Lecture No. 10.
PROPERTY Part 4
MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
DONATION & WILLS & SUCCESSION
ATTY EDUARDO T. REYES, III
ATTY EDUARDO T. REYES, III
(For Fourth Year Section-A,
University of San Agustin School of Law,
General Luna Street, Iloilo City,
School Year 2017-2018 Ist Semester)
TITLE III
DONATION
CHAPTER 1
Nature of Donations
Article
725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes
gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. (618a)
Comments:
1. “Donation” is both a contract thus a “title” and a MODE of acquiring and
transmitting ownership.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 712, thus: “Ownership and
other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and in
consequence of certain contracts, by tradition”.
IN
CONTRAST. Check out Article 1477 which states that: “The
ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual
or constructive delivery thereof”. Thus, a sale is
only a “title” but the mode of transmitting ownership “as a consequence of such
contract of sale”, is by tradition or delivery.
Article
726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the
latter's merits or of the services rendered by him to the donor, provided they
do not constitute a demandable debt, or when the gift imposes upon the donee a
burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is also a
donation. (619)
Article
727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations
shall be considered as not imposed. (n)
Comments:
· See Art. 873 (of
similar effect)
· See however, Art.
1183 (of different effect)
Article
728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor
partake of the nature of testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the
rules established in the Title on Succession. (620)
Comment:
“Donation mortis causa typically: (1) Convey no title or ownership to the
transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and the
control of the property while alive; (2) That before the [donor’s] death, the
transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the properties conveyed; (3) That the transfer should be
void if the transferor should survive the transferee.[1]”
Article
729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the
lifetime of the donor, though the property shall not be delivered till after
the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter vivos. The fruits of the
property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the
donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)
Comment:
“Donation in prasenti to be delivered in future”.
Article
730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition,
which may take place beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor, does
not destroy the nature of the act as a donation inter vivos, unless a contrary
intention appears. (n)
Comment:
Fulfilment of resolutory condition has retroactive effect.
Article
731. When a person donates something, subject to the resolutory condition
of the donor's survival, there is a donation inter vivos. (n)
Article
732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by
the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in this Title. (621)
Article
733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts and remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as
regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed. (622)
Comments:
1. “Donations with an onerous cause
shall be governed by the RULES ON CONTRACTS”. Thus, in an ONEROUS DONATION,
Articles 748 and 749 which require a Donation to be in a public instrument, do
not apply. Instead, Article 1356 of the New Civil Code applies which states
that “ contract shall be obligatory in whatever form it may have
been entered into”.
2. Since “Onerous Donations” are
governed by the law on contracts, in the event that an “Impossible condition”
is imposed, Article 1183 on contracts and NOT Article 727 should apply. Article
1183 states: “Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or
public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the
obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part
thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be
valid”.
But curiously, that is not how the SC ruled in CJ Yulo below.
Article
734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. (623)
“Petitioner contends
that the case at bar is similar to the 1995 case of Central Philippine
University vs. Court of Appeals, where the donee failed for more than
50 years to establish, as required, a medical school on the land donated, and
where this Court declared the donation to have been validly revoked.
To the mind of the
Court, what is applicable to this case is the more recent [2001] case of Republic vs. Silim, where
respondent Silim donated a 5,600-square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur with the
condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for
school purposes only. Although a school building was constructed on the
property through the efforts of the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan, the funds for a Bagong Lipunan school building
could not be released because the government required that it be built on a
one-hectare parcel of land. This led the donee therein to exchange the donated
property for a bigger one.
In Silim,
the Court distinguished the four (4) types of donations:
Donations, according to its purpose or cause,
may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or
compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A
pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.
This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional
or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a
valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing
donated.
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations
of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other
forms of donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the
parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not by the law
on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the
New Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 733 Donations with onerous cause shall
be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value
of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present
controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the
donee to build a school on the donated property.
