OBJECT
AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
ETRIII REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture Outline No. 2
January 2018 revision
OUTLINE/
LECTURE ON
OBJECT
AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
By:
Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III
(Prepared
for Law 3-B,
Univ.
of San Agustin Law School,
SY
2017-2018)
Subject
Index
A.
Object Evidence
B.
Documentary Evidence
C. Best
Evidence Rule
D.
Parol Evidence Rule
E.
Authentication and Proof of Documents
The grouping of these concepts on evidence fall under the classification of
OBJECT and DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE as distinguished from TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
which will be the subject matter of the next lecture outline.
A. Object Evidence; Synonymous with Real,
Demonstrative or Physical Evidence
Section 1, Rule 130.
Object as evidence.- Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of
the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited
to, examined or viewed by the court.
A.1. Versus Testimonial Evidence. As
opposed to TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, which pertains to the “perception” of the
witness which he/ she relates to the Court, OBJECT EVIDENCE is addressed to the
senses of the Court. Thus, in a sense, while testimonial evidence is a
“second-hand, recycled and vicarious” kind of evidence, object evidence is
“first-hand” knowledge of the court.
Thus, it was held, that “Physical evidence is evidence of the
highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses”[1].
A.2. Scope or
extent. “Object evidence is not visual alone. It covers the entire range of
human senses: hearing, taste, smell, and touch. In a case where the issue is infringement
of a musical composition, the court may listen to the composition involved. The
court may not only look at but also touch the blade of a knife to know
whether or not it could have produced the incision characteristic of sharp
blades”[2].
"Harry Potter Case"
"Harry Potter Case"
J.K. Rowling, the author
of the phenomenal “Harry Potter” book series was sued for copyright infringement.
The judge had to read the entire book series and after doing so, arrived at the
conclusion that the “feel and context” of Rowling’s book particularly its plot
and theme are so far removed from the complainant’s book thus warranting the
dismissal of the case. “The contrast
between the total concept and feel of the works is so stark that any comparison
of the two strains credulity” – District Court Judge Shira Sheindlin
"O.J. Simpson
case"
Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the accused O.J. Simpson to put on the gloves which he did before the spectators in the courtroom and the jury and the judge. But regrettably, OJ struggled to put it in and it appeared too small for his humongous hands. This prompted famous attorney, the late Johnnie Cochran, to argue in his closing arguments that, “If it does not fit, you must acquit”. (Rumor has it that the gloves were really those of OJ except that they were leather gloves and since they were kept in custody by the prosecution for quite sometime, they shrunk. OJ Simpson, for his part, not only being a famous athlete but has also dabbled in acting, dramatized his struggle to put on what appeared to be gloves too small for his hands).
Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the accused O.J. Simpson to put on the gloves which he did before the spectators in the courtroom and the jury and the judge. But regrettably, OJ struggled to put it in and it appeared too small for his humongous hands. This prompted famous attorney, the late Johnnie Cochran, to argue in his closing arguments that, “If it does not fit, you must acquit”. (Rumor has it that the gloves were really those of OJ except that they were leather gloves and since they were kept in custody by the prosecution for quite sometime, they shrunk. OJ Simpson, for his part, not only being a famous athlete but has also dabbled in acting, dramatized his struggle to put on what appeared to be gloves too small for his hands).
A.3. Requisites for
Admissibility of object (real) evidence. “An
object may be exhibited, examined or viewed by the court when (1) it is
relevant to the fact in issue, and (2) the present condition of the object be
the same at the time in issue”.
A.3.1. “As a general
rule, it seems essential that articles shown to the court should be connected,
at least prima facie, with the crime in issue. An article of personal property,
the relevancy of which has been shown by its identification with the subject
matter of the crime, may be exhibited in the courtroom, whether as direct
evidence of a relevant fact, or to enable them to understand the evidence or to
realize more completely its cogency and force, or to assist the court in
solving a material, controverted or doubtful point. Admission of visual,
exhibitive or demonstrative evidence is much within the discretion of the
court, and the extent of identification of such articles necessary before
admission varies with circumstances. The court may inspect and smell the
contents of a bottle properly identified and admitted in evidence. Comparison
of materials may also be made by the court, aided by the evidence of expert
witnesses. So, in case the quality of an article, or its adaptability to a
specific use or purpose, is in issue, a sample may be shown to the court,
together with a specimen of a like material which is shown to be of good
quality or adapted to the required purpose, and the court may then make a
comparison to ascertain possible points of difference.
