WILLS & SUCCESSION
(For Fourth Year Section-A ,
University of San Agustin School of Law,
General Luna Street, Iloilo City,
School Year 2017-2018 Ist Semester)
Atty.
EDUARDO T. REYES, III
Part II From “Reserva Troncal”
To End of Succession
Articles 890- 969
Comments:
Study of succession for purposes of civil law review should be divided into: a.
Kinds of Succession, i.e., Testamentary, Legal or Intestate; Mixed
Succession b. Formalities of Last Will & Testament; c. Institution
of Heirs; d. INTERPLAY of Substitution, Accretion & Representation e.
Predecease, Renunciation & Incapacity; f. Distribution of
Estate
Article 890. The legitime reserved for the legitimate
parents shall be divided between them equally; if one of the parents should
have died, the whole shall pass to the survivor.
If the testator leaves
neither father nor mother, but is survived by ascendants of equal degree of the
paternal and maternal lines, the legitime shall be divided equally between both
lines. If the ascendants should be of different degrees, it shall pertain
entirely to the ones nearest in degree of either line. (810)
Comments: 1. “Reserved for the
trunk”.
2. In reserva troncal, there are four parties thus: a.
ASCENDANT of BROTHER or SISTER from where the property originally came from;
b.PREPOSITUS (propositus); c. reservista; and d. reservatorios.
Article 891. The
ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation
of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who
belong to the line from which said property came. (871)
Comment: Reservee must be legitimate relative of origin &
prepositus (propositus).
The recent case of MARIA MENDOZA , in her capacity
and as Attorney-In-Fact of DEOGRACIAS, MARCELA, DIONISIA, ADORACION, all
surnamed MEDOZA, REMEDIOS MONTILLA, FELY BAUTISTA, JULIAN GUILALAS and ELVIRA
MENDOZA V. JULIA POLICARPIO DELOS SANTOS, substituted by her heirs CARMEN P.
DELOS SANTOS, ROSA BUENAVENTURA, ZENAIDA P. DE LOS SANTOS VDA. DE MATEO ET AL.,[1] is very
instructive on the legal ramifications of reserve truncal, viz:
“DECISION
REYES, J.:
Reserva troncal is a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came,
and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant.
The Facts
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of
land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan: (1) Lot 1681-B, with an area of 7,749
square meters;2 (2) Lot 1684, with an area of 5,667 sq m;3 and (3) Lot No.
1646-B, with an area of 880 sq m. Lot Nos. 1681-B and 1684 are presently in the
name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the
other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co-owned by Victoria
Pantaleon, who bought one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza
and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and
Dominga Mendoza (Dominga). Placido and Dominga had four children: Antonio, Exequiel,
married to Leonor, Apolonio andValentin. Petitioners
Maria, Deogracias, Dionisia, Adoracion, Marcela and Ricardo are the children of
Antonio. Petitioners Juliana, Fely, Mercedes, Elvira and Fortunato, on the
other hand, are Valentin’s children. Petitioners alleged that the properties
were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that were subject of an oral
partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria.
After Leonor’s death, her share went to Gregoria. In 1992,
Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after Gregoria’s
death, respondent, who is Leonor’s sister, adjudicated unto herself all these
properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent
in their behalf and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the
Civil Code on reserva troncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the
properties as these did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were
not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According to respondent, the
properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso Ramos in
1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of
the properties.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 6,
found merit in petitioners’ claim and granted their action for Recovery of
Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of TCT and
Reconveyance. In its Decision dated November 4, 2002, the RTC disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premised from
the foregoing judgment [is] hereby
rendered:
1. Ordering [respondents]
(heirs of Julia Policarpio) to reconvey
the three (3) parcels of
land subject of this action in the name of the
plaintiffs enumerated in
the complaint including intervenor Maria Cecilia
M. Mendoza except
one-half of the property described in the old title[,]
TCT No. T-124852(M) which
belongs to Victorina Pantaleon;
2. Ordering the Register
of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel the titles
in the name of Julia
Policarpio[,] TCT No. T-149033(M), T-183631(M)
and T-149035(M) and
reconvey the same to the enumerated plaintiffs;
[and]
3. No pronouncement as to
claims for attorney’s fees and
damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the
RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners. The dispositive
portion of the CA Decision dated November 16, 2006 provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the November 4, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Br. 6, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Third Amended
Complaint in Civil Case
No. 609-M-92 is hereby DISMISSED. Costs
against the Plaintiffs-Appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied
the same per Resolution dated January 17, 2007.
In dismissing the complaint, the CA ruled that petitioners
failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.
The CA also ruled that even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned
the properties, it still cannot be subject to reserva troncal as
neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria predecease
Exequiel.
