Civil Law Review
Lecture Series
PROPERTY
Part 1.1
(Parts 1.2, 2,.1, 2.2, 3 and 4 are found in Older Posts)
(Parts 1.2, 2,.1, 2.2, 3 and 4 are found in Older Posts)
Atty. Eduardo T. Reyes, III
Article 415. The following are immovable properties: x
x x”
· Test of enumeration
· Comma between
“Land, Buildings”; significance
· Can a building
standing on land owned by another, be mortgaged? Should it be by constituting a
Real Estate Mortgage or Chattel?
· “Machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of
land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works”.
· Requisites: a. The
machinery must have been placed by the owner or an agent of the same; b. An
industry or works must be carried on in the building or land; c. The machinery
must tend directly to meet the needs of the industry or works; d. The machinery
must be essential and principal to the pursuance of the business of the owner,
and not merely incidental.
· Davao
Sawmills Co. v Castillo, 61 Phil 709
· A tenant who
installs machinery, etc. on leased property for some industry or works. Real or
personal property?
· Exception?
Exception to exception.
Article 419. Property is either of
public dominion or of private ownership. (338)
Article 420. The following things
are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth. (339a)
Comments:
· Bodies
of water have technical meanings. “River”.
Article 421. All other property of
the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property. (340a)
Article 422. Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Article 423. The property of
provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property. (343)
Article 424. Property for public
use, in the provinces, cities, and
municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of
them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws. (344a)
Article 425. Property of private
ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons,
either individually or collectively. (345a)
Provisions Common to the Three
Preceding Chapters
Article 426. Whenever by provision
of the law, or an individual declaration, the expression "immovable things
or property," or "movable things or property," is used, it shall
be deemed to include, respectively, the things enumerated in Chapter 1 and
Chapter 2.
Whenever the word "muebles,"
or "furniture," is used alone, it shall not
be deemed to include money, credits,
commercial securities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artistic
collections, books, medals, arms, clothing, horses or carriages and their
accessories, grains, liquids and merchandise, or other things which do not have
as their principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building, except
where from the context of the law, or the individual declaration, the contrary
clearly appears. (346a)
TITLE II
OWNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1
Ownership in General
Article 427. Ownership may be
exercised over things or rights. (n)
Article 428. The owner has the
right to enjoy and dispose of a thing,
without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it. (348a)
Article 429. The owner or lawful
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical
invasion or usurpation of his property.
Comments:
· Doctrine
of Self-Help. Real v. Personal Right
· Relate
this to Article 1164. The
creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing from the time the obligation to
deliver it arises. However, he shall acquire no real right over
it until the same has been delivered to him.
· May
an owner or lawful possessor drastically bulldoze the crops planted by an
intruder over the property?
· “Doctrine
of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened
dispossession.”[1]
Article 430. Every owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted
thereon. (388)
Article 431. The owner of a thing
cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the rights of a third
person. (n)
Article 432. The owner of a thing
has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same, if the
interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is
much greater. The owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the
damage to him. (n)
Article 433. Actual possession
under claim of ownership raises
disputable presumption of ownership.
The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the
property.
Comments:
· 1) This
is the legal basis for ejectment actions.
· 2) The
registered owner is not always guaranteed of being successful in an action to
recover property.
· 3) See
Blog Article entitled “Legal Trimmings of “Tolerance” in Unlawful Detainer
Cases” dated June 30, 2016
3.1) Read Ruben Corpuz rep by Atty In Fact Wenfreda C. Agullana v.
Sps. Hilarion Agustin and Justa Agustin, GR No. 183822, January 18, 2012
The rationale for the doctrinal threshold of “more or
less than one-year length of time of dispossession” was doctrinally explained
in a 2012 case law[5], thus:
“One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession
of real property is “accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which
may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer
(desahucio), which is a summary action for the recovery of physical
possession where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court.”[6][14] In
ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is entitled
to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to possession de
facto, and not possession de jure.[7][15]
X x x
Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[8][23] which
reads thus:
Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is
entitled to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he chooses
what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions necessary for such
action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case
against respondents. Ejectment cases—forcible entry and unlawful detainer—are
summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual
possession or the right to possession of the property involved. The only
question that the courts resolve in ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled
to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a
party’s title to the property is questionable. For this reason, an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of the particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the
complaint and sufficiently proven.”
