ETRIII CIVIL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
(Assignment on Class Reporting Immediately Follows
Find in Older Posts or Class Assignments Label)
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
(Prepared for Law 4-A,
Univ. of San Agustin
Law School,
SY 2017-2018)
I. Contract of Loan.
1.1.Defined. By the contract of
loan, one of the parties called the bailor or lender delivers to another called
the borrower or bailee, either something not consumable so that the latter may
use the same for a certain time and return it, in which case it is called
a commodatum ; or money or other consumable thing, upon
the condition that the same amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid,
in which case the contract is simply a loan or mutuum.
1.2.Characteristics.
a)
Real Contract. Commodatum or simple
loan is PERFECTED upon delivery of the object of the contract.
b) Unilateral. There is NO contract
of loan before delivery by the lender. However, in Development Bank of
the Phils v. Guarina Agricultural and Realty Development Corp.,[1] it was held that “x x x a
loan requires the delivery of money or any other consumable object by one party
to another who acquires ownership thereof, on the condition that the same
amount or quality shall be paid. Loan is a reciprocal obligation,
as it arises from the same cause where one party in a reciprocal obligation is
dependent upon the obligation of the other, and the performance should ideally
be simultaneous.”
1.3. Kinds of Loan
a) Commodatum
b) Mutuum
c) Accepted
promise to loan (Art. 1934). This is a CONSENSUAL
contract which is preparatory to a contract of loan.
d) Discounting. Mode of lending money
where interest is withheld in advance.
e) Revolving
Credit.- A credit line is “that amount of money
or merchandise which a banker, merchant, or supplier agrees to supply to a
person on credit and generally agreed to in advance. It is the fixed limit of
credit granted by a bank, retailer, or credit card issuer to a customer, to the
full extent of which the latter may avail himself of his dealings with the
former but which he must not exceed and is usually intended to cover a series
of transactions in which case, when the customer’s line of credit is nearly
exhausted, he is expected to reduce his indebtedness by payments before making
any further drawings”[2].
f) Credit Card. – “The issuance of a
credit card allows the holder thereof to obtain, on credit, goods, and services
from certain establishments. As proof that this credit is extended by the
establishment, a credit card draft is issued. Thereafter, the company issuing
the credit card will pay for the purchases of the credit card holders by
redeeming the drafts. The obligation to collect from the card holders and to
bear the loss- in case they do not pay- rests on the issuer of the credit card”[3].
Three contracts. (1) Contract of sale
between the card holder and the merchant or business establishment that
accepted the credit card; (2) The loan agreement between the credit card holder
and the credit card issuer; and (3) The promise to pay between the credit card
issuer and the merchant or business establishment”[4].
No Duty to Approve. “From the loan
agreement perspective, the contractual relationship begins to exist only upon
the meeting of the offer and acceptance of the parties involved. In
more concrete terms, when cardholders use their credit cards to pay for their
purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with
the credit card company. Only after the latter approves the purchase requests
that the parties enter into binding loan contracts, in keeping with Article
1319 of the Civil Code x x x”[5].
SUMMARY OF RULES AND DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN COMMODATUM, SIMPLE
LOAN AND DEPOSIT[6]
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COMMODATUM
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SIMPLE LOAN
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VOLUNTARY DEPOSIT
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The
purpose is the use of the thing.
NOTE:
Use of the fruits is not included unless expressly provided for.[7]
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The
purpose is for the borrower to consume what was borrowed.
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The
purpose is safe-keeping.
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Real
contract perfected upon delivery.
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Real
Contract
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Real
Contract
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Movable
and Immovable Things
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Involves
Movables
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(2) Judicial Deposit-
Movable and Immovable
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Essentially
Gratuitous
NOTE:
If onerous or compensation is paid, then contract may be Lease.[9]
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May
be Gratuitous or Onerous (Example: If interest is payable)
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May
be Gratuitous or Onerous
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The
object is generally non-consumable
EXCEPTION:
If the purpose is not for consumption but for exhibition.
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The
object is money or other fungible things.
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Consumable
or non-consumable although for safekeeping only
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Bailor/
Lender retains ownership of the thing delivered
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Bailor/
Lender becomes the owner of the thing delivered
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Depositor
retains ownership of the thing delivered
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There
is an obligation to return the same thing.
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The
bailee/ borrower becomes the owner; hence, there is no obligation to return
the same thing.
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The
Depositary must return the same thing.
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Death
of the lender or the borrower extinguishes Commodatum because it is purely PERSONAL
in character.[10]
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Death
of the lender does not extinguish the loan.
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If
gratuitous deposit- Death of the depositor or the depositary extinguishes the
deposit.[11]
If
for compensation- Death of the depositor and or the depositary DOES NOT
extinguish the deposit.
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Generally,
the bailor bears the loss of the thing due to fortuitous event.
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The
bailee-borrower bears the loss of the thing delivered. Res perit
domino.
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Generally,
the depositor bears the loss of the thing due to fortuitous event.
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The
bailor/ lender need not be the owner of the thing loaned.
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The
lender- bailor must be the owner or at least capable of transferring
ownership.
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The
depositor need not be the owner of the thing deposited. However, the
depositary CANNOT be the owner of the thing deposited.
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Generally,
the lender must wait for the expiration of the period agreed upon or the
accomplishment of the use for which the commodatum has been constituted.[12]
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The
lender- bailor must wait for the expiration of the period agreed upon.
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The
depositor can demand the return of the thing at anytime.
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II. Commodatum. The main purpose is
USE of the thing loaned. But the right to the FRUITS is retained by the OWNER.
Thus the distinction from USUFRUCT whereby the usufructuary gets to enjoy the
right to use and to the fruits.
-It is also ESSENTIALLY GRATUITOUS and
TEMPORARY because the agreement is subject to a term or period. Pursuant to
Article 1935, “If any compensation is to be paid by him who acquires
the use, the contract ceases to be a commodatum”.