Now before the Court,
petitioners argue that:
A.
THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT
RESERVABLE PROPERTIES,
COMING AS THEY DO
FROM THE FAMILY LINE OF
THE PETITIONERS
MENDOZAS.
B.
THE HONORABLE [CA]
GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO
NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTIES BY
VIRTUE OF THE LAW
ON RESERVA TRONCAL.
Petitioners take
exception to the ruling of the CA, contending that it is sufficient that the
properties came from the paternal line of Gregoria for it to be subject
to reserva troncal. They also claim the properties in
representation of their own predecessors, Antonio and Valentin, who were the
brothers of Exequiel.
Ruling of the Court
This petition is one for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The general rule in this regard is that it
should raise only questions of law. There are, however, admitted exceptions to
this rule, one of which is when the CA’s findings are contrary to those of the
trial court.
This being the case in the petition at hand, the Court must now
look into the differing findings and conclusion of the RTC and the CA on the
two issues that arise – one, whether the properties in dispute are
reservable properties and two, whether petitioners are entitled to
a reservation of these properties.
Article 891 of the Civil
Code on
reserva troncal
The principle of reserva troncal is provided in
Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant
who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from
another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of
relatives who are within
the third degree and belong to the line from
which said property came. (Emphasis ours)
There are three (3) lines
of transmission in reserva troncal. The first
transmission is by gratuitous title,
whether by inheritance or donation, from
an
ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant called the prepositus. The
second transmission is by operation of law
from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservor, also
called the reservista. The third and last
transmission is from the reservista to the reservees
orreservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from
which the property came.
The lineal character of
the
reservable property is
reckoned
from the ascendant from
whom the
prepositus received the property by
gratuitous title
Based on the circumstances of the present case, Article 891
on reserva troncal is not applicable.
The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it proceeded from the
erroneous premise that Placido is the ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of
the Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace the origin of the subject
properties back to Placido and Dominga, determine whether Exequiel predeceased
Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased Exequiel.
The persons involved
in reserva troncal are:
(1) The ascendant or brother
or sister from whom the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title;
(2) The descendant
or prepositus (propositus) who received
the property;
(3) The reservor (reservista),
the other ascendant who
obtained the property
from the prepositus by operation of
law; and
(4) The reservee (reservatario)
who is within the third
degree from the prepositus and
who belongs to the (linea
o tronco) from which the property
came and for whom
the property should be
reserved by the reservor.
It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties
should be reckoned only from Exequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the
first transmission occurred, or from whom Gregoria inherited the properties in
dispute. The law does not go farther than such ascendant/brother/sister in
determining the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial for
the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether
Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the
properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute
originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand, is the descendant who received
the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should
have been acquired by the descendant or prepositus from an
ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return. At risk
of being repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the
properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance.
Ascendants, descendants
and
collateral relatives
under Article
964 of the Civil Code
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the
property should be an ascendant (also known as the reservor/reservista)
of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregoria’s
ascendant; rather, she is Gregoria’s collateral relative. Article 964 of the
Civil Code provides for the series of degrees among ascendants and descendants,
and those who are not ascendants and descendants but come from a common
ancestor, viz:
Art. 964. A series of
degrees forms a line, which may be either
direct or collateral.
A direct
line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and
descendants.
A collateral
line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
persons who are
not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor.
(Emphasis and italics ours)
Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her
grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s
descendants, if she had one, would be her children, grandchildren and
greatgrandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s ascendants, both petitioners and
Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral
line of relationship, ascent is made to the common ancestor and then descent to
the relative from whom the computation is made. In the case of Julia’s
collateral relationship with Gregoria, ascent is to be made from Gregoria to
her mother Leonor (one line/degree), then to the common ancestor, that is,
Julia and Leonor’s parents (second line/degree), and then descent to Julia, her
aunt (third line/degree). Thus, Julia is Gregoria’s collateralrelative
within the third degree and not her ascendant.
First cousins of the
descendant/prepositus are
fourth
degree relatives and
cannot be
considered reservees/reservatarios
Moreover, petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as
they are not relatives within the third degree of Gregoria from whom the
properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is
Gregoria in this case. Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives,
being her first cousins. First cousins of theprepositus are
fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors
Antonio and Valentin as Article 891 grants a personal right of reservation only
to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the reservable properties
came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces of
the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants
(fathers and mothers) who are the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and
relatives within the third degree. In Florentino v. Florentino, the
Court stated:
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession,
when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right
of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the property
which the reservista (person holding it subject to
reservation) should return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The
right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming same as a reservatario of
the reservable property is not among the relatives within the third degree
belong to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in [A]rticle 811 [now Article 891] is in the highest
degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of the designated persons who are
the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the reservable
property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees
can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not
recognize them as such.
x x x [N]evertheless there is right of representation on the
part of reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom
the reservable property came. x x x.23 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)
The conclusion, therefore, is that while it may appear that the
properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from reserve
troncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the
Civil Code and second, because petitioners are not Gregoria’s
relatives within the third degree. Hence, the CA’s disposition that the
complaint filed with the RTC should be dismissed, only on this point, is
correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of Gregoria’s estate
are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 1003. If there are
no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.