The propriety of justice
of permitting articles and implements such as deadly weapons, lanterns, masks,
counterfeiters’ tools, gambling apparatus and the like, used by criminals, but
which are not shown to be connected with the accused, to be exhibited to the
court may well be doubted. Such a practice, under the pretext of illustrating
or explaining evidence, is well calculated to prejudice the court against the
accused. Generally, where the sole purpose is to arouse prejudice, pity or
other passion, and no legitimate aim is served, it is error to admit articles
thus offered. Lack of some sort of identification or connection with the crime,
a plea of guilty, failure to shed light on an issue, or failure to show
condition unchanged, are other grounds for barring articles from admission as
evidence”[3].
A.3.1.1. Indecency
or impropriety as ground for disallowing the introduction of object
evidence.
Gen. Rule- When the
object produced as evidence is indecent, or improper, it should be excluded,
unless the same is necessary for ascertaining the truth[4].
Exception- “But when
justice and the discovery of the truth, are at stake, the ordinary canons of
modesty and delicacy of feeling cannot be allowed to impose a prohibition upon
necessary measures. If such matters were not unshrinkingly discussed and
probed, many kinds of crimes would remain unpunished. Nevertheless, needless
spectators having no responsibility for the course of justice, may well be
avoided. Where it is a question of what would otherwise be an indecency, two
limitations seems appropriate: (a) there should be a fair necessity for
inspection, the trial court to determine; (b) the inspection should take place
apart from the public courtroom, in the sole presence of the tribunal and the
parties[5]”.
A.3.2. Authentication
of Object Evidence. “It must be emphasized that every evidence,
whether it be a document or an object, needs a witness. Even object evidence
requires statements from a witness to make its way into the realm of admissible
evidence. In short, testimonial evidence provides the foundation for all types
of evidence.[6]”
A.3.3. Extraction
of DNA Samples and the Right Against Self-Incrimination.
“This
right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States, 218 US 245, …is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him…” It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the accused’s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.
It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded
is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
in 4 Wigmore, 2263, discussing the question now before [the Court] in his
treatise on evidence, thus, said: ‘… it is not merely compulsion that is the
kernel of the privilege, … but testimonial compulsion”[7].
A.3.4. Demonstrative
Evidence. This is now deemed
included within the ambit of “object” evidence. Maps, diagram, a photograph and
a model, fall under this category.
A.3.4.1. Photographs.
– “The courts take judicial notice that all civilized communities rely
on photographic pictures for presenting resemblances of persons and animals,
scenery, natural objects, buildings, and other artificial objects. It
is accordingly well established that photographs of persons, things, and
places, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the subjects as of the time in question, are, in the
discretion of the trial court, admissible in evidence as aids to it in arriving
at an understanding of the evidence or the condition of objects or premises,
the circumstances of an accident, or the condition or the identity of a person
when any such matter is relevant to the issues being litigated”[8].
A.3.4.2. Maps. “The
draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy, but any other witnesses
may refer to it while testifying, to illustrate his testimony. It is not
material by whom the map or diagram was prepared providing that he can testify
that the man or diagram was prepared providing that he can testify that the map
or diagram is accurate and is based on knowledge derived from his own
investigation[9]”.
A.3.5. DNA
EVIDENCE. A.M. No. 06-11-05-SC. Deoxyribonucleic acid.
In Agustin v. CA[10], it was
ruled that A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not
change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same
as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair,
earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue and vaginal or rectal cells. Most
importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins”.
Why identical twins?
Rule on Right Against Self-Incrimination in Extraction of Samples.
Guidelines.
ü How
samples were collected.
ü How
they were handled
ü Possibility
of contamination of samples. Liquid samples?
ü Procedure
followed in analyzing samples
ü Proper
standards and procedure followed in conducting tests
ü Qualification
of analyst who conducted the test
DNA Profile.
12 Universally- accepted Markers.
A.3.6.
