ETRIII
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture
Outline No. 7
Part
2
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
EXCEPTIONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE,
OPINION & CHARACTER EVIDENCE
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
(Prepared for Law 3-A,
Univ. of San Agustin Law School, SY 2016-2017)
i. Subject Index
1.A.Exceptions to the
Hearsay Rule
A.
Dying
Declaration
B.
Part of
the RES GESTAE
C.
Entries in
the Course of Business
D.
Declaration
Against Interest
E.
Act or
Declaration about Pedigree
F.
Family
Reputation or Tradition Regarding Pedigree
G.
Common
Reputation
H.
Entries in
Office Records
I.
Learned
Treatises
J.
Testimony
or deposition at a former proceeding
1.B.
Opinion Evidence
1.C.
Character Evidence
1.A. Exceptions to
the Hearsay Rule
A. Dying
Declaration
Section
37, Rule 130. Dying Declaration. – The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case
wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and
surrounding circumstances of such death.
Reason for
Admissibility. – “The
reasons for the admissibility of dying declarations as an exception to the
hearsay rule are (a) NECESSITY and (b) TRUSTWORTHINESS. Necessity, because the
declarant’s death renders impossible his taking the witness stand; and it often
happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime. Hence
it is allowed to prevent a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, for in the
language of Lord Baron Eyre, the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and every
hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the
mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A
situation so solemn and awful is considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.”[1]
“Dying
declarations are admitted on the theory that the conscious danger of impending
death is equivalent to the sanction of an oath.”[2]
Dying
declaration defined. “A dying
declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the
material facts which concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and
which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is impending and is certain to
follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of
retraction and in the absence of all hopes of recovery.”
Requisites.
“A dying declaration, although generally
inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character, may, nonetheless, be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely:
(a)
the
declaration concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death;
(b) it is made when death appears to be imminent
and the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
(c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and
(d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in
which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death”[3].
TEST/
GAUGE IS “STATE OF MIND” OF DECLARANT; NOT HIS CHANCES OF SURVIVAL FROM A MEDICAL
PERSPECTIVE
CONSCIOUSNESS
OF IMPENDING DEATH REQUIREMENT. –
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. It is
the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death, in point
of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary
that approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased.
The test is whether or not the declarant has abandoned hope of living and
looked on death as certainly impending. If so, his declarations are competent,
though he is brought to that state of mind by statements made to him by nurses
or physicians.[4]”
X x x
Proof of
consciousness of impending death. “The
declarant’s belief in the imminence of his death may be shown by his own
statements, or through circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of the
wounds, opinions of the attending physician, statements made by others in the
declarant’s presence, or the fact that last rites were administered. It must
be inferable from the evidence presented that declarant had personal knowledge
of the facts contained in the statement seeking admission. The statement of the
declarant shot in the back by an unseen assailant naming the defendant, as his
murderer cannot be admitted.[5]”
Hypotheticals:
o
Is there a
requirement that the victim/ declarant must die immediately after he makes his
dying declaration?
o
What if
the victim is not severely wounded but he is pessimistic about his chances of
surviving and makes a dying declaration, then he recovers but only for a while
because he eventually dies a month or two after, would that render inadmissible
his dying declaration?
o
What if
the victim is AMBIVALENT of his chances of surviving but he is seriously
wounded, what would you make of his dying declaration?
NO FIXED TIME. “No time is fixed, either by the statute, or by judicial
decision, within which the declarant must have died in order for his dying
declaration to be admissible in evidence. We have no decisions declaring the
meaning of the phrase “a dying person”. It
does not mean that in order to make such declaration admissible the person
making it must be at the time in the act of expiring or in the final struggle.
It is seldom that a human being in
that state of dissolution is capable of making any statement whatsoever in the
nature of a connected or reliable narrative of account of a past transaction.
To admit such declarations only when made by a person in that condition would
practically exclude them altogether, or render them useless for any purpose. By
this rule it is not necessary that
the person should be at the time in the throes of death, or that he should die
immediately, or within any specified time thereafter, in order to give the
declaration probative force. Where a person has been fatally wounded,
is in sore distress therefrom, and believes that he will not recover and is
soon to die, his statement made in this belief relating to the cause of his
injury is admissible, if it appears that he subsequently died from the direct
effects of the wound, although he may have revived after making the statements
or may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and may have again begun to
hope for recovery. Such person is deemed “a dying person” within the meaning of
the rule from the time the wound is received until death results from the
injury, and his statement during that period made in view of death and with the
belief that it is near at hand, may be proven to establish the cause of death”[6].