Art. 1009. Should there
be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children
of brothers or sisters,
the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.
The latter shall succeed
without distinction of lines or preference
among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.
Nevertheless, the Court is not in the proper position to
determine the proper distribution of Gregoria’s estate at this point as the
cause of action relied upon by petitioners in their complaint filed with the
RTC is based solely on reserva troncal. Further, any determination
would necessarily entail reception of evidence on Gregoria’s entire estate and
the heirs entitled thereto, which is best accomplished in an action filed
specifically for that purpose.
A reservista acquires
ownership of
the reservable property
until the
reservation takes place
or is
extinguished
Before concluding, the Court takes note of a palpable error in
the RTC’s disposition of the case. In upholding the right of petitioners over
the properties, the RTC ordered the reconveyance of the properties to
petitioners and the transfer of the titles in their names. What the RTC should
have done, assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal is
applicable, is have the reservable nature of the property registered on
respondent’s titles. In fact, respondent, as reservista, has the
duty to reserve and to annotate the reservable character of the property on the
title. In reserva troncal, the reservistawho inherits
from a prepositus, whether by the latter’s wish or by operation of
law, acquires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring
absolute ownership. All the attributes of ownership belong to him exclusively.
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable
property but subject to the resolutory condition that such title is
extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the
reservor. The transferee’s rights are revoked upon the survival of the
reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when
the reservees predecease the reservor.26 (Citations omitted).
It is when the reservation takes place or is extinguished,
that a reservatario becomes, by operation of law, the owner of
the reservable property. In any event, the foregoing discussion does not
detract from the fact that petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the
properties in dispute.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision dated November 16, 2006 and Resolution dated January 17, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77694 insofar as it dismissed the Third
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 609-M-92 are AFFIRMED. This
Decision is without prejudice to any civil action that the heirs of Gregoria
Mendoza may file for the settlement of her estate or for the determination of
ownership of the
properties in question.
SO ORDERED.”
Article 892. If only one legitimate child or descendant of
the deceased survives, the widow or widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of
the hereditary estate. In case of a legal separation, the surviving spouse may
inherit if it was the deceased who had given cause for the same.
Article 894. If the testator leaves illegitimate children,
the surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-third of the hereditary estate of
the deceased and the illegitimate children to another third. The remaining
third shall be at the free disposal of the testator. (n)
Article 895. The legitime of each of the acknowledged
natural children and each of the natural children by legal fiction shall
consist of one-half of the legitime of each of the legitimate children or
descendants.
The legitime of an illegitimate child who is neither an
acknowledged natural, nor a natural child by legal fiction, shall be equal in
every case to four-fifths of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
The legitime of the illegitimate children shall be taken from
the portion of the estate at the free disposal of the testator, provided that
in no case shall the total legitime of such illegitimate children exceed that
free portion, and that the legitime of the surviving spouse must first be fully
satisfied. (840a)
Article 896. Illegitimate children who may survive with
legitimate parents or ascendants of the deceased shall be entitled to
one-fourth of the hereditary estate to be taken from the portion at the free
disposal of the testator. (841a)
Article 897. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or descendants, and acknowledged natural children, or
natural children by legal fiction, such surviving spouse shall be entitled to a
portion equal to the legitime of each of the legitimate children which must be
taken from that part of the estate which the testator can freely dispose of.
(n)
Article 898. If the widow or widower survives with
legitimate children or descendants, and with illegitimate children other than
acknowledged natural, or natural children by legal fiction, the share of the
surviving spouse shall be the same as that provided in the preceding article.