Here, the Court of
Appeals correctly applied the law on contracts instead of the law on donations
because the donation involved in this case is onerous, saddled as it is by a
burden imposed upon the donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the
infirm. We thus quote with approval the terse ruling of the appellate court in
the challenged decision:
First, the violations of the conditions of the
donation committed by the donee were merely casual breaches of the conditions
of the donation and did not detract from the purpose by which the donation was
made, i.e., for the establishment of a home for the aged and the infirm. In
order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal obligation, which is the
onerous donation in this case wherein the donor is obligated to donate a 41,117
square meter property in Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna on which property the donee
is obligated to establish a home for the aged and the infirm (Exhibit C), may
be rescinded per Article 1191 of the New Civil Code, the breach of the
conditions thereof must be substantial as to defeat the purpose for which the
contract was perfected (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, pp.
179-180; Universal Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 1, 18; Ocampo v.
Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 551, 562). Thus, in the case of Ocampo v. C.A. (ibid),
citing the case of Angeles v. Calasanz (135 SCRA 323, 330), the Supreme Court
ruled:
The right to rescind the contract for
non-performance of one of its stipulations x x x is not absolute. In Universal
Food Corp. v. Court of Appeals (33 SCRA 1) the Court stated that:
The general rule is that rescission of a
contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such
substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement (Song Fo & Co. v. Hawaiian-Philippine Co.,
47 Phil. 821,827). The question of whether a breach of a contract is
substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances (Corpus v. Hon. Alikpala,
et al., L-23707 & L-23720, Jan. 17, 1968).
The above ruling of
the Court of Appeals is completely in tune with this Courts disposition in
Republic vs. Silim, supra. The donor therein sought to revoke the donation on
the ground that the donee breached the condition to exclusively and forever use
the land for school purpose only, but this Court ruled in favor of the donee:
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for
the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged
with another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for
the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered
or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in
furtherance and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of
the bigger lot paved way for the release of funds for the construction of
Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited
area of the donated lot.
As in Silim,
the three (3) lease contracts herein entered into by the donee were for the
sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was intended. In
fact, such lease was authorized by the donor by express provision in the deed
of donation, albeit the prior written consent therefor of the donor is needed.
Hence, considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose
for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack
of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual
breach of the deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the
donation.
Besides, this Court
cannot consider the requirement of a prior written consent by the donor for all
contracts of lease to be entered into by the donee as an absolute ground for
revocation of the donation because such a condition, if not correlated with the
purpose of the donation, would constitute undue restriction of the donees right
of ownership over the donated property.
Instructive on this
point is the ruling of this Court in The Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila vs. Court of Appeals,[7] viz:
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership,
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to
the donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of
the property donated. Although the donor may impose certain conditions in the
deed of donation, the same must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.
x x x
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition
in the deed of donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an integral attribute
of ownership, should be declared as an illegal or impossible
condition within the contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, as specifically stated in said statutory provision, such
condition shall be considered as not imposed. No reliance may accordingly be
placed on said prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly constitutive of the
cause of action for the nullification of the deed of donation is not in truth
violative of the latter, hence, for lack of cause of action, the case for
private respondents must fail.
If petitioner would
insist that the lack of prior written consent is a resolutory condition that is
absolute in character, the insistence would not stand the validity test under
the foregoing doctrine. What would have been casual breaches of the terms and
conditions of the donation, may, in that event, even be considered as no breach
at all when the Court strikes down such absolute condition of prior written
consent by the donor in all instances without any exception whatsoever. The Court,
however, understands that such a condition was written with a specific purpose
in mind, which is, to ensure that the primary objective for which the donation
was intended is achieved. A reasonable construction of such condition rather
than totally striking it would, therefore, be more in accord with the spirit of
the donation. Thus, for as long as the contracts of lease do not detract from
the purpose for which the donation was made, the complained acts of the donee
will not be deemed as substantial breaches of the terms and conditions of the
deed of donation to merit a valid revocation thereof by the donor.
Finally, anent
petitioners contention that the Court of Appeals failed to consider that
respondent had abandoned the idea of constructing a home for the aged and
infirm, the explanation in respondents comment is enlightening. Petitioner
relies on Bishop Bantigues letter dated June 21, 1990 as its basis for
claiming that the donee had altogether abandoned the idea of constructing a
home for the aged and the infirm on the property donated. Respondent, however,
explains that the Bishop, in his letter, written in the vernacular, expressed
his concern that the surrounding area was being considered to be re-classified
into an industrial zone where factories are expected to be put up. There is no
question that this will definitely be disadvantageous to the health of the aged
and the infirm. Thus, the Bishop asked permission from the donor for a possible
exchange or sale of the donated property to ultimately pursue the purpose for
which the donation was intended in another location that is more appropriate.
