Articles 149 to 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Lecture No. 6. Part 1 of 4

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I LECTURE SERIES

Articles 149 to 257, Family Code of the Philippines

For: University of San Agustin School of Law

General Luna Street, Iloilo City

SY 2016-2017, 1st Semester

By: Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III

Chapter 1. The Family as an Institution

Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (216a, 218a)

Art. 150. Family relations include those:

(1) Between husband and wife;

(2) Between parents and children;

(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)

Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.

This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. (222a)

Comment: 

• Art. 150 must be read in tandem with Art. 151 such that the enumeration of “family relations” is exclusive to those mentioned in the former section.

• Thus, when apart from those enumerated, the parties impleaded in a case involved an “in-law”, let alone, a “stranger”, the suit may prosper notwithstanding the absence of showing that “earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made” .

Chapter 2. The Family Home

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. (223a)

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. (223a)

Art. 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (243a)

Art. 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property.

Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home. (227a, 228a)

Art. 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.

In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.

For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas. (231a)

Art. 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (235a)

Art. 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. (238a)

Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.

At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor. (247a, 248a)

Comment:

Note: “results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home”. Thus, involuntary improvements or those which inure without the conscious or deliberate efforts of the spouses, like time, governmental actions or market or economic forces, shall not be taken into account against the value of the family home.

Art. 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home. (n)

Art. 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. (n)

Comments:

1. Duty of the Court once a party invokes insulation of Family Home from execution and forced sales.

2. In Albino Josef v. Otelio Santos , the Supreme Court bewailed the failure of the trial court judge to observe the requisite prudence by following the procedure to ensure that the family home is safe from unlawful execution, viz:

“The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. 

Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioners family home, the trial court should have observed the following procedure:

1. Determine if petitioners obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of the Family Code;

2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioners claim that the property was his family home; conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members of the community where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the premises of the claimed family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary;

3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioners family home, the court should determine:

a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code; 

b) if petitioners spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home; 

c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and

d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160 of the Family Code.

The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime.[23] It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial courts failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioners allegations, is unjustified.”

 3. But, it is important to underscore that the entitlement to the exemption from execution or forced sale of a Family Home must be invoked at the earliest opportunity which should be construed as “before the Sheriff’s Sale at Public Auction” lest it be deemed waived or barred by laches. Thus:

 “While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.” 

 4. When and how is a Family Home deemed constituted?

“For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under  Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.

On the other hand,  for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.

X x x

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution, could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter, are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.” 

 5. Family home must be part of ACP or CPG or exclusive property of either spouse with the latter’s consent. Nonetheless, property subject of a Conditional Deed of Sale, i.e., whereby title or ownership is withheld by the seller until full payment of the purchase price, may be claimed as a Family Home. 

6. Family home subsists for ten (10) years even after the death of one or both spouses or longer if any minor beneficiary still resides therein. It cannot be partitioned.

TITLE VI

PATERNITY AND FILIATION 

Chapter 1. Legitimate Children

Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate. (n)

Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. (55a, 258a)

Comments:

• “Mitochondrial donations” which involve the transplant of “mitochondria” or the tiny power sources inside cells or egg cells from the real mother to a surrogate mother and therefore the child inherits three (3): one from the father, the partner and the surrogate mother. 1 out of 6,500 suffer faults with Mitochondria (See The Economist).  

Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code. (n)

Comment: Arts. 36 and 53 are the ones referred to by Art. 165 when it provides the exception as follows: “unless otherwise provided in this Code”.

Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of:

(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;

(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or

(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or

(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)

Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary:

(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;

(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)

Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.

If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)

Comments:

• In a 2015 doctrinal-ruling (Rodolfo S. Aguilar v. Edna G. Siasat, G.R. No. 200169, January 28^th 2015), the Court explained the proper application of the prescriptive period stated in Art. 170. Thus: “The prescriptive period in Article 170 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child to assert and prove that a person is NOT the man’s child with his wife. It is not applicable to a case where the assertion is that the person is NOT A CHILD AT ALL of the man” .