(n)
Article 899. When the widow or widower survives with
legitimate parents or ascendants and with illegitimate children, such surviving
spouse shall be entitled to one-eighth of the hereditary estate of the deceased
which must be taken from the free portion, and the illegitimate children shall
be entitled to one-fourth of the estate which shall be taken also from the
disposable portion. The testator may freely dispose of the remaining one-eighth
of the estate. (n)
Article 900. If the only survivor is the widow or widower,
she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate of the
deceased spouse, and the testator may freely dispose of the other half. (837a)
If the marriage between the surviving spouse and the testator
was solemnized in articulo mortis, and the testator died within three months
from the time of the marriage, the legitime of the surviving spouse as the sole
heir shall be one-third of the hereditary estate, except when they have been
living as husband and wife for more than five years. In the latter case, the
legitime of the surviving spouse shall be that specified in the preceding
paragraph. (n)
Article 901. When the testator dies leaving illegitimate
children and no other compulsory heirs, such illegitimate children shall have a
right to one-half of the hereditary estate of the deceased.
The other half shall be at the free disposal of the testator.
(842a)
Article 902. The
rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. (843a)
Comment: See Art. 992
Article 903. The legitime of the parents who have an
illegitimate child, when such child leaves neither legitimate descendants, nor
a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half of the hereditary
estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children
are left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the
widow or widower survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime
of the parents is one-fourth of the hereditary estate of the child, and that of
the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate. (n)
Article 904. The testator cannot deprive his compulsory
heirs of their legitime, except in cases expressly specified by law.
Neither can he impose upon the same any burden, encumbrance,
condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (813a)
Article 905. Every renunciation or compromise as regards a
future legitime between the person owing it and his compulsory heirs is void,
and the latter may claim the same upon the death of the former; but they must
bring to collation whatever they may have received by virtue of the
renunciation or compromise. (816)
Article 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the testator has
left by any title less than the legitime belonging to him may demand that the
same be fully satisfied. (815)
Article 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair or
diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be reduced on petition of
the same, insofar as they may be inofficious or excessive. (817)
Article 908. To determine the legitime, the value of the
property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all
debts and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will.
To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the
value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the
time he made them. (818a)
Article 909. Donations given to children shall be charged
to their legitime.
Donations made to strangers shall be charged to that part of the
estate of which the testator could have disposed by his last will.
Insofar as they may be inofficious or may exceed the disposable
portion, they shall be reduced according to the rules established by this Code.
(819a)
Article 910. Donations which an illegitimate child may have
received during the lifetime of his father or mother, shall be charged to his
legitime.
Should they exceed the portion that can be freely disposed of,
they shall be reduced in the manner prescribed by this Code. (847a)
Article 911. After the legitime has been determined in
accordance with the three preceding articles, the reduction shall be made as
follows:
(1) Donations shall be respected as long as the legitime can be
covered, reducing or annulling, if necessary, the devises or legacies made in
the will;
(2) The reduction of the devises or legacies shall be pro rata,
without any distinction whatever.
If the testator has directed that a certain devise or legacy be
paid in preference to others, it shall not suffer any reduction until the
latter have been applied in full to the payment of the legitime.
(3) If the devise or legacy consists of a usufruct or life
annuity, whose value may be considered greater than that of the disposable
portion, the compulsory heirs may choose between complying with the
testamentary provision and delivering to the devisee or legatee the part of the
inheritance of which the testator could freely dispose. (820a)
Article 912. If the devise subject to reduction should
consist of real property, which cannot be conveniently divided, it shall go to
the devisee if the reduction does not absorb one-half of its value; and in a
contrary case, to the compulsory heirs; but the former and the latter shall
reimburse each other in cash for what respectively belongs to them.
The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire
property, provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and
of the share pertaining to him as legitime. (821)
Article 913. If the heirs or devisees do not choose to
avail themselves of the right granted by the preceding article, any heir or
devisee who did not have such right may exercise it; should the latter not make
use of it, the property shall be sold at public auction at the instance of any
one of the interested parties. (822)
Article 914. The testator may devise and bequeath the free
portion as he may deem fit. (n)
SECTION 6
Disinheritance
Disinheritance
Article 915. A compulsory heir may, in consequence of
disinheritance, be deprived of his legitime, for causes expressly stated by
law. (848a)
Article 916. Disinheritance can be effected only through a
will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be specified. (849)
Article 917. The burden of proving the truth of the cause
for disinheritance shall rest upon the other heirs of the testator, if the
disinherited heir should deny it. (850)
Article 918. Disinheritance without a specification of the
cause, or for a cause the truth of which, if contradicted, is not proved, or
which is not one of those set forth in this Code, shall annul the institution
of heirs insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited; but the devises
and legacies and other testamentary dispositions shall be valid to such extent
as will not impair the legitime. (851a)
Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes for
the disinheritance of children and descendants, legitimate as well as
illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found guilty of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted of adultery or
concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence, intimidation,
or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support the parent or
ascendant who disinherits such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed, by the child