The Court sees the
wisdom, prudence and good judgment of the Bishop on this point, to which it
conforms completely. We cannot accede to petitioners view, which attributed the
exact opposite meaning to the Bishops letter seeking permission to sell or
exchange the donated property.
In Silim,
supra, this Court ruled that such exchange does not constitute breach of
the terms and conditions of the donation. We see no reason for the Court to
think otherwise in this case. To insist that the home for the aged and infirm
be constructed on the donated property, if the industrialization indeed pushes
through, defies rhyme and reason. Any act by the donor to prevent the donee
from ultimately achieving the purpose for which the donation was intended would
constitute bad faith, which the Court will not tolerate.”
CHAPTER 2
Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation
Persons Who May Give or Receive a Donation
Article
735. All persons who may contract and dispose of their property may make a
donation. (624)
Article
736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them.
(n)
Article
737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making
of the donation. (n)
Comment:
“Making” means “perfection”.
Article
738. All those who are not specially disqualified by law therefor may
accept donations. (625)
Article
739. The following donations shall be void:
(1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time
of the donation;
(2)
Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof;
(3)
Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by
reason of his office.
In
the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and
donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action. (n)
Article
740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter
vivos. (n)
Article
741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees
but acceptance shall be done through their parents or legal representatives.
(626a)
Article
742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by
those persons who would legally represent them if they were already born. (627)
Article
743. Donations made to incapacitated persons shall be void, though
simulated under the guise of another contract or through a person who is
interposed. (628)
Article
744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be
governed by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more
different persons. (n)
Comment:
See Article 1544 on “Double Sales”.
Article
745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an
authorized person with a special power for the purpose, or with a general and
sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (630)
Article
746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of the
donee. (n)
Article
747. Persons who accept donations in representation of others who may not
do so by themselves, shall be obliged to make the notification and notation of
which article 749 speaks. (631)
Article
748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An
oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the
document representing the right donated.
If
the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation
and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Otherwise,
the donation shall be void. (632a)
Article
749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be
made in a public document, specifying therein the property donated and the
value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of
the donor.
If
the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified
thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
(633)
Comments:
1. Can Donation be proven by Oral Evidence?
“The
donation of real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without the
formalities stated in Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Civil
Code). Article 749 of the Civil Code reads:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an
immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying
therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must
satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless
it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this
step shall be noted in both instruments.
Article
749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made
in a public instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document.[12] The
notary public shall certify that he knows the person acknowledging the
instrument and that such person is the same person who executed the instrument,
acknowledging that the instrument is his free act and deed. The acceptance may
be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance
made in a separate instrument must also be in a public document. If the
acceptance is in a separate public instrument, the donor shall be notified in
writing of such fact. Both instruments must state the fact of such notification.”[3]
Article
751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By
future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the
time of the donation. (635)
Comments:
1.“future property” refers to anything
which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation.
2.Being a MODE of acquiring ownership, as distinguished from a SALE, a donation
cannot involve future property.
Article
752. The provisions of article 750 notwithstanding, no person may give or
receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will.
The
donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation. (636)
Comment:
Limitation applies to giver not the RECIPIENT.
Article
753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it is understood
to be in equal shares, and there shall be no right of accretion among them,
unless the donor has otherwise provided.
The
preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to the husband
and wife jointly, between whom there shall be a right of accretion, if the
contrary has not been provided by the donor. (637)
Comments:
1) See Art. 1015
2) First paragraph is
general rule while second is exception
3) Equal shares meaning
“pro-indiviso”
4) In first para, it applies only when
accretion is proper, e.g., refusal, predecease, incapacity
5) See Article 113
Family Code on separate property
Article
754. The donee is subrogated to all the rights and actions which in case
of eviction would pertain to the donor. The latter, on the other hand, is not
obliged to warrant the things donated, save when the donation is onerous, in
which case the donor shall be liable for eviction to the concurrence of the
burden.