- General rule: Object
is “non-consumable goods”.
- Exception: When
consumable goods is USED merely for exhibition. InProducers Bank of the
Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals[15], the agreement to deposit
respondent’s money in a savings account specifically for the purpose of making
it appear that said firm had sufficient capitalization for incorporation, with
the promise that the amount shall be returned within 30 days is commodatum.
- PERSONAL IN NATURE.
Commodatum is purely personal in character.
Consequences: a. death of either bailor or bailee extinguishes the contract; b.
bailee cannot lease the object of the contract to a third person. However, the
members of the bailee’s household may make use of the thing loaned, unless
there is a stipulation to the contrary, or unless the nature of the thing
forbids such use.[16]
2.1. Obligations of the
Bailee.
(1) To exercise due
diligence while in possession of the thing loaned.
(2) To pay
ordinary expenses for the use and preservation of the thing loaned.
(3) To be responsible for
the loss of the thing in the cases specified in Article 1942
(4) To be liable for any
loss or injury caused because of the bailee’s fault or negligence; and,
(5) To return the thing
upon the expiration of the term of the contract.
Expenses for Preservation. “If a person is
obliged to return a determinate thing, he must exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in taking care of the thing. The bailee is liable for breach
of this duty, hence, the bailee is liable for any loss due to his negligence.
a. As part of the duty
to exercise due diligence, the bailee is obliged to pay for the ordinary
expenses for the use and preservation of the thing loaned. If the thing loaned
is a gasoline generator set, the bailee must shoulder the gasoline cost because
the same cost is for the use of the thing loaned. Similarly, the bailee is
liable for the expenses for the regular routine cleaning of the generator set
because the same is an expense for the preservation of the thing loaned.
b. However, the bailee
does not answer for the deterioration of the thing loaned due only to the use
thereof and without his fault. Justice J.B.L. Reyes opined that the provision
should be taken to refer only to the “normal” use of the thing loaned. It
should be noted that the bailee is even liable for extraordinary expenses
arising from the use of the thing.[17]”
LOSS. The bailee is liable for the
loss of the thing, even if it should be through a fortuitous event in the
following cases:
(1) He devotes the thing
to any purpose different from that for which it has been loaned;
(2) If he keeps it longer
than the period stipulated, or after the accomplishment of the use for which
the commodatum has been constituted;
(3) If the thing loaned
has been delivered with appraisal of its value, unless there is a stipulation
exempting the bailee from responsibility in case of a fortuitous event
(4) If he lends or leases
the thing to a third person, who is not a member of his household;
(5) If, being able to
save either the thing borrowed or his own thing, he chose to save the latter.
RIGHT OF RETENTION:
GENERAL RULE: The bailee cannot
retain the thing loaned on the ground that the bailor owes him something, even
though it may be by reason of expenses.
EXCEPTION: However, the bailee has a right
of retention for damages mentioned in Article 1951, i.e., the bailor is
liable to the bailee if the bailee was damaged because of a flaw or defect in
the thing of which the bailor was aware. The bailor cannot exempt himself from
liability by abandoning the thing.
SOLIDARY LIABILITY. – “When there are two
or more bailees to whom a thing is loaned in the same contract, they are liable
solidarily[18]”.
2.2. Obligations of the
Bailor
General Rule: Bailor cannot demand
the return of thing until after the expiration of the period stipulated or
accomplishment of the use for which commodatum was constituted.
Exceptions:
a) PRECARIUM- In
precarium, the bailor may demand the thing at will. 1)If neither the duration
of the contract nor the use to which the thing loaned should be devoted has
been stipulated; or, 2) If the use of the thing is merely tolerated by the
owner.
“It was opined that the second case of precarium should be
taken as a case where the “use of the thing was understood to have been granted
subject to the revocation at anytime by the bailor. Justice J.B.L. Reyes
observed that: “Commodatum being a gratuitous loan of the use of a thing, it
necessarily implies toleration of such use. Unless the term ‘tolerated’ is
limited, all commodatum will be ‘precarium’ under this rule. Moreover, the use
of the term ‘owner’ for ‘bailor’ is improper, because Article 1938 specifies
that the bailor may not be the owner.[19]”
b) URGENT NEED- Bailor
may temporarily ask for the return of the thing in case
of urgent need.
c) ACTS OF INGRATITUDE-
Commodatum being essentially gratuitous it partakes of the nature of a
donation. Hence, Article 1948 provides for the same grounds for revocation of
donation as grounds for revocation of commodatum.
3. Simple Loan or Mutuum
. A
person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing acquires the
ownership thereof, and is bound to pay to the creditor an equal amount of the
same kind and quality.[20]
3.1. Money or
Fungibles. The contract of mutuum requires the receipt
of money or other fungible things. Fungibility refers to the capability of the
object to be substituted by another of the same kind, quantity or quality.
3.2. Transfer of
Ownership. In mutuum, ownership is transferred to the
borrower. Hence, in simple loan, the failure of the borrower to return the
object does not give rise to estafa.
3.3. Interest . requisites.
a) Payment of interest
is agreed upon;
b) Stipulation to Pay
Interest must be in writing;
c) Rate must not
be against the law (not usurious or unconscionable)
“In
summary, the rules (on interest) may be presented in tabular form as follows:
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TYPE OF OBLIGATION
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INTEREST DUE
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ADDITIONAL INTEREST
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1. When the obligation is breached, and in the payment of
a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money.
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- The interest due should be that which may have been
stipulated in writing.
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a. Interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the
time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default;
b. If court awards a sum of money and the award becomes
final and executor, the rate of legal interest, shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction.
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2. When an obligation not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money is breached.
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- an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum.