Xxx
“In a case, the deceased received
eighteen wounds which caused his death two days later. When asked, before his
dying declaration was taken, about his condition and whether he believed he was
going to die of his wounds, his answer was “Opo, seguro po”. The admission of
the dying declaration was objected to on the ground that the admission of the
deceased means that he believes that he might die but not that he would surely
die. Held: While the words “Opo,
seguro po” may mean that the declarant would not surely die, that may also mean
that he was sure or certain of his death. At any rate, as they could mean both
things, we believe that, considering the seriousness of his wounds,
which caused his death two days later, the deceased signified by these words
the belief that he was going to die.[7]”
INSTANCES
WHEN DYING DECLARATIONS WERE REJECTED.-
§ “When it appears that the decedent at the
time of making the dying declarations which are offered in evidence had any
expectation or hope of recovery, however slight it may have been, though death
actually ensued, the declarations, according to overwhelming weight of
authority, are inadmissible in evidence.[8]”
§ Opinion in dying declarations are
inadmissible. It is indispensable that the dying declaration should consist
solely of facts, and not conclusions, mental impressions or opinions.
The declarations should not contain matter which would be excluded if the
declarant were a witness[9].
IMPEACHMENT
OF DYING DECLARATIONS
§ A
dying declaration stands upon the same footing as the testimony of a witness
sworn in the case. Consequently, it may be impeached by the same means employed
to impeach the latter. It may be shown that the declarant has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude, for the purpose of impeaching the
credibility of his dying declaration.
§ Or by presenting experts to prove that the
injuries sustained by the declarant were calculated to derange his mental
faculties.
B. PART OF
RES GESTAE
Section
42, Rule 130. – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So,
also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and
giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
“Res Gestae; Meaning.”- “Res gestae is from the Latin meaning “things
done” and includes the circumstances, facts and declarations incidental to the
main fact or transaction, necessary to illustrate its character, and also
includes acts, words and declarations which are so closely connected therewith
as to constitute a part of the transaction. The expression, res gestae, as applied
to a crime, means the complete criminal transaction from its beginning or
starting point in the act of the accused until the end is reached. What in any
case constitutes the res gestae of a crime depends wholly on the character of
the crime and the circumstances of the case”[10].
Res
gestae is in law regarded as the actual facts expressing themselves through the
mouth of a witness.
- When
dying declaration falls short of requisites, the statement may constitute as
part of res gestae and therefore still admissible. Where are man after
having been seriously wounded was taken to a municipal building and there he
told a person in authority that he had been wounded by the accused that
statement, although not admissible as dying declaration because it was not made
in the belief that the declarant was about to die, yet it is admissible as part
of the res gestae.[11]
Distinguished
from Dying Declaration.
1. Dying declaration may be made only by the
victim while a statement as part of res gestae may be that of the killer
himself after or during the killing, or that of a third person.[12]
2. In dying declaration, “a sense of impending
death substitutes for an oath, while in res gestae, the “event itself speaks”
It is the transaction speaking as distinguished from the witness.
3. Res gestae may precede, accompany, or follow,
as events occurring as a part of the principal act; dying declaration is
confined to matters occurring after the homicidal act. [13]
4. Res gestae is admissible even if a) Hearsay;
b) tends to prove another offense; c) declarant would have been an incompetent
witness; d) violates the best evidence rule; e) although does not comply with
requirements of dying declaration; and f) self-serving and explanatory.[14]
Three
types.
a) Statements
made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be
given in evidence as part of the res gestae; (also known as Spontaneous statements)
b) Acts and
circumstances which are incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
illustrative of such act;
c) Statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may also be received as part of the res gestae. Statements
accompanying an equivocal act are called by some writers as “verbal facts” or
“verbal acts”.[15](also known as “Verbal Acts”).
a.1.)
Spontaneous statements- A
spontaneous statement may be defined as a statement or exclamation made
immediately after some exciting occasion by a participant or spectator and
asserting the circumstances of that occasion as it is observed by him.[16]
Requisites.