The
donor shall also be liable for eviction or hidden defects in case of bad faith
on his part. (638a)
Comment:
Generally, no warranty.
Article
755. The right to dispose of some of the things donated, or of some amount
which shall be a charge thereon, may be reserved by the donor; but if he should
die without having made use of this right, the property or amount reserved
shall belong to the donee. (639)
Article
756. The ownership of property may also be donated to one person and the
usufruct to another or others, provided all the donees are living at the time
of the donation. (640a)
Article
757. Reversion may be validly established in favor of only the donor for
any case and circumstances, but not in favor of other persons unless they are
all living at the time of the donation.
Any
reversion stipulated by the donor in favor of a third person in violation of
what is provided in the preceding paragraph shall be void, but shall not
nullify the donation. (614a)
Article
758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the
debts of the donor, if the clause does not contain any declaration to the
contrary, the former is understood to be liable to pay only the debts which
appear to have been previously contracted. In no case shall the donee be
responsible for the debts exceeding the value of the property donated, unless a
contrary intention clearly appears. (642a)
Article
759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee
shall be responsible therefor only when the donation has been made in fraud of
creditors.
The
donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at the time
thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to
the donation. (643)
CHAPTER 4
Revocation and Reduction of Donations
Article
760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or
descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate,
may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next article, by the happening of
any of these events:
(1)
If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or
illegitimate children, even though they be posthumous;
(2)
If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he made the
donation, should turn out to be living;
(3)
If the donor subsequently adopt a minor child. (644a)
Comments:
· Prescribes in four
(4) years “from birth of first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption,
or from judicial declaration of filiation, or from the time information was
received regarding the existence of the child believed dead”.
· Reckoning point see
Article 763
· In onerous donations
however, prescriptive period is ten (10) years
Automatic Revocation
Automatic
Revocation Clause in Donation;
Forcible
Entry; Unlawful Detainer
- PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS
RAYMUND F. VILLAFUERTE, JR., Petitioner, -versus BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented
by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, Respondent. G.R. No. 194199 Present: VELASCO,
JR., J., Chairperson, BERSAMIN, REYES, JARDELEZA, and TIJA
22 March 2017
Xx~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~xX
This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic
revocation clause
in donations in the case of De Luna v. Abrigo37 promulgated
in 1990. We
explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses by
first identifying the
three categories of donation. In De Luna, we said that a donation may be
simple, remuneratory
or onerous. A donation is simple when the cause is the
donor's pure
liberality. It is remuneratory when the donor "gives something
to reward past or
future services or because of future charges or burdens,
when the value of
said services, burdens or charges is less than the value of
the donation."38
A donation is onerous when it is "subject to burdens,
charges, or future
services equal (or more) in value than that of the thing
donated x x x. " 39 This Court found that the donation in De Luna was
onerous
as it required the donee to build a chapel, a nursery, and a
kindergarten. We
then went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed
by the law on
contracts and not by the law on donations. It is within this
context that this
Court found an automatic revocation clause as valid.
We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code
allows
the parties "to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy."40 In
contracts law, parties may
agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a
contract unilaterally.
This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an onerous
donation. The
jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of
contracts law therefore
applies in an automatic revocation clause.
Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of
the
Philippines v. De las Angeles41 and Angeles v. Calasanz42
where we held
that an automatic rescission clause effectively rescinds the
contract upon
breach without need of any judicial declaration.
37 G.R. No. 57455, January 18, 1990, 18 1 SCRA 150. 38 id.
at 155. 39 Id. at 156. Citation omitted. 40 Id. at 156- 157. 4 1
In University of the Philippines, this Court held that a
party to a
contract with an automatic rescission clause, who believes
that there has
been a breach warranting rescission, may consider the
contract rescinded
without previous court action. Speaking through Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, we
said:
x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the
contracting party who believes itself injured must first
file
suit and wait for a judgment before taking extrajudicial
steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured
by
the other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its
damages accumulate during the pendency of the suit until
the final judgment of rescission is rendered when the law
itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to
minimize its own damages xx x.