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Court awards a sum of money which becomes final and
executor, the rate of legal interest shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
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3. Unliquidated claims or damages
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- no interest until final judgment
-the legal interest of 6% shall be on the amount finally
adjudged by the Court.
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IV.DEPOSIT
4.1.Definition. There is deposit when
one person delivers and the other person receives a thing belonging to another,
with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same.[21]
4.2. Characteristics.
a) It is a real
contract, that is, it is perfected by delivery;
b) It is a principal
contract;
c) It can be unilateral
if it is gratuitous or bilateral if it is onerous. But GENERALLY
GRATUITOUS. Per Article 1965, New Civil Code, A contract of deposit is
gratuitous save in cases of: 1) when there is an agreement to the contrary; or
2) the depositary is engaged in the business of storing goods.
d) Its purpose is
safekeeping
e) It involves temporary
custody of the depositary as there is an obligation to return; and,
Distinguished from Lease. Read RCG Bus Lines, Inc. v. Master
Tours and Travel Corp.[23]
“To begin
with, the cause in a contract of lease is the enjoyment of the thing; in a
contract of deposit, it is the safekeeping of the thing.6 They thus
create essentially distinct obligations that would result in a novation only if
the parties entered into one after the other concerning the same subject
matter. The turning point in this case, therefore, is whether or not the
parties subsequently entered into an agreement for the storage of the buses
that superseded their prior lease agreement involving the same buses. Although
the buses were described in the lease agreement as “junked and not
operational,” it is clear from the prescribed manner of payment of the rental
fee (P400,000.00 down and P200,000.00 upon completion of their rehabilitation)
that RCJ would rehabilitate such buses and use them for its transport business.
Now, RCJ’s theory is that the parties subsequently changed their minds and
terminated the lease but, rather than have Master Tours get back its junked
buses, RCJ agreed to store them in its garage as a service to Master Tours
subject to payment of storage fees. Two things militate against RCJ’s theory. First,
RCJ failed to present any clear proof that it agreed with Master Tours to
abandon the lease of the buses and in its place constitute RCJ as depositary of
the same, providing storage service to Master Tours for a fee. The only
evidence RCJ relied on is Master Tours’ letter of June 16, 1997 in which it
demanded the return of the four buses which were placed in RCJ’s garage for
“safekeeping.” The pertinent portion of the letter reads: This is to follow up
our previous discussion with you with regards to the Five (5) units of Daewoo
Airconditioned Motorcoaches, which we brought to your garage at E. Rodriguez
Avenue for safekeeping. Since we have outstanding loan with BancAsia Finance
& Investment Corporation and BancAsia Capital Corporation that we are unable
to service payment, they have made final demand to us and are in the process of
foreclosing these units. We urgently request from you a meeting to thresh out
matters concerning the pulling of these units by the financing firms.7 For one
thing, the letter does not on its face constitute an agreement. It contains no
contractual stipulations respecting some warehousing arrangement between the
parties concerning the buses. At best, the letter acknowledges that five Master
Tours’ buses were “brought to your [RCJ’s] garage…for safekeeping.” But the
idea of RCJ safekeeping the buses for Master Tours is consistent with their
lease agreement. The lessee of a movable property has an obligation to “return
the thing leased, upon the termination of the lease, just as he received it.”8
This means that RCJ must, as an incident of the lease, keep the buses safe from
injury or harm while these were in its possession. For another, it is evident
from the tenor of Master Tours’ letter that RCJ’s “safekeeping” was to begin from
the time the buses were delivered at its garage. There is no allegation or
evidence that Master Tours pulled out the buses at some point, signifying the
pre-termination of the lease agreement, then brought them back to RCJ’s garage,
this time for safekeeping. This circumstance rules out any notion that an
agreement for RCJ to hold the buses for safekeeping had overtaken the lease
agreement. Second, it did not make sense for Master Tours to pre-terminate its
lease of the junked buses to RCJ, which would earn Master Tours P600,000.00, in
exchange for having to pay RCJ storage fees for keeping those buses just the
same. As pointed out above, the lease already implied an obligation on RCJ’s
part to safekeep the buses while they were being rented. Two. RCJ claims that
it cannot be held liable to Master Tours for rental fee on the buses
considering that these never became operational. The pertinent portions of the
lease agreement provide: 7 The letter mentions five buses but the contract
refers only to four buses; Section 1. Lease of AIRCON BUSES – The LESSOR hereby
agrees and shall deliver unto the LESSEE the AIRCON BUSES by way of a long term
lease of said buses. Section 2. Term of Lease – The lease of the AIRCON BUSES
shall be for a period of FIVE (5) years to commence on 15 February 1993 and to
end automatically on 15 February 1998. x x x Section 3. Lease Fee – For and in
consideration of the lease of the AIRCON BUSES subject hereof, the lease fee
for five years for the Four (4) units shall be in the amount of PESOS: SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND (P600,000.00). The LESSEE agrees to advance the amount of
PESOS: FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND (P400,000.00) payable upon the signing of the
Agreement. The remaining balance of PESOS: TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00)
will be payable upon completion of rehabilitation of the 4 buses by the
lessee.9 The Court finds no basis in the above for holding that RCJ’s
obligation to pay the rents of P600,000.00 on the buses depended on the buses
being rehabilitated. Apart from delivering the buses to RCJ, the agreement did
not require any further act from Master Tours as a condition to the exercise of
its right to collect the lease fee. Of course, the lease agreement provided for
two payments: P400,000.00 upon the signing of the agreement and P200,000.00
upon completion of rehabilitation of the buses. But this provision is more
about the mode of payment rather than about the extinguishment of the
obligation to pay the amounts due. The phrase “upon completion of
rehabilitation” implies an obligation to complete the rehabilitation which, in
this case, wholly depended on work to be done “by the lessee.” That the buses
may have turned out to be unsuitable for use despite repair cannot prejudice
Master Tours. X x x”
4.3.