HEARSAY RULE; PART OF THE RES GESTAE; REQUISITES.- The requisites
of res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule are (1) that
the principal act or the res gestae be a startling occurrence;
(2) the statement is spontaneous or was made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise, and the statement is made during the occurrence or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto; and (3) the statement made must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[17]
-Startling
occurrence necessary- In order
that spontaneous statements may be received in evidence as part of the res
gestae, it is essential that the spontaneous exclamation should have been
caused by something “startling enough to produce nervous excitement, and to
keep the will dormant so far as any deliberation in concocting matters for
speech or selecting words is concerned. Men
do not, under stress of great excitement in such conditions, frame up evidence
for their future purposes, and for this reason such things are competent either
for or against one charged with crime. Such occurrences are a part of the thing
itself, and are so intimately and closely connected in time with it as not to
be severable from it.[18]
-Interval
of Time between the startling occurrence and the spontaneous statement. – Experience shows that a startling
occurrence may extend its exciting influence over a subsequent period of time
which may be long or short according to the nature and development of the
circumstances. If the statements were made while the nervous excitement was
still working on the declarant’s mind, they are admissible; otherwise, they are
not. Briefly stated, the rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should
have been made before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive
anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law altogether
distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.[19]
e.g. “An alleged rape victim, a 52- year old
widow, who had been married three times, did not immediately go home after the
alleged sexual encounter. She took a walk. Spent some time thinking of what to
do. Her clothes were muddy. She had some bruises on her body and back because
she was lying down on the ground during the sexual intercourse and their
passionate interlude. When she reached home, she revealed what happened to her
daughter. Held: She had enough time
to make a decision on what will be the nature of her story. Her revelation
cannot thus be categorized as part of the res gestae.[20]”
- A requisite of a res gestae statement is
its SPONTANEITY, while under the influence of the transaction, but such
spontaneity of expression does not per se determine “res gestae” x x x The
spontaneous, unpremeditated character of the declarations and the fact that
they seem to be the natural and necessary concomitants of some relevant
transaction in which their author was a participant, constitute the basis for
their admission as evidence[21].
a.2.) Acts
and circumstances which are incidents of a particular litigated act.- “It is well settled that the term “res
gestae” includes all those acts and circumstances which are incidents of a
particular litigated act and which are illustrative of such act. Thus, it is
competent to prove by a witness that shortly after a homicide a party other
than the deceased or defendant had wounds upon his person and was bleeding.
Similarly, upon a trial for murder, where the evidence shows that the accused,
after being knocked down by the deceased, went away and armed himself and
returned within two to five minutes and shot and killed the deceased upon the
renewal of the quarrel, the particulars of the whole transaction are admissible
in evidence as being parts of the res gestae. Evidence that children of a
passenger were crying and much alarmed when he was ejected from the street car
is also admissible as part of the res gestae on the question of the conductor’s
manner and actions in effecting the expulsion. In an action to recover for an
assault, evidence of a quarrel between the parties to the suit immediately
preceding and leading up to the alleged assault is admissible as a part of the
res gestae.[22]”
- Writings
may become a part of the res gestae
and admissible in evidence where they are incidents of a transaction and a part
thereof. Thus, where the testimony shows that one of the parties sent a message
to the other side concerning the matter in dispute, the answer thereto is,
according to some decisions, part of the res
gestae. A written confession by an
embezzling employee, made while the employment is till in force, in response to
the employer’s inquiries is also admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae, in an action by the employer
to recover for the embezzlement upon hi bond, which is conditioned to make good
any embezzlement committed during the life of such bond.[23]”
a.3.)
verbal acts. – Verbal acts are utterances which accompany
some act or conduct to which it is desired to give a legal effect. When such
act has intrinsically no definite legal significance, or only an ambiguous one,
its legal purport or tenor may be ascertained by considering the words
accompanying it, and these utterances thus enter merely as a verbal part of the
act.[24]
-
Requisites.
a) The act characterized by the verbal acts must
be equivocal or ambiguous in tenor
b) The verbal acts must characterize or explain
the equivocal or ambiguous act;
c) The equivocal or ambiguous act must be
material to the issue; and
d) The verbal act must be contemporaneous with
and accompany the equivocal or ambiguous act.[25]
ü In a variety of issues, where some person’s
conduct is material under the issues, dumb conduct alone may be ambiguous. For
example, in a business office we may observe P. handing money to D; But is P
paying a debt? Or is her restoring a deposit? Or, is he lending money? Or, is
he merely showing D some supposedly counterfeit money? Or, is he handing over
for safekeeping some money picked up from the floor and lost by someone else?