or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a dishonorable or
disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the penalty of
civil interdiction. (756, 853, 674a)
Article 920. The following shall be sufficient causes for
the disinheritance of parents or ascendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate:
(1) When the parents have abandoned their children or induced
their daughters to live a corrupt or immoral life, or attempted against their
virtue;
(2) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of an
attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(3) When the parent or ascendant has accused the testator of a
crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found to be false;
(4) When the parent or ascendant has been convicted of adultery
or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(5) When the parent or ascendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(6) The loss of parental authority for causes specified in this
Code;
(7) The refusal to support the children or descendants without
justifiable cause;
(8) An attempt by one of the parents against the life of the
other, unless there has been a reconciliation between them. (756, 854, 674a)
Article 921. The following shall be sufficient causes for
disinheriting a spouse:
(1) When the spouse has been convicted of an attempt against the
life of the testator, his or her descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When the spouse has accused the testator of a crime for
which the law prescribes imprisonment of six years or more, and the accusation
has been found to be false;
(3) When the spouse by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence cause the testator to make a will or to change one already made;
(4) When the spouse has given cause for legal separation;
(5) When the spouse has given grounds for the loss of parental
authority;
(6) Unjustifiable refusal to support the children or the other
spouse. (756, 855, 674a)
Article 922. A subsequent reconciliation between the offender
and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, and
renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made. (856)
Article 923. The children and descendants of the person
disinherited shall take his or her place and shall preserve the rights of
compulsory heirs with respect to the legitime; but the disinherited parent
shall not have the usufruct or administration of the property which constitutes
the legitime. (857)
SECTION
7
Legacies and Devises
Legacies and Devises
Article 924. All things and rights which are within the
commerce of man be bequeathed or devised. (865a)
Article 925. A testator may charge with legacies and
devises not only his compulsory heirs but also the legatees and devisees.
The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the extent of
the value of the legacy or the devise received by them. The compulsory heirs
shall not be liable for the charge beyond the amount of the free portion given
them. (858a)
Article 926. When the testator charges one of the heirs with
a legacy or devise, he alone shall be bound.
Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be liable
in the same proportion in which they may inherit. (859)
Article 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the
estate, they shall be solidarily liable for the loss or destruction of a thing
devised or bequeathed, even though only one of them should have been negligent.
(n)
Article 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the legacy or
devise shall be liable in case of eviction, if the thing is indeterminate and
is indicated only by its kind. (860)
Article 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a
part of, or an interest in the thing bequeathed, the legacy or devise shall be
understood limited to such part or interest, unless the testator expressly
declares that he gives the thing in its entirety. (864a)
Article 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to
another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing
pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the
testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the
disposition shall take effect. (862a)
Article 931. If the testator orders that a thing belonging
to another be acquired in order that it be given to a legatee or devisee, the
heir upon whom the obligation is imposed or the estate must acquire it and give
the same to the legatee or devisee; but if the owner of the thing refuses to
alienate the same, or demands an excessive price therefor, the heir or the estate
shall only be obliged to give the just value of the thing. (861a)
Article 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the
time of the execution of the will already belonged to the legatee or devisee
shall be ineffective, even though another person may have some interest
therein.
If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from
such interest or encumbrance, the legacy or devise shall be valid to that
extent. (866a)
Article 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the
legatee or devisee at the time of the execution of the will, the legacy or
devise shall be without effect, even though it may have subsequently alienated
by him.
If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after such
time, he can claim nothing by virtue of the legacy or devise; but if it has
been acquired by onerous title he can demand reimbursement from the heir or the
estate. (878a)
Article 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise
something pledged or mortgaged to secure a recoverable debt before the execution
of the will, the estate is obliged to pay the debt, unless the contrary
intention appears.
The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or mortgaged
after the execution of the will.
Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the thing bequeathed
is burdened, passes with it to the legatee or devisee. (867a)
Comment: Note that only pledge and mortgage.
Examples of 2nd para. Easement, usufruct.
Article 935. The legacy of a credit against a third person
or of the remission or release of a debt of the legatee shall be effective only
as regards that part of the credit or debt existing at the time of the death of
the testator.
In the first case, the estate shall comply with the legacy by
assigning to the legatee all rights of action it may have against the debtor.
In the second case, by giving the legatee an acquittance, should he request
one.
In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests on the
credit or debt which may be due the testator at the time of his death. (870a)
Article 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding
article shall lapse if the testator, after having made it, should bring an
action against the debtor for the payment of his debt, even if such payment
should not have been effected at the time of his death.
The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is
understood to discharge only the right of pledge. (871)
Article 937. A generic legacy of release or remission of
debts comprises those existing at the time of the execution of the will, but
not subsequent ones. (872)
Article 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor shall
not be applied to his credit, unless the testator so expressly declares.