Chain of Custody Rule
RA
9165; Chain of Custody
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 213221 -
versus - BIYAN MOHAMMAD y ASDORI a.k.a. "BONG BIYAN" and MINA
LADJAHASAN y TOMBREO, Accused, MINA LADJAHASAN y TOMBREO, Present: CARPIO,*
VELASCO, JR.,** J., Chairperson, PERALTA*** ' PEREZ, and REYES,JJ. Promulgated:
Accused-Appellant. Novemb_er 9, 2016 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - ~;or~_
Contrary to the position of Ladjahasan, there is proof directly
linking her in the illegal sale of shabu. We are in full accord with the
factual findings of the lower courts. The RTC held: 4 The said testimony of PO
1 Santiago also illustrates the participation of accused Mina Ladjahasan in
selling of Shabu. She was the one who opened the door and this must be her role
in their drug trafficking operation - answer the knock on the door and verify
the intention of [the one] knocking. In this case, when she learned that PO 1
Santiago, acting as poseurbuyer, intended to buy Shabu, she went back inside
the room. Thereafter, it was accused Mohammad that emerged and transacted with
PO 1 Santiago. Clearly, when accused Ladjahasan went back inside the room, she
relayed to Mohammad the intention of PO 1 Santiago, then, Mohammad took over by
transacting with Santiago who was a prospective buyer of Shabu. CA ro/lo, pp.
45-46. Rollo, pp. 43-44. c7 Decision - 6 - G.R. No. 213221 If Ladjahasan was
not part of the operation, she would have turned away PO 1 Santiago as he would
only be intruding into their intimate space, instead, she just went in as if it
was a normal occurrence in the usual course of their business. When inside, she
informed Mohammad that there is a buyer outside. These circumstances when put
together warrant an inescapable conclusion that both accused Mohammad and
Ladjahasan were animated by a common purpose of engaging in drug trafficking. 5
On the other hand, the CA opined: Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode,
method, and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a point purpose and
design, concerted action, and community of interests. It is clear from the
testimony of POI Santiago that Ladjahasan and Mohammad were of one mind in
selling shabu to him as shown by their series of overt acts during the
transaction, to wit: (1) when POI Santiago knocked on the door of the room
occupied by the accused, it was Ladjahasan who responded by slightly opening
the door; (2) after opening the door, Ladjahasan then asked PO 1 Santiago of
their intention, to which the latter replied that he wanted to buy P200.00
worth of shabu; (3) after hearing the intention of POI Santiago, Ladjahasan closed
the door; (4) a few seconds later, Mohammad came at the door, got the money
from POI Santiago and handed to the latter the shabu. No other logical
conclusion would follow from the concerted action of both Mohammad and
Ladjahasan except that they had a common purpose and community of interest.
Their modus operandi was for Ladjahasan to screen the buyer while Mohammad does
the actual sale. Conspiracy having been established, Ladjahasan is liable as
co-principal regardless of her participation.6 As to the contention that the
buy-bust team failed to observe the chain of custody rule, this Court similarly
discharged in People v. Ros: 7 6 The appellants cannot be allowed to belatedly
question the police officers' alleged noncompliance with Section 21 for the first
time on appeal. The issue on the chain of custody was neither raised nor
mentioned with specificity during the trial. In no instance did the appellants
manifest or at least intimate before the trial court that there were lapses in
the handling and safekeeping of the seized marijuana that might affect its
admissibility, integrity and evidentiary value. This emission is fatal to the
case of the defense. Whatever "justifiable ground" that may excuse
the prosecution from complying with the statutory requirements on chain of
custody will remain unknown in light of the apparent failure of the appellants
to challenge the custody and safekeeping or the issue of disposition and
preservation of the subject drugs before the RTC. This Court cannot now dwell
on the matter because to do so would CA rollo, p. 42. Id. at 108. G.R. No.
201146, April 15, 2015, 755 SCRA 518. tfl Decision - 7 - G.R. No. 213221 be
against the tenets of fair play and equity. As We stressed in People v. Sta.
