Lecture
No. 10.
Part 1
MODES OF ACQUIRING
OWNERSHIP
DONATION & WILLS & SUCCESSION
ATTY EDUARDO T. REYES, III
ATTY EDUARDO T. REYES, III
(For
Fourth Year Section-A and Property Second Year,
University of San Agustin
School of Law,
General Luna Street, Iloilo City,
School Year 2016-2017 Ist Semester)
TITLE
III
DONATION
CHAPTER
1
Nature of Donations
Article
725. Donation is an act
of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in
favor of another, who accepts it. (618a)
Comments:
1. “Donation” is both a contract thus a “title” and a
MODE of acquiring and transmitting ownership.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 712, thus: “Ownership
and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law,
by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in consequence of
certain contracts, by tradition”.
IN CONTRAST. Check out Article 1477
which states that: “The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon
the actual or constructive delivery thereof”. Thus, a sale is
only a “title” but the mode of transmitting ownership “as a consequence of such
contract of sale”, is by tradition or delivery.
Article
726. When a person
gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the
services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a
demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less
than the value of the thing given, there is also a donation. (619)
Article
727. Illegal or
impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall be considered
as not imposed. (n)
Comments:
·
See Art. 873 (of similar effect)
·
See however, Art. 1183 (of different effect)
Article
728. Donations which
are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the
Title on Succession. (620)
Comment:
“Donation
mortis causa typically:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and the control of the property while
alive; (2) That before the [donor’s] death, the transfer should be revocable by
the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be void
if the transferor should survive the transferee.[1]”
Article
729. When the donor
intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor,
though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this
shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of
the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the donee, unless the donor
provides otherwise. (n)
Comment: “Donation in prasenti to be delivered in
future”.
Article
730. The fixing of an
event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take place beyond
the natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of
the act as a donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention appears. (n)
Comment: Fulfilment of
resolutory condition has retroactive effect.
Article
731. When a person
donates something, subject to the resolutory condition of the donor's survival,
there is a donation inter vivos. (n)
Article
732. Donations which
are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions on
contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title. (621)
Article
733. Donations with an
onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts and remuneratory
donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which
exceeds the value of the burden imposed. (622)
Comments:
1.
“Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the RULES ON CONTRACTS”.
Thus, in an ONEROUS DONATION, Articles 748 and 749 which require a Donation to
be in a public instrument, do not apply. Instead, Article 1356 of the New Civil
Code applies which states that “ contract shall be obligatory in whatever
form it may have been entered into”.
2.
Since “Onerous Donations” are governed by the law on contracts, in the event
that an “Impossible condition” is imposed, Article 1183 on contracts and NOT
Article 727 should apply. Article 1183 states: “Impossible conditions, those
contrary to good customs or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul
the obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible,
that part thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition
shall be valid”.
But curiously, that is not how the SC ruled in CJ Yulo
below.
Article
734. The donation is
perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. (623)
Comments:
Case
law teaches[2]
that
“Petitioner contends that the case at
bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central
Philippine University vs. Court of Appeals, where the donee failed for more than
50 years to establish, as required, a medical school on the land donated, and
where this Court declared the donation to have been validly revoked.
To the mind of the Court, what is
applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case of Republic vs. Silim, where respondent Silim donated a
5,600-square meter parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the condition that the said
property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.
Although a school building was constructed on the property through the efforts of
the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building could not be released
because the government required that it be built on a one-hectare parcel of
land. This led the donee therein to exchange the donated property for a bigger
one.
In Silim,
the Court distinguished the four (4)
types of donations:
Donations,
according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2)
remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous.
A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.
This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional
or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.
Of all the
foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct.
This is because, unlike the other forms of donation, the validity of and the
rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is
completely governed not by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In
this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733
Donations with onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that
portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation
involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a
burden imposed upon the donee to build a school on the donated property.
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly
applied the law on contracts instead of the law on donations because the
donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a burden imposed
upon the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. We
thus quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate court in the
challenged decision:
First, the
violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely
casual breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the
purpose by which the donation was made, i.e., for the establishment of a home
for the aged and the infirm. In order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal
obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case wherein the donor is
obligated to donate a 41,117 square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna on which property the donee is obligated to establish a home for the
aged and the infirm (Exhibit C), may be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New
Civil Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be substantial as to
defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected (Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. IV, pp. 179-180; Universal Food Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus,
in the case of Ocampo v. C.A. (ibid), citing the case of Angeles v. Calasanz
(135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court ruled:
The right to
rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is
not absolute. In Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court
stated that:
The general
rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would
defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement (Song Fo &
Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil. 821,827). The question of whether a
breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances
(Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala, et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).