The legal effect of the handing the money is incomplete without the words
accompanying it; hence the words P and of D are admissible as verbal parts of
the act. And this result is irrespective of whether we believe or not any
incidental assertions, e.g. P may say “this is all the money I collected today
from my customers,” or he may say, “You have six hundred dollars more of mine
deposit”; but we do not use his words as testimony to these facts; we use them
only as completing the conduct, and thus as giving to the total conduct the
legal effect of a loan or a payment or deposit.[26]”
C. ENTRIES IN
THE COURSE OF BUSINESS. –
Section 43, Rule 130. Entries made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they
refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Requisites
& Relation to Rule on Authentication.
“The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft
treatment of the Prosecutions flawed presentation was avoidable simply by the
RTC adhering to the instructions of the rules earlier quoted, as well as
withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains
instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a judicial
proceeding, as follows:
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be
the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be
given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence
is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not
themselves seen the execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution
surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.
That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]
On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance
Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay because she had no
personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondents
cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list,
bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers
that even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein respondent, this
cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which gave rise to
respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even though she
personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received by
respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel billets
actually shipped and delivered.
At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of
action is founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of
imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove,
first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued
at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered
to and received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondents importations, including their insurance
coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported,
and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony is not hearsay,
as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the
delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of
the actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the
received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by
other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no
probative value even if not objected to at the trial.
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondents documentary evidence. Under
Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is
admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the
person who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw
it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this
case, respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned
persons. She merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets
based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the
summary of steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings
testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.
xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents
are either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall
under any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section
20of the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity
must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among those
enumerated in Section 19, thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be
proved before they can be admitted in evidence.With the
exception concerning the summary of the weight of the steel billets imported,
respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning
their authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the
insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum,
we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove
petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because
petitioner decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender
her contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had
overruled the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony bypetitioners
counsel due to the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, had no probative value.[39]Verily,
the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were fundamental and substantive, not
merely technical and procedural, and were defects that the adverse partys
waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not set right or cure.
Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue the flawed
evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from
the application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers
were prepared in the regular course of business.[40]Seemingly,
the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to
wit:
Section 43. Entries in the course of business.
Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance
of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet
sweeping manner of justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable
due to the need to show the concurrence of the several requisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The person who made the entry
must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The entries were made at or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a
position to know the facts stated in the entries;
(d) The entries were made in his
professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral, or religious;
(e) The entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.[41]
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State
to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in
the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence
of guilt in order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon
such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee
of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to
prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.”[27]
D. DECLARATION
AGAINST INTEREST. –
Sec.
38, Rule 130. The declaration made by a person deceased or unable to testify,
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant’s own interest, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors in interest and against third persons.
o
Distinguished from Admission.
o
Admission is not necessarily against the
interest of the person who made the admission
o
An admission may be used although the
admitter is alive, while the present exception refers to a declaration against
the interest of a deceased person
o
An admission may be used may only be used
against the admitter and those identified with him in legal interest while a
declaration against interest is admissible against third persons.[28]
Requisites.
a) Declarant
must not be available to testify-
b) Declaration
must concern a fact cognizable by declarant
c) Circumstances
must render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed
E. ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE
Section 39, Rule
130. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be
received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act
or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
“Pedigree” ; Meaning. – Pedigree
is the history of family descent which is transmitted from one generation to
another by both oral and written declarations and by traditions.[29]
Requisites.
a) Declarant
is dead or unable to testify – It is a guiding principle applicable
in pedigree as in other cases, that declarations will not be received when
better evidence is available. As a general rule, declarations as to pedigree
are not admissible unless declarant is dead or unable to testify.[30]
b) Necessity
that pedigree be in issue- It has been laid down that
declarations as to pedigree itself is directly in issue. However, the rule
adopted in many cases is that the fact that pedigree is relevant to the
issue is sufficient to admit the evidence, and that declaration as to matters
of genealogy or facts incidentally connected therewith are admissible as proof
of the fact or facts contained therein in any case in which such facts are
relevant , regardless of whether pedigree is separately in issue.