Maria: The law excuses noncompliance under justifiable grounds. However,
whatever justifiable grounds that may excuse the police officers involved in
the buy-bust operation x x x from complying with Section 21 will remain
unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the
items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of
Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial
court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did
appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the
safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary
value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal;
when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state
in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question
for the first time on appeal. The appellants could have also moved for the
quashal of the Information at the first instance, but they did not. Hence, they
are deemed to have waived any objection on the matter. 8 Moreover, it has been
consistently held that strict compliance on the chain of custody rule is not
required and that the arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the
items seized from him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of
non-compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of RA No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations. The most important factor in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items.9 Here, the prosecution was able to establish with
moral certainty and prove to the court beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal
drugs (and drug paraphernalia) presented to the trial court as evidence are the
same items confiscated from the accused, tested and found to be positive for
dangerous substance.”
“Chain of Custody; 9165
The chain of custody of
evidence was not established Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to
establish the charges of illegal sale and possession of shabu against her due
to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the
evidence in view of non-compliance with Section 21, Article II ofRA 9165. There
is merit in this protestation. The offense of ill~gal sale of shabu has the
following elements: "(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the
object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and
the payment therefor." 18 On the other hand, the offense of illegal
possession of shabu has the following elements: "(l) the accused is in
possession of an item or an object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed said drug." 19 In the prosecution for illegal sale and
possession of shabu, there must be proof that these offenses were actually
committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus def~~
16 Peoplev. Gatong-o, 250 Phil. 710, 711 (1988). 17 People v. Sta. Maria, 545
Phil. 520, 528-529 (2007). 18 People v. Lorenzo, 633 Phil. 393, 402 (2010). 19
Id. at 403. 20 Id. Decision 8 G.R. No. 206590 In both illegal sale and illegal
possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent
doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabuj must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally possessed
and sold x xx is the same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a
guilty verdict.21 "The chain of custody requirement performs this function
in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed."22 Chain of custody is defined as "duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."23 In
People v. Havana,24 the Court expounded on the custodial chain procedure in
this wise: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule
requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. lt would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the
moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom
it was received, where it W(l.S and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always
the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken
chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its
condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a \vitness has
failed to observe its wliqueness. The same standard obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to
whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. Thus, as a genera~
rul~ur links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established/~~ 21 Id. 22 People v. Havana, G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016,
778 SCRA 524, 534. 23 id. 24 Id. at 534-535. Decision 9 G.R. No. 206590 first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and subrrussion of
the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her
initials and signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the
starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be
marked hnmediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings
as reference. 26 The chain of custody rule also reqtlires that the marking of
the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended
violator, and (2) immediately upon confiscation."27 In this case, the
records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with
their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon confiscation.
While P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the
police station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was
accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings
on said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted
placing the markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to
prove authorship of the markings. While marking of the evidence is allowed in
the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of warrantless searches
and seizures.29 Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to
their operation. They therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare
for its implementation. However, the police officers failed· to mark
immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in
spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside
the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the
marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in
the chain of custody. The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting
officers to the investigating officer in the police station constitutes the
secc;md link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court takes note that
the testimonies of the prosecution ~itnesses failed to identify the person to
whom the seized items were turned over,,,,&~ 25 People v. Nandi, 639 Phil.
134, 144-145 (2010). /..., 26 People v. Alejandro, 671 Phil. 33, 46 (20 l 1 ).
27 ld. at 47. 28 TSN, July 12, 2005, pp. I 07-108. 29 People v. Alcuizar, 662
Phil. 794, 802 (201 l). Decision 10 G.R. No. 206590 at the police station.
While SP03 Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the police
station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the investigating
officer. There is nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This
total want of evidence gains importance considering that none of the arresting
officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented during trial as
the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of
custody is missing. The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist in the crime laboratocy is the third link in
the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to
the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it was handled
therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the
seized sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the
responsibility of the PDEA to forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory.
The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police
officer who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO 1 Asis, but he was not
presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratocy was the
same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third break in the chain of
custody. Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist
PSI Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert
that the alleged packs of chemical substance presented for laboratocy
examination and tested positive for shabu were the very same substance
allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the result of
the examination he conducted and not on the source of the substance. From the
foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we
have here are individual links with breaks in-between which could not be
seamlessly woven or tied together. 1he so-called links in the chain of custody
show that the seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the actual
seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the PDEA, as well as its
transfer to the crime laboratocy for examination. The Court therefore cannot
conclude with moral certainty that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the
same as that presented for laboratocy examination and then presented in court.