In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to collect
the excess, if any, of the credit or of the legacy or devise. (837a)
Article 939. If the testator orders the payment of what he
believes he owes but does not in fact owe, the disposition shall be considered
as not written. If as regards a specified debt more than the amount thereof is
ordered paid, the excess is not due, unless a contrary intention appears.
The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the
fulfillment of natural obligations. (n)
Article 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice
is presumed to be left to the heir upon whom the obligation to give the legacy
or devise may be imposed, or the executor or administrator of the estate if no
particular heir is so obliged.
If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been given the
choice, dies before making it, this right shall pass to the respective heirs.
Once made, the choice is irrevocable.
In the alternative legacies or devises, except as herein
provided, the provisions of this Code regulating obligations of the same kind
shall be observed, save such modifications as may appear from the intention
expressed by the testator. (874a)
Article 941. A legacy of generic personal property shall be
valid even if there be no things of the same kind in the estate.
A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid only if
there be immovable property of its kind in the estate.
The right of choice shall belong to the executor or
administrator who shall comply with the legacy by the delivery of a thing which
is neither of inferior nor of superior quality. (875a)
Article 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves the
right of choice to the heir, or to the legatee or devisee, the former may give
or the latter may choose whichever he may prefer. (876a)
Article 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot make
the choice, in case it has been granted him, his right shall pass to his heirs;
but a choice once made shall be irrevocable. (877a)
Article 944. A legacy for education lasts until the legatee
is of age, or beyond the age of majority in order that the legatee may finish
some professional, vocational or general course, provided he pursues his course
diligently.
A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the legatee,
if the testator has not otherwise provided.
If the testator has not fixed the amount of such legacies, it
shall be fixed in accordance with the social standing and the circumstances of
the legatee and the value of the estate.
If the testator or during his lifetime used to give the legatee
a certain sum of money or other things by way of support, the same amount shall
be deemed bequeathed, unless it be markedly disproportionate to the value of
the estate. (879a)
Article 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain annual,
monthly, or weekly amount is bequeathed, the legatee may petition the court for
the first installment upon the death of the testator, and for the following
ones which shall be due at the beginning of each period; such payment shall not
be returned, even though the legatee should die before the expiration of the
period which has commenced. (880a)
Article 946. If the thing bequeathed should be subject to a
usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall respect such right until it is legally
extinguished. (868a)
Article 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the
pure and simple legacies or devises from the death of the testator, and
transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
Article 948. If the legacy or devise is of a specific and
determinate thing pertaining to the testator, the legatee or devisee acquires
the ownership thereof upon the death of the testator, as well as any growing
fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income; but not the
income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death.
From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed
shall be at the risk of the legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its
loss or deterioration, and shall be benefited by its increase or improvement,
without prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or administrator.
(882a)
Article 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific and
determinate thing, but is generic or of quantity, its fruits and interests from
the time of the death of the testator shall pertain to the legatee or devisee
if the testator has expressly so ordered. (884a)
Article 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to
cover all the legacies or devises, their payment shall be made in the following
order:
(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;
(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be
preferential;
(3) Legacies for support;
(4) Legacies for education;
(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which
forms a part of the estate;
(6) All others pro rata. (887a)
Comment: BUT, if they concur with legitimes, donations inter
vivos, Article 911 applies.
Article 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with
all its accessories and accessories and in the condition in which it may be
upon the death of the testator. (883a)
Article 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or devise, or
the executor or administrator of the estate, must deliver the very thing
bequeathed if he is able to do so and cannot discharge this obligation by
paying its value.
Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even though the heir or
the estate may not have any.
The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing bequeathed
shall be for the account of the heir or the estate, but without prejudice to
the legitime. (886a)
Article 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take possession
of the thing bequeathed upon his own authority, but shall request its delivery
and possession of the heir charged with the legacy or devise, or of the
executor or administrator of the estate should he be authorized by the court to
deliver it. (885a)
Article 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a part of
the legacy or devise and repudiate the other, if the latter be onerous.
Should he die before having accepted the legacy or devise,
leaving several heirs, some of the latter may accept and the others may
repudiate the share respectively belonging to them in the legacy or devise.
(889a)
Article 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or
devises, one of which is onerous, cannot renounce the onerous one and accept
the other. If both are onerous or gratuitous, he shall be free to accept or
renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the testator intended that the two
legacies or devises should be inseparable from each other, the legatee or
devisee must either accept or renounce both.
Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or devisee
may waive the inheritance and accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the
latter and accept the former, or waive or accept both. (890a)
Article 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is
unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if the legacy or devise for any
reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged into the mass of the
estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right of accretion. (888a)
Article 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:
(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a
manner that it does not retain either the form or the denomination it had;
(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the
thing bequeathed or any part thereof, it being understood that in the latter
case the legacy or devise shall be without effect only with respect to the part
thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again belong to the
testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or
devise shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been
effected by virtue of the exercise of the right of repurchase;
(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime
of the testator, or after his death without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the
person obliged to pay the legacy or devise shall be liable for eviction if the
thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its kind, in accordance
with the provisions of article 928. (869a)
Article 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing
bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence, if it is possible to identify the
thing which the testator intended to bequeath or devise. (n)
Article 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor
of the testator's relatives shall be understood to be in favor of those nearest
in degree. (751)
CHAPTER
3
Legal or Intestate Succession
Legal or Intestate Succession
SECTION
1
General
Provisions
Article 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:
(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one
which has subsequently lost its validity;
(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of
all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession
shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has
not disposed;
(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of
heir does not happen or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the
testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no substitution, and no
right of accretion takes place;
(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except
in cases provided in this Code. (912a)
Article 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law
vests the inheritance, in accordance with the rules hereinafter set forth, in
the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in the surviving
spouse, and in the State. (913a)
Article 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when
it properly takes place.
Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares,
subject to the provisions of article 1006 with respect to relatives of the full
and half blood, and of article 987, paragraph 2, concerning division between
the paternal and maternal lines. (912a)
SUBSECTION 1. Relationship
Article 963. Proximity of relationship is determined by the
number of generations. Each generation forms a degree. (915)
Article 964. A series of degrees forms a line, which may be
either direct or collateral.
A direct line is that constituted by the series of degrees among
ascendants and descendants.
A collateral line is that constituted by the series of degrees
among persons who are not ascendants and descendants, but who come from a
common ancestor. (916a)
Article 965. The direct line is either descending or
ascending.
The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
(917)
Article 966. In the line, as many degrees are counted as
there are generations or persons, excluding the progenitor.
In the direct line, ascent is made to the common ancestor. Thus,
the child is one degree removed from the parent, two from the grandfather, and
three from the great-grandparent.
In the collateral line, ascent is made to the common ancestor
and then descent is made to the person with whom the computation is to be made.
Thus, a person is two degrees removed from his brother, three from his uncle,
who is the brother of his father, four from his first cousin, and so forth.
(918a)
Article 967. Full blood relationship is that existing
between persons who have the same father and the same mother.
Half blood relationship is that existing between persons who
have the same father, but not the same mother, or the same mother, but not the
same father. (920a)
Comments: (Quoted from Aquino Reviewer on Civil Law, First
Edition, 2014).
1. Rule on Preference Between Lines
1.1. Persons in direct descending line
EXCLUDE those in the direct ascending and collateral lines
1.2. Persons in the direct ascending line
EXCLUDE those in the collateral line.
2. Rule of Proximity. The relative NEAREST in degree
excludes the more distant ones. EXCEPTION: When the right of representation
takes place.
3. Rule on Equal Division. Relatives in the
SAME degree shall inherit in equal shares.
3.1. Exceptions: There is no equality.
a) Between
legitimate and illegitimate children. Art. 967, New Family Code
b) If the
rule of preference between the lines applies
c) Under
the rule of division by line in the ascending line (between paternal and
maternal grandparents) . Art. 987, New Civil Code
d) Between
relatives of the full and half-blood- brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces. Articles 1006 and 1008, New Civil Code
e) When
the right of representation takes place.
4. Curtain Bar Rule. This means that there is a
separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family. The
illegitimate family cannot inherit by intestate succession from the
legitimate family.
4.1. Not applicable to preference in appointment of administrator. “The
curtain bar rule is inapplicable if the issue to be resolved is who is better
qualified to administer the estate of the decedent. The paramount consideration
in the appointment if an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the
prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.[2]”
4.2. In the
same case, an extensive discussion on the “Curtain Bar-Rule” was made:
“One final note. Counsel for petitioner
meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar
between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply
in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III,
an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the
decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and
trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of
administration.
We are not unmindful of the
critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the
bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the
eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right
of representation was admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so
that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil Code of
the Philippines apparently adhered to this principle since it
reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but with fine
inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the
illegitimate issue of a legitimate child from representing him in the intestate
succession of the grandparent, the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can
now do so. This difference being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future
revision of the Civil Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either
that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said article
and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more in accord
with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]
Manresa explains the
basis for the rules on intestate succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the
presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said, first descends, then ascends,
and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls the descendants, then
the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring those closer in
degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the deceased would
have done so had he manifested his last will. Lastly, in default of anyone
called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it
is in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to
charitable or educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of
humanity.[24]
4.2. Is the curtain
Bar-Rule likewise applicable to illegitimate siblings of the half-blood? If
illegitimate brothers and sisters could inherit from one another, would not an
illegitimate child be afforded better rights than a legitimate child who is
barred from inheriting ab intestato from
his illegitimate brother?