Ex. Mother who
is alive declares that she and the deceased were married. The putative child
claims otherwise because he has a witness that says that when the alleged
father was still alive, he declared that he was never married to the mother.
c) Declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question- So far as
blood relatives, however, are concerned the law does not lay down the degree of
relationship that must be established between the person whose pedigree is in
question and the declarant, in order that the declarations of the latter may be
admissible. It is enough if some relationship is shown, although the
declarations of very remote relatives might be entitled to very little weight.
d) Declaration
must be made before the controversy occurred.- The rule
which permits declarations to be received of proof of pedigree requires that
the declarations must have been made ANTE LITEM MOTAM- that is, before the
controversy, and under such circumstances that the person making them could
have no motive to misinterpret the facts. In other words, in order for a
declaration as to pedigree to be admissible, it is necessary that the declarant
should have been disinterested to the extent of having no motive which can
fairly be assumed to be such as would induce him to state the fact otherwise
than as he understood it. The statement must therefore be shown to have been
made ante litem motam; and a
fortiori it must have been made before commencement of a suit involving the
issue to which the declaration relates.[31]
e) The
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
-Exception: “Where the subject of the
declaration is the declarant’s own relationship to another person it seems
absurd to require, as a foundation for the admission of the declaration, proof
of the very fact which the declaration is offered to establish. The preliminary
proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.[32]”
f. FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING
PEDIGREE
Section 40, Rule 130. Family
reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of
any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity.
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
o
Reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree. – By reputation or tradition in matters of pedigree is meant such
declarations and statements as have come down from generation to generation
from deceased relatives in such a way that even though it cannot be said or
determined which of the deceased relatives originally made them, or was
personally cognizant of the facts therein stated, yet it appears that such
declarations and statements were made as family history, ante litem motam, by a deceased person connected by blood or
marriage with the person whose pedigree is to be established.
o
Requisites.
a)
There is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any members of a
family.
b)
The reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned
existed prior to the controversy.
c)
The witness testifying to the reputation or tradition regarding the
pedigree of the person concerned must be a member of the family of said person,
either by consanguinity or affinity.
Section 41, Rule 130. Common
reputation. — Common reputation existing previous to the controversy,
respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or
respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and
inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.
Section 43, Rule
130. Entries in the course of business. —
Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts
therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if
such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance
of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
REQUISITES.
a) Entries must have
been made at or near the tome of the transaction to which they refer
b) Entrant must have
been in a position to know the facts stated in the entries.
c) Entries must have
been made by entrant in his professional capacity or in the performance of his
duty.
d) Entries were made
in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty
e) Entrant must be
deceased or unable to testify
Section 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made
in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
Requisites.
a) That the written
statement was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined
by law to do so;
b) That it was made
by the public officer in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law;
and,
c) That the public
officer or the other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
ü UNAVAILABILITY OR DEATH of Entrant is not a requisite. It is not necessary to show that the person making the entry is
unavailable by reason of death, absence, etc., in order that the entry maybe
admissible in evidence, for his being
excused from appearing in court in order that public business be not deranged,
is one of the reasons for this exception to the hearsay rule.[33]
ü AUTHENTICATION. The extraordinary
degree of confidence reposed in documents of a public nature is founded
principally upon the circumstance that they have been made by authorized and
accredited agents appointed for the purpose. This does not mean that
authentication of official or public documents is entirely dispensed with.
There must be some proof, in connection with the production of original papers
or documents purporting to be public papers or their identity as such. If
available, such proof should come from the custodian of the record or document.
If such custodian is not available for the purpose of identification, the
identity of the document or record may be established by any witness conversant
of the facts.
Journals of the
legislature published under the authority of the Senate are receivable in
evidence without any further proof of their authenticity.[34]
NOTE: This SHOULD BE READ IN TANDEM WITH SEC. 24,
RULE 132 OF THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON “PUBLIC DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE”.
Thus, in a case for land registration, in light of the overwhelming
presumption of land being owned by the State
unless clearly shown to have been segregated therefrom, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that mere certifications from the CENRO or PENRO would
not be enough; but rather, no less than the very issuance of the DENR Secretary
himself “that the land subject of registration is ALIENABLE and DISPOSABLE”
must be presented or a Certified true copy of such issuance duly certified by
its custodian of record.
