Articles 194 to 219. Family Code of the Philippines

Lecture 6. Part 3

CIVIL LAW REVIEW I

Lecture Series 

University of San Agustin

School of Law

Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III

TITLE VIII

SUPPORT

Art. 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.

The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work. (290a)

Art. 105. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article:

(1) The spouses;

(2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;

(3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;

(4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and

(5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)

Art. 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (291a)

Art. 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership. (n)

Comments:

• Should be read in juxtaposition with Articles 94 [9] on charges and liabilities of Absolute Community Property and 122 on counter-part provision on Conjugal Partnership of Gains

• General Rule No. 1. Support of common children, legitimate children of either spouse chargeable on ACP or CPG

• General Rule No. 2. Support of ascendants and descendants, illegitimate children and brothers and sisters of either spouse, chargeable to separate property. However, may be ADVANCED by ACP or CPG subject to ff conditions: 1. For ACP- “mere insufficiency” of separate property. 2. For CPG- All obligations under Art. 121 must have been covered and insufficiency of separate properties of concerned spouse.

Art. 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. (292a)

Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:

(1) The spouse;

(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;

(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and

(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Comment: 

• This is the hierarchy of obligors in support claims.

• Query: What if the amount of support that a father can provide is INSUFFICIENT for the needs of the children, can the grandparents be obliged to provide for the deficiency despite the father being still alive and capable of providing some amount of support albeit insufficient? 

• Can the grandparents claim that their liability should only be circumscribed to their exercise of substitute parental authority such that when the wife/ mother abandoned her husband and left the house of the grandparents, the substitute parental authority had ceased thus also necessarily ending any obligation to give support?

• Answered by case law  as follows:

“Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.

However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.”

• Creditable deductions. Read Lim-Lua v.Lua  where the Supreme Court sought elucidation from US case law in order to ascertain if there are “creditable deductions” arising from voluntary “gifts” advanced by the father to his children in the form of allowances for credit card payments, gas, etc, or even a car. The Supreme Court explained at length, to wit: 

“On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US courts. In Bradford v. Futrell, 25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal property given by him to the children themselves, even though he referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband (appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree. In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court said in part: “The payments to the children themselves do not appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress.”26 In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when such can be done without injustice to her. 25 225 Md. 512; 171 A.2d 493; 1961 Md. LEXIS 686. 26 Id. at 519; id. at 496-497. 27 59 Wn.2d 468; 368 P.2d 170; 1962 Wash. LEXIS 419. Decision 13 G.R. Nos. 175279-80 The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as to when such credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.) Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in arrears “less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support,” the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed: While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the latter. x x x29 On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s financial resources, it is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of petitioner 28 Id. at 473; id. at 172-173. 29 Records, p. 48. Decision 14 G.R. Nos. 175279-80 and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses. In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2) cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the total amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both her eye[s] which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support of P115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal.30 (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children: Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71 Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00 Credit card purchases of Angelli (Groceries and Dry Goods) 365,282.20 Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan 228,869.38 TOTAL Php 648,102.29 

Art. 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each.

However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them.

When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. (295a)

Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. (296a)

Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same. (297a)

Comments: 

1.“Delicate balancing act as to resources or means of giver and needs of recipient”.

2. Amount of support is never immutable or final.

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.

Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)

Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (299a)

Comment: 

“Strained relations.”

Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)

Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)

Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)

Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.

Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)

TITLE IX

PARENTAL AUTHORITY 

Chapter 1. General Provisions

Art. 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being. (n)

Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. (313a)

Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)

Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n)

Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority. (355a)

Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)

Comments:

• Special Rule on Habeas Corpus involving custody of children. “In a habeas corpus petition involving the custody of child, the court must not stop at ordering the production of the child in court but must resolve as to who is the rightful custodian.”  

Chapter 2. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:

(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;

(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and

(3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.

Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a)

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (314a)

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a)

Comment: 

“teacher in charge”.

Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.

The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.

All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.

Comments:

            On Child Custody, Visitation Rights and ne exat rights [i.e., rights to object to a minor leaving the country] are rights of custody” and most contracting states” have adopted such views.

           

                                                            p. 173, Breyer

Visitation Rights v. “Access Rights”

“Access rights” – right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.

            As the Abbott Court explained, the purpose of the Hague Convention is to secure the best interests of children by ensuring that courts of their home countries make their custody determinations.

            “Being entitled to bar the child’s departure from Chile gave Mr. Abbott a significant right relating to his boy’s care and development- he could thus determine “ the language the child speaks, the identity he finds, or the culture and traditions [he] will come to absorb.”

-        Abbott v. Abbott 560 U.S., I, 8 (2010)

(Stevens J., dissenting) – (Timothy Abbott… has no authority to decide whether his son undergoes a particular medical procedure; whether his son attends a school field trip; whether and in what manner his son has a religious upbringing; or whether his son can play a videogame before he completes his homework. These are all rights and responsibilities of … respondent Jacquelyn Abbott. It is she who received sole custody; or ‘daily care and control’, of [the child] when the expatriate couple divorced while living in Chile in 2004. Mr. Abbott possesses only visitation rights) [Internal citation omitted].