Free Valet Parking. Read Triple- V Food
Services, Inc. v. Filipino Merchants Insurance Co.[24] “When a restaurant
offers free valet parking to its customers, the restaurant company is
constituted as DEPOSITARY. The customer entrusts his or her car to the
restaurant with the expectation of the car’s safe return at the end of the
meal. The stipulation in the “Parking stub” holding the restaurant not liable for
any damage- being a contract of adhesion- is void in view of the nature of the
transaction.”[25]
4.4. Safety Deposit Box.
Question: Is it governed by
Contract of Lease (Title VII, Book IV of the Civil Code) or Deposit under
(Title XII, Book IV)?
It
is not a contract of lease. It is governed by Section 53 of the General Banking
Law being one of the functions of a bank which is to : (5)Rent out
safety deposit boxes”. “The depositary’s responsibility is still found
within the parameters of a contract ofdeposit”, I.E., the receiving in
custody of the funds, securities and other effects which it receives duly
separate from the bank’s own assets and liabilities.”
4.5. Escrow Agreements v.
Escrow Deposit
- X x x An escrow fills
a definite niche in the body of the law; it has a distinct legal character. The
usual definition is that an escrow is a written instrument which by its terms
imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or
obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party, to be kept by the
depositary until the performance of a condition or the happening of a certain
event, and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promise, or obligee.
While originally, the doctrine of escrow applied to deeds by
way of grant, or as otherwise stated, instruments for the conveyance of land,
under modern theories of law, the term escrow is not limited in its application
to deeds, but is applied to the deposit of any written instrument with a third
person. Particular instruments which have been held to be the subject of an
escrow include bonds or covenants, deeds, mortgages, oil and gas leases,
contracts for the sale of land or for the purchase of personal property,
corporate stocks and stock subscriptions, promissory notes or other commercial
paper, insurance applications, indentures of apprenticeship, receipts assigning
concessions and discontinuances and releases of causes of action. Moreover,
it is no longer open to question that money may be delivered in escrow.
- Escrow Deposit. According to Prof.
Timoteo B. Aquino: “It is submitted, however, that bank deposits that are
considered “escrow deposit” are not governed by the rules on the contract of
deposit. The law on mutuum still applies to the deposit itself. However, the
bank must perform the service of releasing of the escrow fund subject to
certain conditions. For instance, if the parties in a contract of sale agreed
to deposit the price in escrow, the release by the bank of the funds to the
seller may be subject to the condition that the seller must submit the title
and the tax declaration in the name of the buyer. Hence the purpose of the
deposit is not for safekeeping”[26].
4.6. USE OF THE THING. Gen. Rule- Depositary
cannot use the thing because the purpose of the contract is only for
SAFEKEEPING.
Exceptions:
(1) The preservation of
the thing requires its use (Article 1977, New Civil Code)
(2) Irregular deposit
(Article 1978, New Civil Code).
4.6.1. Irregular Deposit v. Loan.
“Manresa, in his Commentaries on the
Civil Code (vol. 11, p. 664), states that there are three points of difference
between a loan and an irregular deposit. The first difference which he
points out consists in the fact that in an irregular deposit the only benefit
is that which accrues to the depositor, while in a loan the essential cause for
the transaction is the necessity of the borrower. The contract in question does
not fulfill this requirement of an irregular deposit. It is very apparent that
it was not for the benefit of Rogers. It, like any other loan of money, was for
the benefit of both parties. The benefit which Smith, Bell & Co., received
was the use of the money; the benefit which Rogers received was the interest on
his money. In the letter in which Smith, Bell & Co., on the 30th of
June, 1888, notified the plaintiff of the reduction of the interest, they said:
“We call your attention to this matter in order that you may if you think best
employ you money in some other place”.
Nor does the contract in question fulfill the third requisite indicated by
Manresa, which is, that in an irregular deposit, the depositor can demand the
return of the article at anytime, while the lender is bound by the provisions
of the contract and cannot seek restitution until the time for payment, as
provided in the contract, has arisen. It is apparent from the terms of this
documents that the plaintiff could not demand his money at anytime. He was
bound to give notice of his desire for its return and then to wait for six
months before he could insist upon payment”.
4.7. Depositor’s Right to
Sell. With respect to the depositor, his right to sell would
depend on whether or not he is the owner or is authorized to sell the thing
deposited. The depositor who is not the owner must also secure the necessary authority
to sell from the owner[28].
4.8. Right of
Retention. The depositary may retain the thing in pledge until the full
payment of what may be due him by reason of the deposit.
4.9. Necessary Deposits.
“Article 1962, in
relation to Article 1998, of the Civil Code defines a contract of deposit and a
necessary deposit made by persons in hotels or inns:
Art. 1962. A deposit
is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another,
with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
Art. 1998. The
deposit of effects made by travelers in hotels or inns shall also be regarded
as necessary. The keepers of hotels or inns shall be responsible for them as
depositaries, provided that notice was given to them, or to their employees, of
the effects brought by the guests and that, on the part of the latter, they
take the precautions which said hotel-keepers or their substitutes advised
relative to the care and vigilance of their effects.
Plainly, from the
facts found by the lower courts, the insured See deposited his vehicle for
safekeeping with petitioner, through the latters employee, Justimbaste. In
turn, Justimbaste issued a claim stub to See. Thus, the contract of deposit was
perfected from Sees delivery, when he handed over to Justimbaste the keys to
his vehicle, which Justimbaste received with the obligation of safely keeping
and returning it. Ultimately, petitioner is liable for the loss of Sees
vehicle.
Vehicles. “The hotel-keeper is
liable for the vehicles, animals and articles which have been introduced or
placed in the annexes of the hotel.[30]
Liability for Acts of Servants and Employees- Art. 2000
Thief and Robber. The act of a thief or
robber who has entered the hotel is not deemed force majeure.