In effect, the very issuance of the Secretary of the DENR is the
“official entry in the public record” and not the mere certification from the
PENRO or CENRO.
Thus, in the case of Republic v. Lucia M. Gomez,[35]the Supreme Court’s discussion
on this score was enlightening, this:
“Thus,
we held that this Certification was inadequate to prove that the land was
alienable and disposable, to wit:
The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not
appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests
with the applicant.
In this case, respondent submitted two
certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The 3 June 1997 Certification by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (CENRO), Batangas City, certified that lot 10705, Cad-424,
Sto. Tomas Cadastre situated at Barangay San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas
with an area of 596,116 square meters falls within the ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
ZONE under Project No. 30, Land Classification Map No. 582 certified [on] 31
December 1925. The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the
trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated that the subject area falls
within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas
certified on Dec. 31, 1925 per LC No. 582.
The certifications are not
sufficient. DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, 18 dated 30 May 1988,
delineated the functions and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under
DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land
classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO
No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the authority of
the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of
land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this
case, respondent applied for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by
Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares (564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate
covered the entire Lot 10705 with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as
per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify
as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has
no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary
minor products (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill
permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits
covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects; and
4. Issues renewal of certificates of
registration for logs, poles, piles, and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical
Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary
minor [products] (OM) permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of
registration for logs, poles, and piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill
permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20
to 50 cubic meters within calamity declared areas for public infrastructure
projects; and
5. Approves original and renewal of special
use permits covering over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional
Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the form of a memorandum to the trial court,
has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough
for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved
the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent
failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager,
identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials
who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to
testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even
if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they
have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Public documents are defined under Section 19,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:
(a) The written official acts, or records
of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the
Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of
public documents referred to in Section 19 (a), when admissible for any purpose,
may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by
the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputyThe CENRO is
not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR
Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should
have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretarys issuance declaring
the land alienable and disposable.
Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence provides:
Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a
duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the
fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public documents
contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications
do not reflect entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer, such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of
registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official
records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not
even records of public documents. The certifications are conclusions
unsupported by adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the
alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts
stated therein. Such government certifications may fall under the class of
documents contemplated in the second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As
such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due execution and
date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is likewise important to note that the
Certifications considered by the CA were not presented during trial, but only
on appeal. This being so, the genuineness and due execution of these documents
were not proven. Furthermore, they did not cover the contested property, but
merely the lots adjacent to it.
In
conclusion, respondent was not able to comply with Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 1529, or
the Property Registration Decree, which states:
Who May Apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. — Evidence of statements of
matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list,
register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is
published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Section 46. Learned treatises. — A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending
to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial
notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the
statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his
profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a)
Section 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. — The testimony
or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former
case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and
subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the
opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a)
1.B. Opinion Rule
Section 48. General rule. — The opinion of witness is not admissible, except
as indicated in the following sections. (42)
Section 49. Opinion of
expert witness. — The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be
received in evidence.
Expert. – An expert may be defined as a person who is so
qualified, either by actual experience or by careful study, as to enable him to
form a definite opinion of his own respecting any division of science, branch
of art, or department of trade about which persons having no particular
training or special study are incapable of forming accurate opinions or of
deducing correct conclusions.[36]
An expert has been
defined to be one possessing, in regard to a particular subject or department
of human activity, knowledge not usually acquired by other persons.[37]
To “Qualify” an Expert. – A witness, to qualify as an expert, must
have acquired such SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE of the subject-matter, about which he is
to testify, either by study of the recognized authorities on the subject, or by
practical experience, that he can give the court assistance and guidance in
solving a problem to which its equipment of good judgment and average knowledge
is inadequate. It is not enough for a witness who would qualify as an expert
to prove that he belongs to the profession or calling to which the subject- matter
of the inquiry relates; he must further show that he possesses special
knowledge as to the very question on which he proposes to express an opinion.[38]
Subjects of Expert Testimony.
a)
HANDWRITING
ü There is no test by which one can determine with precision how much
experience or knowledge of handwriting a witness must have in order to qualify
as an expert for comparison. This problem, is generally speaking, left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reversible in the absence
of an abuse of that discretion.