The above ruling of the Court of
Appeals is completely in tune with this Courts disposition in Republic vs.
Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation on the ground
that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use the land
for school purpose only, but this Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the
slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated
when the lot donated was exchanged with another one. The purpose for the
donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The
exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange
of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of the
purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved way for the
release of funds for the construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which
could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
As in Silim,
the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the
sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In
fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed
of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed.
Hence, considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose
for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack
of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not warrant
the revocation of the donation.
Besides, this
Court cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor
for all contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute
ground for revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not
correlated with the purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction
of the donees right of ownership over the donated property.
Instructive on this point is the ruling
of this Court in The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. Court of Appeals,[7] viz:
Donation, as
a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective transfer of title over
the property from the donor to the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the
donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor
may impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
x x x
In the case
at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of donation against the
alienation of the property for an entire century, being an unreasonable
emasculation and denial of an integral attribute of ownership, should be
declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article
727 of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not imposed. No
reliance may accordingly be placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of
donation. The net result is that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale
supposedly constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the
deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter, hence, for lack of cause
of action, the case for private respondents must fail.
If petitioner would insist that the
lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition that is absolute in
character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under the foregoing
doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and conditions of
the donation, may, in that event, even be considered as no breach at all when
the Court strikes down such absolute condition of prior written consent by the
donor in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The Court, however,
understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose in mind,
which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation was
intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather than
totally striking it would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of the
donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts of lease do not detract from the
purpose for which the donation was made, the complained acts of the donee will
not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and conditions of the deed
of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.
Finally, anent petitioners contention
that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that respondent had abandoned the
idea of constructing a home for the aged and infirm, the explanation in
respondents comment is enlightening. Petitioner relies on Bishop Bantigues
letter dated June 21, 1990 as its
basis for claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of
constructing a home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated.
Respondent, however, explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the
vernacular, expressed his concern that the surrounding area was being
considered to be re-classified into an industrial zone where factories are
expected to be put up. There is no question that this will definitely be
disadvantageous to the health of the aged and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop
asked permission from the donor for a possible exchange or sale of the donated
property to ultimately pursue the purpose for which the donation was intended
in another location that is more appropriate.
The Court sees the wisdom, prudence and
good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it conforms completely. We cannot
accede to petitioners view, which attributed the exact opposite meaning to the
Bishops letter seeking permission to sell or exchange the donated property.
In Silim,
supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of
the terms and conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to
think otherwise in this case. To insist that the home for the aged and infirm
be constructed on the donated property, if the industrialization indeed pushes
through, defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to prevent the donee
from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended would
constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.”
CHAPTER
2
Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation
Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation
Article
735. All persons who
may contract and dispose of their property may make a donation. (624)
Article
736. Guardians and
trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. (n)
Article
737. The donor's
capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. (n)
Comment: “Making” means
“perfection”.
Article
738. Al those who are
not specially disqualified by law therefor may accept donations. (625)
Article
739. The following
donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty
of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his
wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for
declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and
the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action. (n)
Article
740. Incapacity to
succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter vivos. (n)
Article
741. Minors and others
who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be done
through their parents or legal representatives. (626a)
Article
742. Donations made to
conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would
legally represent them if they were already born. (627)
Article
743. Donations made to
incapacitated persons shall be void, though simulated under the guise of
another contract or through a person who is interposed. (628)
Article
744. Donations of the
same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed by the provisions
concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different persons. (n)
Comment: See Article
1544 on “Double Sales”.
Article
745. The donee must
accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special
power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the
donation shall be void. (630)
Article
746. Acceptance must be
made during the lifetime of the donor and of the donee. (n)
Article
747. Persons who accept
donations in representation of others who may not do so by themselves, shall be
obliged to make the notification and notation of which article 749 speaks.
(631)
Article
748. The donation of a
movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery
of the thing or of the document representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated
exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in
writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Article
749. In order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument,
the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall
be noted in both instruments. (633)
Comments:
1.
Can Donation be proven by Oral Evidence?
