dispossession. If the dispossession
has not lasted for more than a year, an ejectment proceeding is proper and the
MTC acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the dispossession
lasted for more than a year, the proper action to be filed is an accion publiciana which should be
brought to the proper RTC x x x”[2].
In
an earlier 2009 case, it was likewise held that “Moreover, the complaint was filed (August 6, 2001) within one year from
the demand to vacate was made (March 2, 2001). Petitioners dispossession had
thus not lasted for more than one year to justify resort to the remedy of accion
publiciana”[3].
And
this is further consistent with an even earlier 2008 ruling involving a case
with a parallel factual situation, whereby it was ruled that “En
passant, the Court notes that respondents’ cause of action accion publiciana is a wrong mode. The
dispossession took place on October 1, 1996 and the complaint was filed four
months thereafter or on February 7, 1997. Respondents’ exclusion from the
property had thus not lasted for more than one year to call for the remedy of accion publiciana”[4].
Thus, even when the possession involved is anchored on ownership, it is
not correct to posit that it is no longer possession de facto but is already possession de jure. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence teaches that “even a
registered owner of land must follow the conditions imposed by law in order
that the action to recover would prosper”. In effect, it is humbly submitted
that there is no twilight zone where the Regional Trial Court, which has
jurisdiction over cases for accion
publiciana (where the assessed value of course of the real property
complies with the Php50,000.00 in the Metropolitan areas and Php20,000.00 in
other areas requirement) that it can choose to take cognizance of a case
involving dispossession which had not lasted for more than a year, on the
chimera that the possession involved is “anchored on ownership”, because
existing jurisprudence is visceral in ejectment cases as it takes into account
all cases whether anchored on ownership or not, as the only point of reference
is the length of dispossession, and nothing else.
The rationale for the doctrinal threshold of
“more or less than one-year length of time of dispossession” was doctrinally
explained in a 2012 case law[5], thus:
“One
of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property is
“accion interdictal, or an
ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action
for the recovery of physical possession where
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be
brought in the proper inferior court.”[6][14]
In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is
entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[7][15]
X x x
Instructive
on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[8][23] which reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to
its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses what action to file,
he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.
In the
present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case against respondents.
Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are summary proceedings
designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right
to possession of the property involved. The only question that the
courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical
possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure.
It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not
necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of
the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the
particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and
sufficiently proven.”
Inevitably,
it is the rule that when the dispossession has not lasted for more than a year,
the proper action should be forcible entry or unlawful detainer because if the
dispossession is fresh and therefore urgent, the possession involved is DE FACTO, PHYSICAL OR MATERIAL POSSESSION only.
Necessarily, it follows that when the dispossession
had exceeded one year, then the possession involved is no longer mere physical,
material or de facto possession but DE JURE or REAL RIGHT OF POSSESSION. It
is then and only then that an accion
publiciana case may be deemed proper. “The
accion publiciana is intended for the
recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding before a Court of
First Instance (now RTC) (Roman Catholic
Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6. Phil 286); and must be brought within a
period of ten years otherwise the real right of possession is lost. (See Art. 555, No. 4). The issue is not
possession de facto but possession de jure.[9]”
In the end, the moral of the story is that a
torrens title is not an absolute guarantee that the registered owner can evict
any person in actual possession of the property.
He
must take into account and follow all the nuances and niceties of the different
ejectment actions in order that his case can succeed.
[2] See Sergio R. Mendoza v. Mun. of Pulila, Bulacan etc., G.R. No.
200244, September 15, 2014
[3] Sps. Lydia Flores Cruz et al v. Spouses Leonardo and Iluminada
Goil-Cruz, G.R. No. 172217, September 18, 2009
[4] Fernando Geonzon Vda. De Barrera and Johnny Oco, Jr. v. Heirs of
Vicente Legaspi, represented by Pedro Legaspi, G.R. No. 174346, September 12,
2008
[5] Ruben Corpuz rep by Atty In Fact
Wenfreda C. Agullana v. Sps. Hilarion Agustin and Justa Agustin, GR No.
183822, January 18, 2012
[9] See p. 102 Civil Code of the Philippines by Paras Book II,
Fourteenth Edition 1999
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