43
We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the
extrajudicial rescission in court in case of abuse or error
by the rescinder. It
is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the
issue becomes
necessary.
that:
Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled
in De Luna
It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial
declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even
without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper.
44
While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous
donations
with an automatic revocation clause, we extended this
doctrine to apply to
donations inter vivas in general in Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila.
We explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code
states that the
general provisions on obligations and contracts shall govern
donations inter
vivas in all matters not determined in Title III, Book III
on donations. Title
III has no explicit provisions for instances where a
donation has an
automatic revocation clause. Thus, the rules in contracts
law regarding
automatic rescission of contracts as well as the
jurisprudence explaining it
find suppletory application. We then reiterated in Roman
Catholic
Archbishop of Manila that where a donation has an automatic
revocation
clause, the occurrence of the condition agreed to by the
parties as to cause
the revocation, is sufficient for a party to consider the
donation revoked
without need of any judicial action. A judicial finding that
the revocation is
proper is only necessary when the other party actually goes
to court for the
specific purpose of challenging the propriety of the
revocation. Nevertheless,
even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the court
will be merely
declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act. "45 We
also explained in this case that in ascertaining the
prescription of actions
arising from an automatic revocation clause in donations,
the general
provisions on prescription under the Civil Code apply.
Article 764--which
provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an
action to revoke the
donation in case of breach of a condition--govems an
instance where the
deed of donation does not contain an automatic revocation
clause.46
We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now
P.D.
Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas.47 We once again
held that if a
contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or
reversion in case of
a breach of a condition and the donee violates it or fails
to comply with it,
the property donated automatically reverts back to the donor
without need of
any judicial declaration. It is only when the donee denies
the rescission or
challenges its propriety that the court can intervene to
conclusively settle
whether the resolution was proper. This was also the import
of our ruling in
Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata. 48
In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear
automatic
revocation clause. The clause states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE
shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the
construction of its building to be owned and to be
constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its
offices to be used by the said Ca.marines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under
its
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers'
Association as well as the Ca.marines Sur High School
Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that
the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the
property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party and provided,
lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings
referred to above shall be commenced within a period of
one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically
revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.49
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation:
( 1) that the
property shall be used for "no other purpose except the
construction of its
building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to
house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur
Teachers'
Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under
its charter and bylaws
and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur
45 Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 24 at 308-309. 46 Id. at 306. 47 G.R. No. 1526¥3, ovember 18, 2005,
475 SCRA 458. 48 G.R. No. 148433 September 30, 2008, 567 SCRA 163. 49 Rollo, p.
I 07.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 194199
High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall
"not sell, mortgage or
incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements
thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the
construction of the building or
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (I)
year from and after the execution." The last clause of
this paragraph states
that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked x x
x."50 We read the final clause of this provision as an
automatic revocation
clause which pertains to all three conditions of the
donation. When
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first
and second
conditions.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA
leased
the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions in the
Deed of Donation
and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It
even executed a
Deed of Revocation. The records show that CASTEA never
contested this
revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman
Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders
Kilusang
Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation revoked
and by virtue
of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was
automatic and
immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the
CA clearly erred
in its finding that petitioner should have first filed an
action for
reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the
aforementioned
cases and renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic
revocation
clause.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked
and
CASTEA never contested it, the property donated effectively
reverted back
to it as owner. In demanding the return of the prope1ty,
petitioner sources its
right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of
the Civil Code,
the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing
in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which
is
anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act
of leasing
the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated
in the Deed of
Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic
revocation of the
donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an
authorized
administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a
lessor need not
be the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at the
very least, have
the authority to lease it out.51 None exists in this case.
Bodega finds no basis
for its continued possession of the property.
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the
petitioner's right to
file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not prescribed.
so Id.
" Bali" t"o' ' · A blon, G .R. No. 14 3 361,
F obmacy 9, 2006, 482 SCRA 23, 33 (
Decision 11 G.R. No. 194199
First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively
declared that
Article 7 64 on the prescription of actions for the
revocation of a donation
does not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic
revocation
clause.52 This is necessarily so because Article 764 speaks
of a judicial
action for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern
cases where a
breach of a condition automatically, and without need of
judicial
intervention, revokes the donation.