ü Bank tellers and other bank officers and employees whose daily business
and duties compel them to scrutinize and examine writings are competent experts
respecting handwriting.[39]
ü Function of
handwriting expert. – No handwriting expert should wish for his testimony to be received as
unquestionable authority, the idea being rather that it is the function of the
expert to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own
opinion.[40]
ü In the recent 2016 case of Damasco T. Ambray and Cerefino T. Ambray,
Jr., v. Sylvia A. Tsourous, et al,[41] it was held that:
“As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by
clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof lies on the
party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery
can only be established by a comparison between the alleged forged signature
and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose
signature is theorized to have been forged.
Under Rule 132, Section 22 of the Rules of Court, the
genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: ( 1) by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has
seen theperson write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which
the witness has acted or been charged; (2) by a comparison, made by the witness
or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party,against
whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge.
° Corollary thereto, jurisprudence states that the presumption
of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery
47 New City Builders, Inc. v. NLRC, 499 Phil. 207, 212-213
(2005), citing Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. CA, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428
SCRA 79, 86. 48 Maersk-Filipinas Crewing Inc., v. Avestruz, supra note 46, at
172. 49 Gepulle-Garbo v. Garabato, G.R. No. 200013, January 14, 2015, 746 SCRA
189, 198-199. 50
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. - The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write,or has seen
writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged,
and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the
witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
~
Decision 8 G.R. No. 209264
and fraud.
As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness
who was physically present at the signing of the contract and who had personal
knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness constitutes indirect or
circumstantial evidence at best. 51
In this case, the only direct evidence presented by
respondents to prove their allegation of forgery is Questioned Documents Report
No. 266-39752 dated March 24, 1997 issued by National Bureau of
Investigation(NBI) Document Examiner II Antonio R. Magbojos (Magbojos), stating
that the signatures of Ceferino, Sr. and Estela on the Deed of Sale, when compared
to standard sample signatures, are not written by one and the same person.
In refutation, petitioners offered in evidence, inter alia,
the testimony of their mother, Estela, in the falsification case where
petitioners were previously acquitted. In the course thereof, she identified53
the signatures on the Deed of Sale as hers and Ceferino, Sr.' s, which was
fully corroborated54
by Atty. Zosimo Tanalega (Atty. Tanalega), the notary public
who notarized the subject Deed of Sale and was present at the time the Ambray
spouses affixed their signatures thereon.
Between the Questioned Documents Report presented by
respondents and the testimony given by Estela in the falsification case in
support of petitioners' defense, the Court finds greater evidentiary weight in
favor of the latter. Hence, respondent's complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance,
and damages in Civil Case No. SP-5831(01) should be dismissed.”
ü Proof of
genuineness of Specimen Signatures must be established. – Generally, where writings are admitted to
serve as a basis for comparison, the genuineness thereof must be proved to the
satisfaction of the judge as a preliminary question. (Jones on Evidence).
o Defendants recognize that the rule is that in order to
make such signatures proper evidence they must be CONCEDED to be genuine. But
their contention is that if the party which the writing purports to be the signature
of admits it to be his signature, this is sufficient regardless of what the
other party may say. This will not do, at least when the question arises as
this has. One of the principal reasons for the rule excluding such testimony
is that it brings collateral issues which would produce endless confusion, in
trials. In the case at bar the plaintiff declared these signatures were not
genuine and could have tendered that collateral issues in the midst of the
trial, an issue which would frequently be as tedious to investigate and as
doubtful of correct result as the main matter in litigation. The concession
of the genuineness of the signature must be such concession as will prevent and
avoid an issue over the matter. To permit a party to introduce in his own
behalf, over the protest of his opponent as to its genuineness, a signature
which he claims to have written, or, indeed, which he may have written, would
put it in the power of such party to make evidence for himself. A signature
not genuine might be admitted to be so, if it would serve the purpose of
defense. So signatures might be made with a view to future use.[42]
o Comment: Simply put, when a disputed signature is
juxtaposed with purported standard specimen signatures, the comparison should
only be done AFTER a “concession” is made that indeed the “standard specimen
signatures” of the party concerned are his. Because it would be easy for a
party who had entered into a transaction he wants to back out from, to deny his
signature on the contract and thereafter, change his signature henceforth
thereby making his previous genuine signature as to appear to be NOT HIS
SIGNATURE as his new signatures (if used as standard specimens) will disown his
previous signature thereby relegating it to “forged”.