Exception: The act of a thief or robber is a defense if it
is done with the USE OF ARMS or through IRRESTIBLE FORCE. Hence the depositary
is not liable under this exception.
NOT LIABLE FOR ACTS OF GUESTS. If loss is caused
(1) due to acts of guest,
his family, servants or visitors, or
Prohibited Acts. The hotelkeeper
cannot free himself form responsibility by posting notices to the effect that
he is not liable for the articles brought by the guest.
“Any stipulation between the
hotelkeeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of the former is
suppressed or diminished.[32]”
Burden of Evidence. “One who, while a
guest at an inn or hotel, has lost his goods, is not bound, in an action
against the innkeeper, to prove negligence on the part of the defendant or his
servants. Proof of the loss suffices to make out a prima facie case, and casts
upon the defendant the burden of showing facts which will exonerate him of
liability. The innkeeper is said to be liable as an insurer of the goods which
have been intrusted to him.
This rule is of almost
universal application, but some jurisdictions apply the rule of measuring
liability by the negligence of the innkeeper or his servants, a very high
degree of care being demanded, and a presumption of negligence arising from the
fact of loss. Such a rule is, in effect, an application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine, and to avoid liability the innkeeper must show that
the loss was due to some other cause than his own or his servant’s or agent’s
fault.
Even under the prevailing
rule that he is an insurer, the innkeeper is not bound to establish, in order
to escape liability, that the loss of the plaintiff’s property was caused by
inevitable accident or an irresistible force. The rule has been thus stated in
a leading case: “The general doctrine deducible from the authorities, ancient
and modern, is that keepers of public inns are bound well and safety to keep
the property of their guests accompanying them at the inn; and in case of such
property is lost of injured, the innkeeper can only absolve himself from
liability by showing that the loss or injury occurred without any fault on his
part, or by the fault of the guest, his companions or servants or by superior
force; and the burden of proof to exonerate the innkeeper is upon him, for in
the first instance the law will attribute the loss injury to his fault.”
The rule of strict liability
does not apply to the loss or to the damage of the goods of permanent
boarders and other parties who have a special contract as to board.”[33]
V.GUARANTY. By guaranty, a
person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.[34]
5.1.
Guaranty & Suretyship v. Mortgage, Pledge & Antichresis
v The contracts of
guaranty and suretyship are both PERSONAL SECURITY TRANSACTION that secures a
principal obligation – it is the personal obligation of the natural or
juridical entity. They should be distinguished from REAL SECURITY AGREEMENT
like mortgage, pledge and antichresis where property is given by way of
collateral.[35]
v Excussion. The
liability of the guarantor is SUBSIDIARY. The guarantor cannot be compelled to
pay the creditor unless:
a. The creditor has
EXHAUSTED all the property of the debtor; and
b. The creditor has
resorted to all the legal remedies against the debtor.
VI.SURETYSHIP
|
SURETY
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GUARANTY
|
|
The surety insures the debt- the surety’s undertaking is
that the debt shall be paid.
|
The guarantor insures the debtor’s solvency- the
guarantor’s undertaking is that the debtor shall pay.
|
|
The surety is solidarily and primarily liable
|
The guarantor is subsidiarily liable.
|
|
The surety is not entitled to the benefit of excussion.
|
The guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion.
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VII.PLEDGE AND MORTGAGE
7.1.
Requirements COMMON to Pledge and Mortgage
a) They must be
constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation
b) The mortgagor or
pledger must be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or mortgaged
c) The pledger or
mortgagor must have free disposal of the property.
7.2. Who may pledge or mortgage. The debtor
himself or a Third Person (who are not parties to the principal obligation) may
mortgage or pledge to secure the obligation of the debtor.
Comment:
The following article is an illustration of the principle that the mortgagor
must be the owner which precept must be interspersed
with the ramifications of the Torrens System of Registration that protects
the innocent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith.
CONTRACTS
TO SELL OR OF SALE versus REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
LET’S DO IT LEGALLY RIGHT
By: E.T. Reyes III
With the upsurge in real estate
dealings involving land development for mixed-use purposes in the Philippines
that had started and eventually saturated the Metropolis, and now had spread
its tentacles to the countryside, sales and mortgages of vast tracts of land
had become banal.
Assuredly, bigger acquisitions of lands
are in the horizon hence it is necessary to be mindful of the implications of
transactions involving lands in order to avoid legal pitfalls.
In the normal run of things, a single
piece of land could become the subject of a contract to sell or of a contract
of sale on one hand; and likewise of a mortgage, one after the other, either in
that order or otherwise. Should theis string of transactions take place, what
would be the legal repercussions?
To answer the question, here are some
hypotheticals:
1) Land owner X, with a
titled property enters into a CONTRACT TO SELL with A, who does not register it
with the register of deeds. Then, X, subsequently loans money from B and
mortgages the same land as security. The mortgage is registered with the
register of deeds.
2) Land owner X,
with a titled property, enters into a CONTRACT OF SALE with A, who does not
register it with the register of deeds. Then, X, subsequently loans money from
B and mortgages the same land as security. The mortgage is registered with the
register of deeds.
3) Land owner X, with a
titled property, loans money from B and mortgages the same land as security. The
mortgage is registered with the register of deeds. Then, X subsequently enters
into either a CONTRACT TO SELL or a CONTRACT OF SALE in favor of A.
Apparently, X is the seller/ mortgagor
while A is the buyer and B is the mortgagee. In this clash of rights, which
between the sale and the mortgage will prevail?