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the
petitioner
should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the
property, and that
petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the
action within 10
years. This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a
donation with an
automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the
breach of the
condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation.
All the donor has
to do is to formally inform the donee of the revocation.
Judicial intervention
only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety
of the
revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to
merely confirm
and not order the revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year
prescriptive
period to file an action to speak of. When the donee does
not contest the
revocation, no court action is necessary.
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner
is entitled to
its possession. The petitioner's action for ejectment is
anchored on this right
to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a
party seeking to
eject another from a property for unlawful detainer must
file the action for
ejectment within one year from the last demand to vacate.53
This is the
prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to comply
with in this case.
The records show that the petit_ioner served its last demand
letter on
November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on
March 13, 2008 or
around four months from the last demand. The action is
clearly within the
prescriptive period.
We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the
petitioner.
Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of
the
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of
the premises, attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis
supplied.)
52 Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata,
G.R. No. 148433 , September 30, 2008,
567 SCRA 163, 18 1-1 82; Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77425,
June 19, 199 1, 198 SCRA 300, 306-307.
" CIVIL CODE, Art. 11 47; RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Sec.
'7
Decision 12 G.R. No. 194199
Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is
entitled to
recover damages, which refer to "rents" or
"the reasonable compensation forthe use and occupation of the
premises," or "fair rental value of the
property" 54 and attorney's fees and costs. More
specifically, recoverable
damages are "those which the plaintiff could have
sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and
occupation of the
property. " 55
In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of Pl
5,000 monthly as
damages. Petitioner argued that considering that the
Contract of Lease
between CASTEA and Bodega shows that the monthly rent for
the property
is P30,000, the amount of Pl5,000 which it prays for is fair
and reasonable.56
We agree with the petitioner's position. The amount of rent
in the Contract
of Lease is evidence of the fair rental value of the property.
That the
petitioner asked for half of this amount as damages is
reasonable given the
circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 31 , 2010 which
AFFIRMED
the Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated May 13,
2009 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC Naga City is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
x----------------------------x
Article
761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall
be revoked or reduced insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely
disposed of by will, taking into account the whole estate of the donor at the
time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (n)
Article
762. Upon the revocation or reduction of the donation by the birth,
appearance or adoption of a child, the property affected shall be returned or
its value if the donee has sold the same.
If
the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem the mortgage, by paying the
amount guaranteed, with a right to recover the same from the donee.
When
the property cannot be returned, it shall be estimated at what it was worth at
the time of the donation. (645a)
Article
763. The action for revocation or reduction on the grounds set forth in
article 760 shall prescribe after four years from the birth of the first child,
or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from the judicial
declaration of filiation, or from the time information was received regarding
the existence of the child believed dead.
This
action cannot be renounced, and is transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to
his legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants. (646a)
Article
764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the
donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon
the latter.
In
this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations
made by the donee and the mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the
limitations established, with regard to third persons, by the Mortgage Law and
the Land Registration laws.
This
action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised
against the donee's heirs. (647a)
Comment:
1. “Conditions” refer to “obligations or charges imposed by the donor on the
donee. “Does not refer to uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment
of a juridical relation depends, but is used in the vulgar sense of obligations
or charges imposed by the donor on the done. It is used, not in its technical
or strict legal sense, but in its broadest sense[4]”.
2. In De Luna v. Abrigo[5] ,
the prescriptive period of an action for revocation of an onerous donation by
reason of non-compliance with the condition/ obligation imposed is ten (10)
years counted from the time within which the done must comply with the
conditions/ obligations of the donation.
Article
765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by
reason of ingratitude in the following cases:
(1)
If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the
property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2)
If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving
moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act
has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his
authority;
(3)
If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to
give support to the donor. (648a)
Comments: Ground is “Ingratitude”
prescriptive period is 1 year “from the time the donor had knowledge of the
fact and it was possible for him to bring the action” per Art. 769
Article
766. Although the donation is revoked on account of ingratitude,
nevertheless, the alienations and mortgages effected before the notation of the
complaint for revocation in the Registry of Property shall subsist.
