Civil Law Review
Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III
University of San Agustin
College of Law
I. X executes a will but it was declared void and the heirs paid a legacy to a friend of their father, can it be revoked and legacy returned?
-General rule: Article 1430. “When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with a clause in the defective will, the payment is effective and irrevocable.
-What if heir had no knowledge that the will was void?
II. Estoppel; Landlord- Tenant
“It is clear from the above-quoted provision that [w]hat a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply. Hence, the tenant may show that the landlords title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount.
Thus, we declared in Borre v. Court of Appeals that:
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the landlords title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship [VII Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 87 (1973)]. In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlords title remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant. (Emphasis supplied.)
While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of the property at the time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord relationship between him and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioners title, as far as respondent is concerned, came only after the commencement of such relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is precisely because at the time of the execution of the second and third contracts of lease, respondent was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased property to China Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two months before the expiration of said contracts when respondent came to know of the same after it was notified by said bank. This could have been the reason why respondent did not anymore pay petitioner the rents for the succeeding months of December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be said that there was a change in the nature of petitioners title during the subsistence of the lease that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this case. Petitioners reliance on said conclusive presumption must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the CA when it entertained respondents assertion of a title adverse to petitioner.”
-Enrico Santos v. NSO, G.R. No. 171129, April 6, 2011
III. Express Trust v. Implied Trust (Oral Evidence).
Art. 1443, NCC- “No express trusts concerning an immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence.”
“Petitioner contends that private respondent is attempting to enforce an unenforceable express trust over the disputed real property. Petitioner is in error when she contends that an express trust was created by private respondent when he transferred the property to his son. Judge Abraham P. Vera, in his order dated March 31, 1993 in Civil Case No. Q-92-14352, declared:
[e]xpress trust are those that are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed or will or by words evidencing an intention to create a trust. On the other hand, implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from the nature of the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the particular intention of the parties. Thus, if the intention to establish a trust is clear, the trust is express; if the intent to establish a trust is to be taken from circumstances or other matters indicative of such intent, then the trust is implied (Cuaycong vs. Cuaycong, 21 SCRA 1191 [1967].
In the cases at hand, private respondent contends that the pieces of property were transferred in the name of the deceased Alexander for the purpose of taking care of the property for him and his siblings.Such transfer having been effected without cause of consideration, a resulting trust was created.
A resulting trust arises in favor of one who pays the purchase money of an estate and places the title in the name of another, because of the presumption that he who pays for a thing intends a beneficial interest therein for himself. The trust is said to result in law from the acts of the parties. Such a trust is implied in fact (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 4, p. 678).
If a trust was then created, it was an implied, not an express trust, which may be proven by oral evidence (Article 1457, Civil code), and it matters not whether property is real or personal (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. 4, p. 814).
Petitioners assertion that private respondents action is barred by the statute of limitations is erroneous. The statue of limitations cannot apply in this case. Resulting trusts generally do not prescribe (Caladiao vs. Vda. De Blas, 10 SCRA 691 [1964]), except when the trustee repudiates the trust. Further, an action to reconvey will not prescribe so long as the property stands in the name of the trustee (Manalang, et. al. vs. Canlas, et. al., 94 Phil. 776 [1954]). To allow prescription would be to permit a trustee to acquire title against his principal and the true owner.”
-[G.R. No. 112872. April 19, 2001] THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALEXANDER T. TY, represented by the Administratrix, SYLVIA S. TY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ILDEFONSO E. GASCON, and ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondents.[G.R. No. 114672. April 19, 2001] SYLVIA S. TY, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Alexander T. Ty, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO B. TY, respondents.
IV. Do actions to recover immovable based on trust Prescribe?
As a rule no. The action to compel the trustee to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust does not prescribe. (Caladiao v. Santos Vda. De Blas, 10 SCRA 691; Diaz v. Gorricho, 103 Phil. 261). If at all, it is only when the trustee repudiates the trust that the period of prescription commences to run. The prescriptive period is 10 years from the repudiation of the trust (Heirs of Maria de La Cruz v. CA, 182 SCRA 638) or issuance of a title (Gonzales v. CA, G.R. No. 66479, Nov. 21, 1991).
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