The Supreme Court in a January
2016 ruling in the case of Fabio Cahayag and Conrado Rivera
v. Commercial Credit Corporation etc. and Dulos Realty and Development
Corporation etc. v. Commercial Credit Corp., G.R. Nos. 168078 & 168357,
January 13, 2016, by re-affirming long standing doctrines in Civil law,
un-tangled seemingly convoluted facts, as follows:
· Pursuant to Article
2085 (2) of the New Civil Code, the mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the
thing mortgaged. Necessarily, if he had previously sold the land, he could not
validly mortgage it anymore.
· This is based on
the Nemo dat quod non habet principle which means – a person
cannot give what he does not have. But this Latin precept has been
jurisprudentially held to apply to a contract of sale at its consummation
stage and not at the perfection stage.
· A contract to
sell on one hand should therefore be distinguished from a contract
of sale. The former does not carry with it the obligation to deliver
or transfer the ownership of the thing sold, because of the existence
of a positive suspensive condition which is usually the full
payment of the price. Thus the seller remains as owner pending delivery. In
a contract of sale, the obligation to deliver and transfer
ownership is a necessary consequence of the sale.
· Thus, in hypothetical
No. 1 above, the prior Contract to Sell entered by X in favor of A, would not
affect in any way the subsequent mortgage to B. The mortgage in favor of B
prevails because X was still the owner of the land at the time when he
mortgaged the same to B. And there was no delivery or transfer of ownership yet
from X to A because the positive suspensive condition of full payment of the
price in the contract to sell had not yet been fulfilled hence it is as if
there is no previous sale transaction at all, at the time when the mortgage was
constituted in favor of B.
· In hypothetical No. 2
above, since what X entered into was a Contract of Sale in favor of A, then as
a rule, he could not validly mortgage it anymore to B. There is one exception:
that is if B, the mortgagee, qualifies as an innocent mortgagee for
value as when he claims that he relied on a clean title because the
previous sale to A was not registered. The exception however, only applies when
the mortgagee is NOT a banking or financing institution. Notably, in the case
of De la Merced v. GSIS, G.R. No. 167140, September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court
applied more stringent requirements on banking and financing institutions whose
business are extending loans upon mortgaging of lands on a daily basis hence
presumed to be experienced in background checking lands before approving a
mortgage. They cannot therefore just rely on a clean title but they must
investigate whether the land was subject of a previous sale. Failure to do so,
the previous sale albeit un-registered, would prevail over the registered
mortgage.
· In hypothetical
No. 3, given that the registered mortgage was ahead of either the contract to
sell or the contract of sale, then the legal maxim, “first in time, priority in
right” applies. This is because registration of the mortgage with the register
of deeds constitutes as a constructive notice to the whole world that a
previous mortgage was constituted over the land. If, notwithstanding, buyer A
still buys the land despite the previous mortgage to B, then here, the mortgage
prevails over the sale. This is true even if A buys the land without knowing about
the previous mortgage.
The moral here is that before engaging
in the cumbersome process of land sales or mortgages, always check the title
and make a background investigation. Or better yet, consult an attorney to
guide you in the maze of legal nuances and niceties lest your stable
equilibrium be upended by importunings of court litigation you would get
ensnared in because of ignorantia legis – ignorance of the law
or due to an incomplete understanding thereof.”
7.3. PACTUM COMMISSORIUM. The debtor may
waive the security and just file an action for specific performance for the
payment of the obligation. However, if he wants to reply on the security, he
must foreclose or have the property sold for the payment of the debt. The
creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or
dispose of them.[36]
7.3.1. Requisites.
a) There should be a
property mortgaged or pledged by way of security for the payment of the
principal obligation; and
b) There should be a
stipulation for automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing given as
secutiry in case of non-payment of the principal obligation within the
stipulated period.
7.3.2. A promise to transfer a property in favor of the
creditor in case of non payment is not pactum commissorium because there is no
automatic transfer. “The mortgagor is free to sell or not to sell the property.”[37]
- There is also no pactum commissorium if the principal
obligation is extinguished by dacion en pago, novation or cession.[38]
- An AUTHORITY TO SELL and the appointment of the mortgagee
as attorney-in-fact to sell and dispose of real rights does not, by itself,
constitute pactum commissorium. Such authority is consistent with Article 2087.[39]
VIII.REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE v. IX.CHATTEL MORTGAGE
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REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
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CHATTEL MORTGAGE
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Object: Immovable Property
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Object: Movable Property
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Blanket Mortgage or Dragnet Clause- specifically phrased
to SUBSUME ALL DEBTS OF PAST OR FUTURE ORIGIN; After-incurred obligations
|
After-incurred obligations.
Section 5 of Chattel Mortgage Law requires an “Affidavit
of Good Faith” which states that “ We severally swear that the
foregoing mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation
specified in the conditions thereof, and for no other purpose,
and that the same is a just and valid obligation, and not entered into for
the purpose of fraud”.
- “While a pledge, real estate mortgage, or antichresis
may exceptionally secure after-incurred obligations so long as these future
debts are accurately described, a chattel mortgage, however, can only cover
obligations existing at the time the mortgage is constituted.[40]
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Concept of Mortgagee in Good Faith and In Bad Faith- Exception:
Banks and other Financial Institutions cannot merely rely on face of title[41]
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After-Acquired Properties
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Chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the
property described in the written mortgage contract.[42]
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Deficiency Judgment
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Deficiency Judgment. Unless: covered by Recto Law.
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Right of redemption; equity of redemption
Note: Rural Banks: 2 years redemption
period
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No right of redemption over personal property. Only equity
of redemption (before sale of property in judicial foreclosure).[43]
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Act 3135- Rules on Foreclosure
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Act 1508
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Foreclosure; writ of possession. “the proceeding in a
petition and/ or motion for issuance of writ of possession, after the lapse of
the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature. The trial court is
mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the
one-year statutory period for redemption without the redemptioner having
redeemed the property.[44]
HOWEVER, The right of the
mortgagor to annul the foreclosure proceedings and recover possession pursuant
to sections 7 & 8 of Act 3135 as amended, is limited only to the
“redemption period”[45].