It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and
Wlbroken. In reality however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must
therefore be observed "is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to detennine the
guilt or innocence of the accused."30 Her~, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to prope~~ 30 People v. Mendoza, supra note I.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 206590 preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a
chain of custody could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to
offer testimony to establish a substantially complete chain of custody of the
shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer
in court diminishes the government's chance of successfully prosecuting a dtug
case. 31 Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken
chain of custody, another procedural lapse casts farther uncertainty on the
identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance
by the arresting officers with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to
the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1), Article II
of RA 9165, which reads as follows: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Corifi.scated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources qf
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner: (1) The
apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows: Section 2l(a) The
apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
the same in the presence offue accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seizr,d, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the ,,/'//
ne,arest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case ~ ctf/I / ··· People v. Havana, supra note 22 at 537. Decision 12 G.R. No.
206590 of warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of
and custody over said items. In this case, the apprehending team never
conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the place where the
search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department
of Justice, nor did it photograph the same in the presence of appellant after
their initial custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing
and confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation offered for such failure.
While this directive of rigid compliance has been tempered in certain cases,
"such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can
be applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug
are properly preserved."32 Such an exception does not obtain in this case.
"Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu] in view
of the broken linkages in the chain of custody. [Thus,] the presumption of
regularity in the perfonnance of official duty accorded to the [apprehending
officers] by the courts below cannot arise."33 WHEREFORE, the
appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00744 dated June 23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y
Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her guilt not having been
established beyond reasonable doubt. The Superintendent for the Correctional
Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the appellant from
custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause. SO ORDERED. 32 Id. at
538-539. 33 Id. at 539.”
B.
Documentary Evidence.
“Section 2. Rule 130. Documentary Evidence.- Documents as evidence consist of
writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols
or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents”.
Sec. 1(h), Rule 2 of Rules on Electronic Evidence. “Electronic document” refers
to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other modes of written expressions described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term ‘electronic document’ may be used
interchangeably with ‘electronic data message’”.
B.1. Nature. Consists
of writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents.
B.2.
Admissibility of documentary evidence. – “Documentary evidence is
subject to the same basic rules of evidence or tests with respect to relevancy
and materiality as are other types of evidence. Subject to the application of
exclusionary rules and trial court discretion, where such discretion is
fitting, admissibility of documentary evidence, as with other evidence, is
determined by the issues in the particular case.
A
proper foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that
is, the identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably
established as a pre-requisite to its admission. However, a party who does not
deny the genuineness of a proferred instrument may not object that it was not
properly identified before it was admitted in evidence”.
e.g. Failure to contest
actionable documents. Sec. 8, Rule 8, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
“When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding
section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall
be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath,
specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but he
requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to
be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection
of the original instrument is refused.”
B.3.
Requisites for Admissibility of Documentary Evidence.
a) The
document must be relevant;
b) The
evidence must be authenticated;
c) The
document must be authenticated by a competent witness; and,
Important Rules on
Documentary Evidence. – “Rules on documentary
evidence which a lawyer must thoroughly familiarize himself to the end that a
proper and effective presentation of documents in evidence may be made are:
ü The Best evidence rule-
Secs. 3-4, Rule 130
ü The Rule on Secondary
Evidence- Secs. 5-8, Ibid
ü The Parol Evidence Rule-
Sec. 9, Ibid
ü The Rule on
Authentication and Proof of Documents- Sec. 19-33, Rule 132
ü Documents written in
unofficial language must be translated to English or Filipino- Section 33, Rule
132
C. The Best Evidence
Rule; Applicability. “Stated in simple form,
the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade or
evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact.”
Reason: to prevent fraud. Because if a party is in possession of such evidence
and withholds it; and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
C.1. Primary Evidence.
The highest or best evidence which, from the abstract
nature of the facts to be proved, is procurable, and which, under circumstances
of the particular case, affords the greatest certainty of the fact, that is,
renders the probability of its existence most evident to the understanding. It
is that evidence which does not indicate the existence of other evidence nearer
the facts to be proved.[12]
C.2.