“The donation of real
property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the formalities stated in
Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil Code). Article 749 of
the Civil Code reads:
Art. 749. In order that the
donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take
effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a
separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form,
and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
Article 749 of the Civil
Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in a public
instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation acknowledged
before a notary public is a public document.[12] The
notary public shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the
instrument and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument,
acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed. The acceptance may
be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance
made in a separate instrument must also be in a public document. If the
acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in writing
of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact of such notification.”[3]
CHAPTER 3
Effect of Donations and Limitations Thereon
Article 750. The donation may comprehend all the
present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of
all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced in petition of any person affected. (634a)
Article
751. Donations cannot
comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the
donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)
Comments:
1.“future
property” refers to anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of
the donation.
2.Being a MODE of acquiring ownership, as distinguished
from a SALE, a donation cannot involve future property.
Article
752. The provisions of
article 750 notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it
may exceed this limitation. (636)
Comment: Limitation
applies to giver not the RECIPIENT.
Article
753. When a donation is
made to several persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares, and
there shall be no right of accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise
provided.
The preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to
donations made to the husband and wife jointly, between whom there shall be a
right of accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the donor. (637)
Comments:
1)
See Art. 1015
2)
First paragraph is general rule while second is
exception
3)
Equal shares meaning “pro-indiviso”
4)
In first para, it applies only when accretion is
proper, e.g., refusal, predecease, incapacity
5)
See Article 113 Family Code on separate property
Article
754. The donee is
subrogated to all the rights and actions which in case of eviction would
pertain to the donor. The latter, on the other hand, is not obliged to warrant
the things donated, save when the donation is onerous, in which case the donor
shall be liable for eviction to the concurrence of the burden.
The donor shall also be liable for eviction or
hidden defects in case of bad faith on his part. (638a)
Comment: Generally, no
warranty.
Article
755. The right to
dispose of some of the things donated, or of some amount which shall be a
charge thereon, may be reserved by the donor; but if he should die without
having made use of this right, the property or amount reserved shall belong to
the donee. (639)
Article
756. The ownership of
property may also be donated to one person and the usufruct to another or
others, provided all the donees are living at the time of the donation. (640a)
Article
757. Reversion may be
validly established in favor of only the donor for any case and circumstances,
but not in favor of other persons unless they are all living at the time of the
donation.
Any reversion stipulated by the donor in favor of a
third person in violation of what is provided in the preceding paragraph shall
be void, but shall not nullify the donation. (614a)
Article
758. When the donation
imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor, if the
clause does not contain any declaration to the contrary, the former is
understood to be liable to pay only the debts which appear to have been
previously contracted. In no case shall the donee be responsible for the debts
exceeding the value of the property donated, unless a contrary intention
clearly appears. (642a)
Article
759. There being no
stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible
therefor only when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of
creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient
property to pay his debts prior to the donation. (643)
CHAPTER 4
Revocation and Reduction of Donations
Article
760. Every donation
inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or
legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced
as provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these events:
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should
have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate children, even though they be
posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the
latter believed to be dead when he made the donation, should turn out to be
living;
(3) If the donor subsequently adopt a minor
child. (644a)
Comments:
·
Prescribes in four (4)
years “from birth of first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or
adoption, or from judicial declaration of filiation, or from the time
information was received regarding the existence of the child believed dead”.
·
Reckoning point see
Article 763
·
In onerous donations
however, prescriptive period is ten (10) years
Article
761. In the cases
referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced
insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will,
taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the birth,
appearance or adoption of a child. (n)
Article
762. Upon the
revocation or reduction of the donation by the birth, appearance or adoption of
a child, the property affected shall be returned or its value if the donee has
sold the same.
If the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem
the mortgage, by paying the amount guaranteed, with a right to recover the same
from the donee.
When the property cannot be returned, it shall be
estimated at what it was worth at the time of the donation. (645a)
Article
763. The action for
revocation or reduction on the grounds set forth in article 760 shall prescribe
after four years from the birth of the first child, or from his legitimation,
recognition or adoption, or from the judicial declaration of filiation, or from
the time information was received regarding the existence of the child believed
dead.
This action cannot be renounced, and is
transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to his legitimate and illegitimate
children and descendants. (646a)
Article
764. The donation shall
be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply with
any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.
In this case, the property donated shall be
returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the mortgages
imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with
regard to third persons, by the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from
the noncompliance with the condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the
donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)
Comment: 1.“Conditions”
refer to “obligations or charges imposed by the donor on the donee. “Does not
refer to uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment of a juridical
relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations or charges
imposed by the donor on the done. It is used, not in its technical or strict
legal sense, but in its broadest sense[4]”.