“The provisions of
Act No. 3135 applies until the period of redemption; once redemption lapses and
consolidation of the purchaser’s title ensues, Act No. 3135 finds no
application In a number of cases,14 the Court declared that Section 8 of Act
No. 3135 is the available remedy to set aside a writ of possession, without
considering whether the writ involved in each of these cases was issued during
or after the lapse of the redemption period. Upon reevaluation, we find it
necessary to make a distinction and clarify when the remedy under Section 8 of
Act No. 3135 may be availed of. In extrajudicial foreclosures, a writ of
possession may be issued either (1) within the redemption period or (2) after
the lapse of the redemption period.15 The first instance is based on a
privilege provided under Section 7 of Act No. 3135; the second is based on the
purchaser’s right of ownership. The basis of the purchaser’s right to possess
the property affects the nature of the right. Act No. 3135 governs only the
manner of the sale and redemption of the mortgaged real property in an
extrajudicial foreclosure; proceedings beyond these, i.e., upon the lapse of
the redemption period 13 Supra note 6, at 861. 14 Some of these include Samson
v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 759, 770; Cua Lai Chu v.
Laqui, G.R. 169190, February 11, 2010, 612 SCRA 227, 235; Fortaleza v. Lapitan,
G.R. No. 178288, August 15, 2012, 678 SCRA469, 484-485; Tolosa v. United
Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 183058, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 138, 147. 15
Section 6 of Act No. 3135 allows a one-year redemption period. This provision
has been partly modified by Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791 or the General
Banking Law of 2000. For juridical mortgagors whose property is mortgaged in
favour of banks, they are “allowed to exercise the right of redemption only
“until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale”
and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes
first,” Goldenway Merchandizing Corporation v. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No.
195540, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 439, 453. Decision 7 G.R. No. 206599 and the
consolidation of the purchaser’s title, are no longer within its scope. This is
apparent from Section 1 of Act No. 3135, which states: Section 1. When a sale
is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate
mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment
of any other obligation, the provisions of the following [sections] shall
govern as to the manner in which the sale and redemption shall be effected,
whether or not provision for the same is made in the power. [Emphasis ours] In
fact, the nine (9) sections of Act No. 3135 pertain to proceedings governing
extrajudicial foreclosures, from the conduct of the foreclosure sale up to the
exercise of the right of redemption. Our reading of Act No. 3135, therefore,
should be consistent with the law’s limited coverage. During the redemption
period, the purchaser’s title is merely inchoate.16 The “mere purchase and
[issuance of a] certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the
possession or beneficial use of the premises [in favor of the purchaser].”17
Nonetheless, the purchaser may acquire possession of the property during the
redemption period by exercising the privilege granted to him under Section 7 of
Act No. 3135: Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the
purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place
where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession
thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent
to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the
mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition
shall be made under oath and filed in form of an ex parte motion in the
registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in
special proceedings in the case of property registered under the Mortgage Law
or under section one hundred and ninety-four of the Administrative Code, or of
any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the
office of any register of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in
each case the clerk of the court shall, upon the filing of such petition,
collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and
fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six, as amended by Act
Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and sixty-six, and the court shall, upon approval
of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of
the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order
immediately. [Emphases ours] The debtor, on the other hand, is provided
opportunity to contest the transfer of possession during the redemption period
under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as he remains to be the owner of the
foreclosed property. The provision states: 16 Ermitaño v. Paglas, G.R. No.
174436, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 158, 168. 17 Id. at 170. Decision 8 G.R. No.
206599 Sec. 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was
requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given
possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession
cancelled, specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not
violated or the sale was not made in accordance with the provisions hereof, and
the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with the summary
procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Numbered Four
hundred and ninety-six; and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified,
it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished by the
person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order
of the judge in accordance with section fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred
and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effect during the
pendency of the appeal. [Emphases ours] The writ of possession that the debtor
may petition to set aside under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 undoubtedly refers to
one issued pursuant to Section 7 of the same law “during the redemption
period.” The reference to the Section 7 proceeding underscores the position
that the remedy provided in Section 8 is available only against a writ of
possession during the redemption period. Further showing Section 7 and 8’s
close relation is the bond required to be filed by the purchaser in Section 7
that the debtor may proceed against in Section 8. Section 7 states that the
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession should be accompanied by a
bond which, under Section 8, shall “indemnify the debtor in case it be shown
that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with
the requirements of [Act No. 3135].” The requirement and purpose of the bond in
Act No. 3135 support the position that Section 8 thereof is a remedy available
only during the redemption period. A bond is no longer required to be filed in
support of a petition for writ of possession filed after the redemption period
has expired without the mortgagor exercising his right of redemption. At this
point, the purchaser’s right over the property is consolidated and his right to
obtain possession of the property stems from his right of ownership. In
Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, 18 the Court ruled
that - A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership
of the property in the name of the purchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is
not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. As
such, he is entitled to the possession of the property and can demand it any
time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance of a
new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in Section
7 of Act No. 3135 is no longer necessary. Possession of 18 G.R. No. 153951,
August 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 287. Decision 9 G.R. No. 206599 the land then becomes
an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application
and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a
ministerial duty of the court.19 [Emphases ours] If a bond is no longer
required to support a writ of possession issued after the consolidation of the
purchaser’s ownership, then no relief can be extended to the debtor under
Section 8 of Act No. 3135. As pointed out, the remedy provided under Section 8
of Act No. 3135 to the debtor becomes available only after the purchaser
acquires actual possession of the property. This is required because until then
the debtor, as the owner of the property, does not lose his right to possess.