Not Applicable when subject of inquiry does not pertain to contents of document
“The best evidence rule
as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure applies only when the content of such document is the
subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such
document was actually executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to
or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence
is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original. Moreover, production of the original
may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever the
opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and
no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that
the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case. Here, there was
no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly admitted in
evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The petitioner never even denied their
due execution and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition. As for
the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect, admitted its genuineness and due
execution when she failed to specifically deny it in the manner required by the
rules. The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express
the true agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional
paper arrangements made upon the advice of counsel. Apparently, the
petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but alleges that there
was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua
Sioc Huan was only temporary.[13]”
- Both cases were for
prosecution of Bouncing checks law where only photocopies of checks were
offered in evidence
- First case, check was
offered to prove “execution or existence of the document or the circumstances
surrounding its execution
- Second case, check was
offered to prove “contents, names of drawer, drawee, date, amount and dishonor
C.3. Best evidence rule
not applicable when document is merely collateral to issue.“When a document is
involved in the inquiry but the document is only collaterally in issue, the
best evidence rule does not apply. A document is collaterally in issue when the
purpose of introducing the document is not to establish its terms, but to
show facts that have no reference to its contents like its existence,
condition, execution or delivery[16].
C.4.
What constitutes as Original Document.
“The best evidence rule
is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a
disputed fact. Although there are certain recognized exceptions when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself.
However,
in the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, the receipt presented
by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the triplicate copy of the
provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the other copies of the
same receipt involving the same transaction. Section 4, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court provides:
Sec.
4. Original of document.
(a) The
original of the document is one the contents of which are the subject of
inquiry.
(b) When
a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time, with
identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When
an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals.[17]”
C.4.1. Original of an
Electronic Document. – An electronic document shall be regarded as the
equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately. (Section 1, Rule 4 of Rules on Electronic Evidence).
D. SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Requisites for Introduction in Case of Loss, Destruction or Unavailability of
Original
“The burden of proof rests upon petitioner, as plaintiff, to
establish its case based on a preponderance of evidence. It is well-settled
that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving
it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the
principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the
original sales invoices it had presented in court were inadmissible in
evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still have had
little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence
to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary
evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the
offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3[ of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well s the
conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the
photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not
established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When
original document is unavailable. When the original document has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of
its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad
faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the
order stated.
Applying the above Rule
to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the
following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the
loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in
court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which
the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The correct order of
proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At
the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case,
the existence of the original sales invoices was established
by the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however,
failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in
court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the
originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that
were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by
Equitable.Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from
Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than
one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have
been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence
can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting
for the other originals.
In Santos v.
Santos the Court upheld the pronouncement of the CA that before
the appellees therein could be allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove
the contents of the original, they had to prove -- with the requisite quantum
of evidence -- the loss, the destruction or the unavailability of all original
copies of the document.
In the present case,
triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice
only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had
gone to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three
copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original
copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the
search for them.
E. Parol Evidence Rule;
Applicability
“Rule 130, Section 9 of
the Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule and states:
SEC.
9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However,
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the
written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
(c) The validity of the
written agreement; or
(d) The existence of
other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors-in-interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term
"agreement" includes wills.
The
parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the
terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting to show
that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the
purport of the written contract.[9]
This principle
notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule that this case falls
within the exceptions, particularly that the written agreement failed to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This argument is
untenable.
Although parol evidence
is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve
the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless
there has been fraud or mistake.[10] Evidence of a prior
or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[11]
The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12] is
the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions.[13] Business
forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are
commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the
parties and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business
transaction has in fact transpired.[14]These
documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces
of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the
details of the consummation of contracts.[15]
The
terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to
Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo
Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a
party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms
stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise
from their breach.[16]
Oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence.[17]
Hence,
petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the
parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains
only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in
terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a
mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the
subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other,
and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of
the instrument.
Even
assuming there is a shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot
be made a basis for holding respondents liable therefor.
As
pointed out by the CA, Rodriguez is a person separate and independent from
Autocorp. Whatever obligations Rodriguez contracted cannot be attributed to
Autocorp and vice versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner proffers as
its defense under the Lease Purchase Agreement was not even incurred by
Rodriguez or by Autocorp but by Uniline.