-Read:
IN THE MATTER
OF THE INTESTATE
ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO
AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA,
G.R. No. 155733, January 27, 2006
“Pertinent to this matter is the following
observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another
woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but of half-blood
relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate
children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though there is unquestionably
a tie of blood between them.It seems that to allow an illegitimate child
to succeed ab intestato (from)
another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the
former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a
legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate
brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The
reason impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate
and illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no such
difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent,
even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same
footing before the law, just like legitimate children of half-blood
relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of
legitimate brothers and sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood
illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of
half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of
the half-blood, they shall share equally.[53]
5. Separation of the Adopted and the Relatives of the
Adopter. Although the adopted child shall be treated as a legitimate
child, the relationship extends only up to the adopter/s. There is no legal
relationship with the relatives of the adopter/ s, hence: (1) the adopted
cannot inherit from the relatives of the adopter, (2) The right of
representation DOES NOT APPLY – the adopted child cannot represent and cannot
be represented. EXCEPTION: If the adopted is a blood relative in proper case.
6. Double Share of collateral relatives of
full-blood. When full and half-blood brothers or sisters, nephews or
nieces, survive, the full-blood shall take a portion in the inheritance double
that of the half-blood.
7. Repudiation by All in the Same Degree. If
the inheritance should be repudiated by the nearest relative, should there be
one only, or by all the nearest relatives called by law to succeed, should there
be several, those of the following degree shall inherit in their own right and
cannot represent the person or persons repudiating the inheritance.[3]
This is subject to the rule of preference between lines.
8. Right of REPRESENTATION. A right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place
and degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter
would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.[4]
a) Law.
The representative is called to the succession by the law not by the person
represented.
b) Capacity.
He does not succeed from the person represented but from the decedent – one
whom the person represented would have succeeded.[5] Hence,
the representative must be capable of succeeding the decedent[6].
Nevertheless, the representative is not disqualified to represent the heir
whose inheritance he has renounced.[7]
c) Representation
in Direct and Collateral Line.
1. Direct
line. – representation takes place ad infinitum in the direct
descending line, NEVER in the ascending line.[8]
a. Only
legitimate children can represent a legitimate child of the decedent
b. Both
legitimate and illegitimate children can represent an illegitimate child of the
decedent.[9]
2. Collateral
line. Representation takes place only in favour of the children of brothers or
sisters (nephews or nieces), whether of the full- or half-blood, and only if
they concur with one ormore uncle/ s or aunt/ s.[10]
d) No representation in Repudiation. Heirs who repudiate their
share may NOT be represented. [11]
e) Cases when there is Representation. 1. Predecease of the
person represented; 2. Incapacity or Unworthiness of the person represented;
and 3. Disinheritance of the person represented.
9. Per STIRPES SHARING. Whenever there is
succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be made per
stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall
not inherit more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were
living or could inherit.[12]
10. Order of Intestate Succession.
1) Legitimate children or descendants;
2) Legitimate parents or ascendants;
3) Illegitimate children or descendants;
4) Surviving spouse;
5) Brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces;
6) Other collateral relatives within the 5th degree; and,
7) The State.
1) Legitimate children or descendants;
2) Legitimate parents or ascendants;
3) Illegitimate children or descendants;
4) Surviving spouse;
5) Brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces;
6) Other collateral relatives within the 5th degree; and,
7) The State.
Article 968. If there are several relatives of the same
degree, and one or some of them are unwilling or incapacitated to succeed, his
portion shall accrue to the others of the same degree, save the right of
representation when it should take place. (922)
Article 969. If the inheritance should be repudiated by the
nearest relative, should there be one only, or by all the nearest relatives
called by law to succeed, should there be several, those of the following
degree shall inherit in their own right and cannot represent the person or
persons repudiating the inheritance. (923)
[1] G.R.
No. 176422, March 20, 2013
[2] Suntay
III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No, 183053, 683 SCRA 439 (2010)
[3] Art.
969, NCC
[4] Article
970, Ibid.
[5] Art.
971, Ibid.
[6] Art.
973, Ibid
[7] Art.
976, Ibid
[8] Art.
972, Ibid
[9] Arts.
902, 989, 990, Ibid.
[10] Art.
972, Ibid
No comments:
Post a Comment