· 4. RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION
· and DAMAGES
· 4.1) It is no longer
good law that all cases for recovery of possession or accion publiciana lie
with the RTC, regardless of the value of the property.[2]
4.2) “Stealth”; What it
constitutes of. See Milagros Diaz et al v. Punzalan et al[1]
“Contrary to petitioner’s contention
that none of the means to effectuate forcible entry was alleged in the
complaint, the Court finds that the allegations actually make up a case for
forcible entry. They claimed in their complaint that the spouses Punzalan
constructed their dwelling house or a portion on petitioner’s lot, without the
latter’s prior consent and knowledge. This
clearly falls under stealth, which is defined as any secret, sly or clandestine
act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within residence
of another without permission. Here, the evidence clearly reveal that the
spouses’ possession was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated,
considering that they started without the permission and consent of petitioners.
The spouses’ entry into the land was therefore, effected clandestinely, without
the knowledge of the owners. Consequently, it is categorized as possession by
stealth which is forcible entry”.
· 4.3) Different kinds of
actions to recover possession: 1.forcible entry and unlawful detainer; 2.
Accion publiciana; 3 Accion Reinvindicatoria
1. In Victoriano
M. Encarnacion vs. Nieves Amigo[2],
the Honorable Supreme Court discussed in great detail the three kinds of
actions for recovery of possession of real property and it laid down when
resorting to each would be proper, thus:
“In this
jurisdiction, the three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession of real
property are:
1. Accion interdictal, or an ejectment
proceeding which may be either that for forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary action for recovery of
physical possession where the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in
the proper inferior court;
2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action for
the recovery of the real right of possession, which should be brought in the
proper Regional Trial Court when the dispossession has lasted for more than one
year; and
3. Accion
reinvindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion, which is an action for the
recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper Regional Trial Court.
Based on the
foregoing distinctions, the material
element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of the
possession of the property in this case is the length of time of dispossession.
Under the Rules of Court, the remedies of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are granted to a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person.
These remedies afford the person deprived of the possession to file at any time
within one year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession,
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with
damages and costs. Thus, if the
dispossession has not lasted for more than one year, an ejectment proceeding is
proper and the inferior court acquires jurisdiction. On the other hand, if
the dispossession lasted for more than one year, the proper action to be filed
is an accion publiciana which should be brought to the proper Regional Trial
Court.” (Emphasis supplied)
Article 555
(4)- “A possessor may lose his possession: x x x (4) by the
possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new
possession has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is
not lost till after the lapse of ten years.”
· 4.4) The accion
publiciana is intended for the recovery of the better right to
possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding before a Court
of First Instance (now RTC)[2]and must be brought within a period of
ten years otherwise the real right of possession is lost. The issue is not
possession de facto but possession de jure.[3]
· In turn, see Article
1141. “Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years. This
provision is without prejudice to what is established for the
acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.”
· 5) The foregoing
provisions which could be found scattered in different chapters of the Civil
Code provide the legal basis for the ff:
5.1) Material
or Physical Possession
Material or Physical P For Forcible entry
and unlawful detainer
Or De facto possessi Dispossession must be
fresh such that case must be filed within one year
5.2) Better right of
possession, Real Right
Of Possession or De
Jure Possession- For purposes of accion
publiciana
Either the
dispossession had lasted for more than a year or the elements of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer are not present, but must be within ten (10) years
5.3) Possession as a
consequence of
Ownership -
-For purposes of accion
reinvindicatoria
-Pursuant to Art.
1141, an action involving real property may be filed within thirty (30) years.
Summary:
1.Within 1 year from
dispossession: Forcible entry; Unlawful detainer
2. After 1 year but
within ten (10) years- accion publiciana
3. Within 30 years
(Art. 1141) - accion reinvindicatoria. However, according to Art. 555 (4) in
relation to 2nd paragraph of Art. 1141 itself, the real
right to possession could be lost after 10 years.
· The 30-year period that is
granted by law to the owner to recover possession under Art. 1141 is
CIRCUMSCRIBED by the second paragraph of the very same provision.