The
Lease Purchase Agreement clearly shows that the parties thereto are two
corporations not parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this
Lease Purchase Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not
Rodriguez, that incurred the debt to Focus Point. The obligation of
Uniline to Focus Point arose out of a transaction completely different from the
subject of the instant case.
It is
settled that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
individual stockholders or members, and is not affected by the personal rights,
obligations and transactions of the latter. The corporation may not be
held liable for the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can
its stockholders be held liable for its obligation.
Of
course, this Court has recognized instances when the corporations separate
personality may be disregarded. However, we have also held that the same may
only be done in cases where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23] Moreover,
the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be
presumed.
To reiterate, the
transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that
under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes
Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline incurred obligations to
Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that
Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations
separate personalities were being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or
wrongdoing.
Moreover, Rodriguez, as
stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held personally liable for the
debts of the corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own.
While Section 31 of the Corporation Code lays down the exceptions to the
rule, the same does not apply in this case. Section 31 makes a director
personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for
or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also
makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the corporation. The bad faith or
wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly. Bad
faith is never presumed.
The burden of proving bad
faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on petitioner, a burden which
it failed to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to have
dismissed the third-party complaint against Rodriguez on the ground that he was
not a party to the sale of the excavator.
Rule 6, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party complaint as a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
The purpose of the rule
is to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party
which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing
multiplicity of suits. Had it not been for the rule, the claim could have
been filed separately from the original complaint.
Petitioners claim against
Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before the trial court, tried
and decided on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates as res
judicata against another suit involving the same parties and same
cause of action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that
Rodriguez was not a party to the sale of the excavator. On the other hand,
petitioner Seaoils liability has been successfully established by respondent.
A last point. We reject
Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator, having been legally
and completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc., cannot be
subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not legally
entitled to any writ of replevin.[30] The
claim is negated by the sales invoice which clearly states that [u]ntil after
the vehicle is fully paid inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the
property of Autocorp Group which reserves the right to take possession of said
vehicle at any time and place without prior notice.[31]
Considering, first, that
Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator and, second, that
Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still
rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil
had already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its
depot in Batangas. Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the
transaction even as it has not complied with its obligation. It cannot be
permitted to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No.
72193 is AFFIRMED.[19]”
PURPOSE
OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
“The appellate court is
correct in declaring that under the parole evidence rule, when the parties have
reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have intended such
written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of everything that
they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous agreements are
deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as between them
and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive evidence
of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary, alter or
modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms of the
subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are clear and explicit
and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity depends. To be sure,
Allied Bank was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the management committee
was ordered created; hence, it would not be correct to presume that it had
notice of the existence of the management committee which, incidentally, was
still to be created when the subject promissory note was executed on 12 August
1981. Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to form the
management committee on 27 July 1981, it was only on 14 August 1981 when the
committee was actually created and its members appointed. Clearly then, the
subject promissory note was outside the realm of authority of the management
committee. Corollarily, the chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.
We thus declare and so
hold that Allied Banks foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted over the
vessel Jean III was justified. On this score, we also rule that the loss of the
mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not by Allied Bank
but by the spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was incumbent
upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel sank before
the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its loss must be
borne by the spouses Cheng”[20].
E.1.
Applicability of Parol Evidence Rule Does not Require A Particular form
“REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; DOES NOT SPECIFY
THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.- Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written
agreement be a public document. What is required is that the agreement
be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that
which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have
expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to
control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different
contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them" [FRANCISCO,
THE RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p.
179] Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need
not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general
rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to
be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.”[21]
E.2.
Not Applicable to Labor Cases
“In determining arbitral
awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other factors and documents
including, as in this case, the financial documents[6] submitted
by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and financial outlook and
improvements as stated in its own website.[7]
The appellate courts
ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and the minutes of
the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate the rule on
parol evidence is erroneous. The parol evidence rule, like other rules on
evidence, should not be strictly applied in labor cases. Interphil
Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8] teaches:
[R]eliance
on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending
before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are notcontrolling. Rules of
procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in
labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting
and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated
in the CBA. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)”[22]
Right
of Repurchase and the
Statute
of Frauds
A.“Since a right to repurchase is a part of the contract of sale, it is
governed also by the Statute of Frauds. However, when the contract of sale has
been reduced in writing, parol evidence may be adduced to prove the agreement
allowing the right of repurchase the property sold, since the deed of
sale and the verbal agreement allowing the right of repurchase should be
considered as an integral whole, then the deed of sale relied upon by the
seller “is in itself the note or memorandum evidencing the contract” which
would take the case outside the provisions of the Statute of Frauds”[23].