Later
ones shall be void. (649)
Article
767. In the case referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding
article, the donor shall have a right to demand from the donee the value of
property alienated which he cannot recover from third persons, or the sum for
which the same has been mortgaged.
The
value of said property shall be fixed as of the time of the donation. (650)
Article
768. When the donation is revoked for any of the causes stated in article
760, or by reason of ingratitude, or when it is reduced because it is
inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except from the filing of
the complaint.
If
the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any of the conditions imposed
in the donation, the donee shall return not only the property but also the
fruits thereof which he may have received after having failed to fulfill the
condition. (651)
Article
769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be
renounced in advance. This action prescribes within one year, to be counted
from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it was possible for him
to bring the action. (652)
Article
770. This action shall not be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, if
the latter did not institute the same, although he could have done so, and even
if he should die before the expiration of one year.
Neither
can this action be brought against the heir of the donee, unless upon the
latter's death the complaint has been filed. (653)
Comment:
If Ground is “non-compliance with condition” action is transmissible under Art.
764
Article
771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions of article 752, are
inofficious, bearing in mind the estimated net value of the donor's property at
the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the excess; but this
reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of
the donor, nor shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.
For
the reduction of donations the provisions of this Chapter and of articles 911
and 912 of this Code shall govern. (654)
Article
772. Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to the
legitime and their heirs and successors in interest may ask for the reduction
or inofficious donations.
Those
referred to in the preceding paragraph cannot renounce their right during the
lifetime of the donor, either by express declaration, or by consenting to the
donation.
The
donees, devisees and legatees, who are not entitled to the legitime and the
creditors of the deceased can neither ask for the reduction nor avail
themselves thereof. (655a)
Comment:
1. Creditors must go after the estate and not the donees.
2.
Pursuant to Mateo v. Laguna[6], an
action for reduction of inofficious donation prescribes in 10 years following
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code. Because the cause of action accrues only
upon the death of the donor-decedent hence the prescriptive period starts to
run only upon such death.
Article
773. If, there being two or more donations, the disposable portion is not
sufficient to cover all of them, those of the more recent date shall be
suppressed or reduced with regard to the excess. (656)
TITLE IV
SUCCESSION
CHAPTER 1
General Provisions
Comments:
Study of succession for purposes of civil law review should be divided into: a.
Kinds of Succession, i.e., Testamentary, Legal or Intestate; Mixed
Succession b. Formalities of Last Will & Testament; c. Institution
of Heirs; d. INTERPLAY of Substitution, Accretion & Representation e.
Predecease, Renunciation & Incapacity; f. Distribution of Estate
Article
774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his
will or by operation of law. (n)
Article
775. In this Title, "decedent" is the general term applied to
the person whose property is transmitted through succession, whether or not he
left a will. If he left a will, he is also called the testator. (n)
Article
776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of
a person which are not extinguished by his death. (659)
Comment:
Conflicts with Art. 793
Article
777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the
death of the decedent. (657a)
Article
778. Succession may be:
(1)
Testamentary;
(2)
Legal or intestate; or
(3)
Mixed. (n)
Article
779. Testamentary succession is that which results from the designation of
an heir, made in a will executed in the form prescribed by law. (n)
Article
780. Mixed succession is that effected partly by will and partly by
operation of law. (n)
Article
781. The inheritance of a person includes not only the property and the transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, but also those which
have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. (n)
Comment:
See Art. 793 and compare
Article
782. An heir is a person called to the succession either by the provision
of a will or by operation of law.
Devisees
and legatees are persons to whom gifts of real and personal property are
respectively given by virtue of a will. (n)
Comments:
· “devisees” – real
property
· “legatees”- personal
property
· In PRETERITION, Art
854, instituted voluntary heir gets nothing but legatees and devisees get their
property for as long as legitime is not impinged upon.
[2] CJ Yulo &
Sons, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc., G.R. No. 133705, March
31, 2005
[4] Central
Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511, Dissenting Opinion by
Justice Davide
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