2. In De Luna v. Abrigo[5]
, the prescriptive period of an action for revocation of an onerous
donation by reason of non-compliance with the condition/ obligation imposed is
ten (10) years counted from the time within which the done must comply with the
conditions/ obligations of the donation.
Article 765. The
donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of
ingratitude in the following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense
against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or
children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any
criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should
prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee
himself, his wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the
donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. (648a)
Comments:
Ground is “Ingratitude” prescriptive period is 1 year “from the time the donor
had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action” per
Art. 769
Article
766. Although the
donation is revoked on account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienations
and mortgages effected before the notation of the complaint for revocation in
the Registry of Property shall subsist.
Later ones shall be void. (649)
Article
767. In the case
referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding article, the donor shall
have a right to demand from the donee the value of property alienated which he
cannot recover from third persons, or the sum for which the same has been
mortgaged.
The value of said property shall be fixed as of the
time of the donation. (650)
Article
768. When the donation
is revoked for any of the causes stated in article 760, or by reason of
ingratitude, or when it is reduced because it is inofficious, the donee shall
not return the fruits except from the filing of the complaint.
If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with
any of the conditions imposed in the donation, the donee shall return not only
the property but also the fruits thereof which he may have received after
having failed to fulfill the condition. (651)
Article
769. The action granted
to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
action prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had
knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him to bring the action. (652)
Article
770. This action shall
not be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, if the latter did not institute
the same, although he could have done so, and even if he should die before the
expiration of one year.
Neither can this action be brought against the heir
of the donee, unless upon the latter's death the complaint has been filed.
(653)
Comment: If Ground is “non-compliance with
condition” action is transmissible under Art. 764
Article
771. Donations which in
accordance with the provisions of article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind
the estimated net value of the donor's property at the time of his death, shall
be reduced with regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the
donations from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor shall it bar the
donee from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations the provisions of
this Chapter and of articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern. (654)
Article
772. Only those who at
the time of the donor's death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and
successors in interest may ask for the reduction or inofficious donations.
Those referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot
renounce their right during the lifetime of the donor, either by express
declaration, or by consenting to the donation.
The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not
entitled to the legitime and the creditors of the deceased can neither ask for
the reduction nor avail themselves thereof. (655a)
Comment: 1. Creditors must go after the estate and
not the donees.
2. Pursuant to Mateo v. Laguna[6],
an action for reduction of
inofficious donation prescribes in 10 years following Article 1144 of the New
Civil Code. Because the cause of action accrues only upon the death of the
donor-decedent hence the prescriptive period starts to run only upon such
death.
Article
773. If, there being
two or more donations, the disposable portion is not sufficient to cover all of
them, those of the more recent date shall be suppressed or reduced with regard
to the excess. (656)
TITLE IV
SUCCESSION
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
Comments:
Study of succession for purposes of civil law review
should be divided into: a. Kinds of Succession, i.e., Testamentary, Legal or Intestate; Mixed Succession b.
Formalities of Last Will & Testament; c. Institution of Heirs; d. INTERPLAY
of Substitution, Accretion & Representation e. Predecease, Renunciation
& Incapacity; f. Distribution of Estate
Article
774. Succession is a
mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to
the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through
his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law. (n)
Article
775. In this Title,
"decedent" is the general term applied to the person whose property
is transmitted through succession, whether or not he left a will. If he left a
will, he is also called the testator. (n)
Article
776. The inheritance
includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death. (659)
Comment: Conflicts with Art. 793
Article
777. The rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. (657a)
Article
778. Succession may be:
(1) Testamentary;
(2) Legal or intestate; or
(3) Mixed. (n)
Article
779. Testamentary
succession is that which results from the designation of an heir, made in a
will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
Article
780. Mixed succession
is that effected partly by will and partly by operation of law. (n)
Article
781. The inheritance of
a person includes not only the property and the transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)
Comment: See Art. 793 and compare
Article
782. An heir is a
person called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by
operation of law.
Devisees and legatees are persons to whom gifts of
real and personal property are respectively given by virtue of a will. (n)
Comments:
· “devisees”
– real property
· “legatees”-
personal property
· In
PRETERITION, Art 854, instituted voluntary heir gets nothing but legatees and
devisees get their property for as long as legitime is not impinged upon.
[1] Vilanueva
v. Branoco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011
[2] CJ
Yulo & Sons, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., G.R. No.
133705, March 31, 2005
[3]
DECS v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005
[4]
Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511, Dissenting
Opinion by Justice Davide
[5]
181 SCRA 150, 156 (1990)
[6] 29
SCRA 864