Thus, in DESAMPARADOS
M. SOLIVA, Substituted by Sole Heir PERLITA SOLIVA GALDO, petitioner,
vs. The INTESTATE ESTATE of MARCELO M. VILLALBA and VALENTA BALICUA
VILLALBA, respondents.[4] it
was held that:
“Moreover, we find that the RTC and
the CA correctly appreciated the operation of ordinary acquisitive prescription
in respondents favor. To acquire ownership and other real rights over
immovables under Article 1134 of the Civil Code, possession must be for 10
years. It must also be in good faith and with just title.
Good faith consists of the
reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thing
was its owner, but could not transmit the ownership thereof. On the other
hand, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right.
The RTC and the CA held that the
Villalbas had continuously possessed the property from January 4,
1966 until May 5, 1982 or for a total of 16 years. Capt.
Villalba came into possession through a sale by petitioner, whom he believed
was the owner, though -- at the time of the sale -- she was not. Clearly,
all the elements of ordinary acquisitive prescription were present.
Petitioner is thus precluded from
invoking the 30-year prescriptive period for commencing real action over
immovables. Prescription of the action is without prejudice to acquisitive
prescription, according to Article 1141 of the Civil Code, which we quote:
Art.
1141. Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This
provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of
ownership and other real rights by prescription.
(Italics supplied)”
Automatic
Revocation Clause in Donation;
Forcible
Entry; Unlawful Detainer
This
Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause
in
donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo37 promulgated in 1990. We
explained
the nature of automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the
three
categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may be
simple,
remuneratory or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is the
donor's
pure liberality. It is remuneratory when the donor "gives something
to
reward past or future services or because of future charges or burdens,
when
the value of said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of
the
donation."38 A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens,
charges,
or future services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing
donated
x x x. " 39 This Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous as
it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten. We then
went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts
and not by the law on donations. It is within this context that this Court
found an automatic revocation clause as valid.
We
explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows
the
parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy."40 In contracts law, parties may agree
to give one or both of them the right to rescind a contract unilaterally. This
is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation. The jurisprudence
on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law therefore applies in an
automatic revocation clause.
Hence,
in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the
Philippines
v. De las Angeles41 and Angeles v. Calasanz42 where we held
that
an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the contract upon
breach
without need of any judicial declaration.
In
University of the Philippines, this Court held that a party to a contract with
an automatic rescission clause, who believes that there has been a breach
warranting rescission, may consider the contract rescinded
without
previous court action. Speaking through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we
said:
x
x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the
contracting
party who believes itself injured must first file
suit
and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial
steps
to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by
the
other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its
damages
accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
the
final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law
itself
requires that he should exercise due diligence to
minimize
its own damages xx x.
43
We,
however, clarified that the other party may contest the
extrajudicial
rescission in court in case of abuse or error by the rescinder. It
is
only in this case where a judicial resolution of the issue becomes
necessary.
that:
Applying
this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna
It
is clear, however, that judicial intervention is
necessary
not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration
rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by
virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without
judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether
or not the rescission was proper.
44
While
the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations
with
an automatic revocation clause, we extended this doctrine to apply to donations
inter vivas in general in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.
We
explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the
general
provisions on obligations and contracts shall govern donations inter vivas in
all matters not determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Title III has
no explicit provisions for instances where a donation has an
automatic
revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts law regarding
automatic
rescission of contracts as well as the jurisprudence explaining it
find
suppletory application. We then reiterated in Roman Catholic
Archbishop
of Manila that where a donation has an automatic revocation clause, the
occurrence of the condition agreed to by the parties as to cause the
revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider the donation revoked without
need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that the revocation is proper
is only necessary when the other party actually goes to court for the specific
purpose of challenging the propriety of the revocation. Nevertheless, even in
such a case, "x x x the decision of the court will be merely declaratory
of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act. "45 We also
explained in this case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions arising
from an automatic revocation clause in donations, the general provisions on
prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764—which provides for a
four-year prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the donation in case
of breach of a condition--govems an instance where the deed of donation does
not contain an automatic revocation clause.46
We
repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D.