B. Waiver; Estoppel
1.4.
Basically, in Nool v. CA,[24] the doctrine was laid down that a right of repurchase must
be part and parcel of a contract of sale and cannot be embodied in a separate
contract.
-“under
the wise, just and equitable presumption in Article 1602, a document which
appears on its face to be a sale- absolute or with pacto de retro- may be
proven by the vendor or vendor-a –retro to be one of a loan with mortgage. In
this case, parol evidence becomes competent and admissible to prove
that the instrument was in truth and in fact given merely as a security for the
payment of a loan. And upon proof of the truth of such allegations, the court
will enforce the agreement or understanding in consonance with the true intent
of the parties at the time of the execution of the contract”[25].
[1] People
v. Suunpongco, 163 SCRA 222; People v. Pardella, G.R. No. L-45266, November 24,
1988; People v. Bardaaje, 99 SCRA 388; People v. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114.
[3] See
Francisco on Evidence, pp. 105-106, Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition citing
Underhill’s Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 196-197
[9] Underhill;s
Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 228, 229, 230-231,
cited on p. 119, Francisco, Ibid.
Authentication and Proof of
Documents
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Section 19. Classes of Documents. — For
the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are either public or
private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts,
or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;
(b) Documents acknowledge
before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents required by law to the entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before
any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be. (21a)
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of
private document not necessary. — Where a private document
is more than thirty years old, is produced from the custody in which it would
naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or
circumstances of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need be
given. (22a)
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.
— The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to
be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by
the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction
of the judge. (23a)
Section 23. Public documents as evidence. — Documents
consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person,
of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
(24a)
Section 24. Proof of official record. — The
record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a
certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated
by the seal of his office. (25a)
|
Section 19 (a), Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should be
read in tandem with Section 24, Rule 132, thus:
Sec. 19 (a)
“Public documents
are:
(a)
Written official
acts, or records of official acts of sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign
country. X x x
Sec. 24. Proof of
official record. –
The record of public documents
referred to in para. (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may
be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or, by a copy attested by the officer
having legal custody of the record or by his deputy.
X x x”
In the 23
January 2017 case of Republic
v. Carmen Santo Rio, (G.R. No. 215009), it was held that:
“The CENRO and
Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications [do] not fall within
the the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of
Section23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect “entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer” such as entries made by the Civil
Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook.
The certifications are not the
certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records
in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even
records of public documents. X x x
In fact,
the contents of the certifications are hearsay because respondent’s sole
witness and attorney-in-fact, Lea Galeno Barroca, was incompetent to testify
on the veracity of their contents, as she did not prepare any of the
certifications nor was she a public officer of the concerned government
agencies.
|
Section 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever
a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must
be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he
be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26a)
Section 26. Irremovability of public record. — Any
public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be
removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where
the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27a)
Section 27. Public record of a private document. — An
authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record,
with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Section 28. Proof of lack of record. — A
written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified
tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of
his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. — Any
judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in
the court or judicial officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud
in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a)
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or
document involved. (31a)
.“Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favour the presumption of
regularity which may only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed
only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. A
defective notarization will strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private document. Consequently, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and the
measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence”. (Spouses Charito M. Reyes et al., v. Heirs of
Benjamin Malan Ce etc., G.R. No. 219071, August 24, 2016)
Section 31. Alteration in document, how to explain. — The
party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to
have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration was
made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the
parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or innocent made, or that the
alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument. If he
fails to do that, the document shall not be admissible in evidence. (32a)
Section 32. Seal. — There
shall be no difference between sealed and unsealed private documents insofar as
their admissibility as evidence is concerned. (33a)
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial
language. — Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino. To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before trial. (34a)
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