• Articles 166, 167 up to 176. Prescriptive period applies only in cases where what is being impugned is the legitimacy of the child who came out of the wife’s womb.

• Consequences: 1. No Prescription. 2. Filiation could be attacked collaterally or indirectly.

• “Physical impossibility” in par.1 of Art. 166 is a high standard requirement. “Highly improbable” is not enough.

• “First 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child” refers to period of conception.

• DNA. “DNA result that excludes the putative father from paternity is conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the probability of paternity resulting from DNA is 99.9%, this creates a refutable presumption of paternity. If it is less than 99.9%, it is merely corroborative” . 

• There are stringent rules in handling the DNA sample after extraction. Then the samples are processed and DNA profiles generated. The profiles are cross-matched with 12 universal markers.

• In cases of  ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION. Can the husband impugn the legitimacy when the following set of facts are obtaining?

a. If he had knowledge and consent? Cannot impugn. Because grounds to impugn under Art. 166 are exclusive. The failure to follow procedure in Art. 164 is not a ground enumerated therein. Par. 3, Art. 166 refers only to “written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence”. 

b. Wife obtains sperm from husband and allows Artificial Insemination without husband’s knowledge or consent? Legitimacy may be impugned

c. Sperm is that of another man and there is no compliance with Art. 164? May be impugned. BUT, if husband allows the period to lapse (See Art. 170), the child is legitimate.

d. Sperm is that of another man and husband objects? May be impugned.

e. Husband agrees to Artificial Insemination and Art. 164 (2) is complied with? No right to impugn.

• Presumption of Law v. Presumption of Fact. 

• Query: If a married woman becomes unfaithful by cohabiting with another man and they conceive a child and such child is acknowledged by her lover in no less than the Certificate of Birth of the child, in the eyes of the law, who is presumed as the father? The legal husband or the lover?

• Read Concepcion v. Court of Appeals ([G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]

“The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.^[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.^[20]

As a guaranty in favor of the child^[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy.^[22] We explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals^[23]:

The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.

Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)^[24] of the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,^[25]his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.^[26] Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.^[27] Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception.^[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child.^[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.^[30]

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.^[31]

To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible.^[32] This may take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or provinces and they were never together during the period of conception.^[33] Or, the husband was in prison during the period of conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through the violation of prison regulations.^[34]

Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometers apart.

Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible for them to engage in the marital act.

Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.

Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer^[35] to the petition for annulment of marriage^[36] that she never lived with Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was binding on her.

Gerardos argument is without merit.

First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.

The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.

Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.^[37] A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.^[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is illegitimate.^[39] The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the legitimacy of children.^[40]

Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.

Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation of a child.^[41] Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his defenselessness.

The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.^[42]

Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from the moment of his birth.^[43] Although a record of birth or birth certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a child,^[44]as the status of a child is determined by the law itself, proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300 days following the termination of marriage is sought to be established.^[45]

Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs. Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was improper and uncalled for.

In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.^[46] As prima facie evidence, the statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.^[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the law.

It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.^[48] On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother. He can claim support only from a more limited group and his legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.^[49] Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination against him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors his interest.

It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.

This case has been pending for a very long time already. What is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.

Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the presumption of his legitimacy.

As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames.^[50] A persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is passed on from parent to child.^[51] Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.

In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each others company. There being no such parent-child relationship between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.

Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:

Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:

Article 3

1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.

The State as parens patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those of tender years.^[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their eventual development as responsible citizens and members of society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and lineage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.”

  

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Comments:

• “An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned”. Sec. 19 a,b c of the Rules on Evidence. A. written official acts of sovereign authority; b. those acknowledged before a notary public and; c. public records.

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;

(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and

(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code. (264a)

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. (289a)

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a)