Monfort
North) Municipality of Dumangas.47 We once again held that if a
contract
of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach
of a condition and the donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the
property donated automatically reverts back to the donor without need of any
judicial declaration. It is only when the donee denies the rescission orchallenges
its propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively settle whether the
resolution was proper. This was also the import of our ruling in Zamboanga
Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata. 48
In
this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic
revocation
clause. The clause states:
That
the condition of this donation is that the DONEE
shall
use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present
donation for no other purpose except the
construction
of its building to be owned and to be
constructed
by the above-named DONEE to house its
offices
to be used by the said Ca.marines Sur Teachers'
Association,
Inc., in connection with its functions under its
charter
and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association
as well as the Ca.marines Sur High School
Alumni
Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that
the
DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the
property
herein donated including any and all
improvements
thereon in favor of any party and provided,
lastly,
that the construction of the building or buildings
referred
to above shall be commenced within a period of
one
(1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise,
this donation shall be deemed automatically
revoked
and voided and of no further force and effect.49
The
provision identifies three conditions for the donation: ( 1) that the
property
shall be used for "no other purpose except the construction of its
building
to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to
house
its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association,
Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and bylaws
and
the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur
High
School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or
incumber
the property herein donated including any and all improvements
thereon
in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or
buildings
referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (I)
year
from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states
that
"otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x
x."50
We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation
clause
which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When
CASTEA
leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second
conditions.
Accordingly,
petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased
the
property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation
and
as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a
Deed
of Revocation. The records show that CASTEA never contested this
revocation.
Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic
Archbishop
of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang
Bayan,
Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue
of
the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and
immediate,
without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred
in
its finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for
reconveyance.
This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned
cases
and renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation
clause.
Thus,
as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and
CASTEA
never contested it, the property donated effectively reverted back
to
it as owner. In demanding the return of the prope1ty, petitioner sources its
right
of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code,
the
owner has a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing
in
order to recover it.
This
right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is
anchored
on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing
the
property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of
Donation,
is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the
donation.
Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized
administrator
of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not
be
the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have
the
authority to lease it out.51 None exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis
for
its continued possession of the property.
As
to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to
file
this ejectment suit against Bodega has not prescribed.
First,
we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that
Article
7 64 on the prescription of actions for the revocation of a donation
does
not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic revocation
clause.52
This is necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial
action
for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern cases where a
breach
of a condition automatically, and without need of judicial
intervention,
revokes the donation.
Second,
we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner
should
have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property, and that
petitioner's
action has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10
years.
This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a donation with an
automatic
revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the breach of the
condition
in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has
to
do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention
only
becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the
revocation.
Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm
and
not order the revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive
period
to file an action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the
revocation,
no court action is necessary.
Third,
as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to
its
possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is anchored on this right
to
possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to
eject
another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the action for
ejectment
within one year from the last demand to vacate.53 This is the
prescriptive
period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case.
The
records show that the petit_ioner served its last demand letter on
November
11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or
around
four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the
prescriptive
period.
-
PROVINCE
OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., Petitioner,
-versus BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL,
Respondent. G.R. No. 194199 Present: VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson, BERSAMIN,
REYES, JARDELEZA, and TIJA
22 March 2017
Xx~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~xX
Article 434. In an action to
recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. (n)
Article 435. No person shall be
deprived of his property except by competent authority and for public use and
always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first
complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case, restore the
owner in his possession.
(349a)
Article 436. When any property is
condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of health, safety or
security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he
can show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. (n)
ARTICLE 437. The owner of a parcel of
land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can
construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he
may deem proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws
and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation. (350a)
Article 438. Hidden treasure
belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on which it is
found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is
made on the property of another, or of the State or any of its subdivisions,
and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder
is a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to
science or the arts, the State may acquire them at their just price, which
shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)
Article 439. By treasure is
understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money,
jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not
appear. (35
Comments:
· If
A by chance unearths a diamond in its natural state, how would the same be
divided?
[1] German Management and Services, Inc. v. CA et al., G.R. Nos. 76216, 76217, Sept. 14, 1989
[2] See Roman Catholic Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron, 6 Phil. 280
[3] See p. 102, Civil Code Book II Fourteenth Edition by Paras
[1] German Management and Services, Inc. v. CA et al., G.R.
Nos. 76216, 76217, Sept. 14, 1989