b)
BALLISTICS-
o Forensic
ballistics- the examination and identification of guns and bullets- is a 2oth-century
science.
o The spiral “lands” and grooves of a rifled gun barrel leave
characteristic STRIATIONS on the body of the bullet as it spins. No two guns,
even from a single manufacturer, produce identical striations, and ballistics
examiners can prove the identity of striations on a bullet recovered at the
scene of a crime and a test bullet fired from a suspect’s gun.
o Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes. In 1902, he had a gunsmith fire a test
bullet for comparison with one recovered at the scene of a murder. As Holmes
stated in his judgment: “I see no other way in which the jury could have
learned so intelligently how a gun barrel would have marked a lead bullet fired
through it”.[43]
c)
DNA- Refer to previous lecture outline.
Section 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. — The opinion of a witness for
which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding —
(a) the identity of a person
about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (44a)
1.C. Character Evidence
Section 51. Character
evidence not generally admissible; exceptions: —
(a) In
Criminal Cases:
(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved
if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In
Civil Cases:
Evidence of
the moral character of a party in civil case is admissible only when pertinent
to the issue of character involved in the case.
(c) In the
case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14.
[1] 31 C.J.S. 987 as cited on p. 531, EVIDENCE by Francisco, Volume VII
Part I, 1997 Edition
[2] 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, (11th ed.), p. 836, Ibid.
[3] People v. Gatarin, G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014 as cited on p.
307, EVIDENCE, Riano, 2016 Edition
[4] People v. Borella, 312 Ill. 34, 143 N.E. 471, EVIDENCE by
Francisco, p. 534, Ibid.
[5] pp. 540-541, Id.
[6] People v. Cord, 157 Cal. 562, 108 P. 51 as cited on p. 534,
EVIDENCE by Francisco, Ibid.
[7] People v. Reyes, 52 Phil. 541-542
[8] p. 537, EVIDENCE by Francisco, Ibid.
[9] Jones v. State, 52 Ark. 345, 12 S.W. 704
[10] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol. I, pp.
664-665
[11] See People v. Silva, G.R. No. L-44130; IV L.J. 580.
[12] People v. Reyes, 82 Phil. 563
[13] Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, (11th ed.), p. 837
[14] Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, pp. 754-754,
[15] See p. 588, EVIDENCE by Francisco, Ibid.
[16] Keefe v. State of Arizona, 293; 72 P. 2d 425
[17] People v. Francisco, G.R. No.
110873, September 23, 1999
[18] Clem v. Com., 198 Ky. 586, 248 S.W. 1036
[19] p. 598, EVIDENCE by Francisco, Ibid.
[20] People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100.
[21] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th ed., Vol I. pp.
689-690
[22] 20 Am. Jur. 558-559
[23] 41 Am. Jur. 558
[24] Keefe v. State of Arizona, 30 Ariz. 293, 72 P. 2d 425.
[25] 3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1172; 11 Ency. Of Evidence, 381-384
[26] Wigmore on Evidence, (Stud. Text), p. 217
[27] Anna Lerima Patula v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457,
April 11, 2012
[28] Barlett v. Patton, 33 W. Va. 71, 10 S.E. 10, 21
[29] 3 Jones on Evidence, 2d., Sec. 1131
[30] 31 Corpus Juris Secundum
[31] 31 C.J.S. 975
[32] p. 572, EVIDENCE by Francisco, Ibid.
citations omitted.
[33] 3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1621
[34] 20 Am. Jur. 832-833
[35] Republic v. Lucia M. Gomez, G.R. 189021, February 22, 2012
[36] 20 Am. Jur. 656-6567
[37] U.S. v. Gil, 13 Phil. 530
[38] Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, (11th ed.), pp. 1691-1962
[39] 20 Am. Jur., pp. 706-707
[40] People v. Bustos, 45 Phil. 9, 28
[41] G.R. No. 209264, July 05, 2016
[42] Doua v. Reid, 53 Mo. App. 553
[43] pp. 174-175 “The Speeding Bullet”, BODIES OF EVIDENCE, Brian Innes
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