However, upon the lapse of the redemption period without the debtor exercising
his right of redemption and the purchaser consolidates his title, it becomes
unnecessary to require the purchaser to assume actual possession thereof before
the debtor may contest it. Possession of the land becomes an absolute right of
the purchaser, as this is merely an incident of his ownership. In fact, the
issuance of the writ of possession at this point becomes ministerial for the
court.20 The debtor contesting the purchaser’s possession may no longer avail of
the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, but should pursue a separate action
e.g., action for recovery of ownership, for annulment of mortgage and/or
annulment of foreclosure. FSAMI’s consolidation of ownership therefore makes
the remedy under Section 8 of Act No. 3135 unavailable for 680 Home. 680 Home
cannot assail the writ of possession by filing a petition in LRC No. M-5444. A
further consideration in this case is the rule against forum shopping, which
would be violated if 680 Home’s resort to a Section 8 remedy is allowed. We
note that 680 Home has already commenced an action for the annulment of the
foreclosure before the RTC of Makati City (docketed as Civil Case No. 09-254)
after FSAMI consolidated its ownership but before it acquired a writ of
possession. To authorize 680 Home to resort to Section 8 of Act No. 3135 to
have the sale and the writ set aside would be to allow two pending actions
grounded on the same cause, i.e., the supposed invalidity of the foreclosure
proceedings, contrary to the rules against forum shopping. Given the
inapplicability of Section 8 of Act No. 3135, it becomes irrelevant to consider
the effect of Aldanco’s continued possession of the property on 680 Home’s
opposition to the writ of possession. That Aldanco’s possession prevented FSAMI
from acquiring actual possession of the property neither benefited nor harmed
680 Home’s case which is not dependent on FSAMI’s actual possession.”
PRESENT LAW ON REMEDY
AFTER LAPSE OF REDEMPTION PERIOD. Section 111 of Act 496 is no longer good law. Act 496 was
enacted way back on January 1, 1903. It is already deemed superseded by The
Property Registration Decree (PD 1529) which became effective on
June 11, 1978.
Instead, the
applicable law is Section 75 of PD 1529 which states:
“SEC. 75. Application
for new certificate upon expiration of redemption period. – Upon
the expiration of the time, if any, allowed by law for redemption after
registered land has been sold on execution taken or sold for the enforcement of
a lien of any description, except a mortgage lien, the purchaser at such sale
or anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new
certificate of title to him.
Before
the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all
legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.”
X.ANTICHRESIS
REQUISITES. In Spouses Charito M. Reyes
and Roberto Reyes etc. v. Heirs of Benjamin Malance etc.[46] the requisites of
Antichresis was laid down, to wit:
“Notably, the purpose
indicated for the Malance heirs’ formal offer of the records and receipts of
hospitalization, medicines, and burial expenses of Benjamin was merely “to show
proof of expenses incurred by x x x Benjamin x xx relative to his sickness and
x x x where he spent the loan he obtained from the Magtalas sisters. The Court,
however, concurs with the RTC’s finding, as affirmed by the CA, that the
Kasulatan is a contract of antichresis. Article 2132 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art.
2132. By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive
the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to
the payment of the interest, if owing and thereafter to the principal of his
credit.
Thus, antichresis
involves an express agreement between the parties whereby: (a) the creditor will have possession of the debtor’s real property
given as security; (b) such creditor will apply the fruits of the said property
to the interest owed by the debtor, if any, then to the principal amount; ( c )
the creditor retains enjoyment of such property until the debtor has totally
paid what he owes; and (d) should the obligation be duly paid, then the
contract is automatically
extinguished proceeding from the accessory character of the
agreement.
Until
when is Antichretic Creditor entitled to possession?
X x x
The document
specifically authorizes [the Magtalas sisters] to receive the fruits of the
subject landholding with the obligation to apply them as payment to his
[P]600,000.00 principal loan for a period of six (6) years. The instrument
provides no accessory stipulation as to interest due or owing the creditors x x
x . No mention of interest was ever made by the creditors when they testified
in court. This could only be interpreted that the [Magtalas sisters] have no
intention whatsoever to charge Benjamin of interest for his loan. We note also
that the Kasulatan is silent as to the transfer of possession of the subject
property. However, [the Magtalas sisters] admitted taking possession of
Benjamin’s landholding after his death on September 29, 2006 and that they have
been cultivating it since then. They rationalize that their action is in accord
with their agreement with Benjamin when the latter was still alive. They assure
the return of the subject property upon full payment of Benjamin’s loan [the
Malance Heirs], the successors-in-interest of Benjamin. While the Kasulatan did
not provide for the transfer of possession of the subject land, the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties show that such possession was
intended to be transferred. Atty. Navarro testified that while the Kasulatan
only shows that the harvest and the fruits shall answer for Benjamin’s
indebtedness, the parties agreed among themselves that the lenders would be the
one to take possession of the subject land in order for them to get the
harvest. Indeed, such arrangement would be most reasonable under the premises
since at that time, Banjamin’s medical condition necessitated hospitalization,
hence, his physical inability to cultivate and harvest the fruits thereon. As
antichretic creditors, the Magtalas sisters are entitled to retain enjoyment of
the subject land until the debt has been fully paid.
X x x
The debt not having
been totally paid, petitioners are entitled to retain enjoyment of the subject
land. Consequently, the Malance heirs’ complaint for recovery possession,
declaration of nullity of the Kasulatan, and damages against petitioners must
be dismissed.”
[17] See pp. 23 to 24, Essentials of Credit Transactions
and Banking Laws by Timoteo B. Aquino, 2015 citing J.B.L. Reyes, Observations
on the New Civil Code on Points Not Covered by Amendments Already Proposed,
March 31, 1951, reproduced in Ipse Loquitur, Ruben F. Balane,
Ed., p. 258, hereinafter referred to in this work as “J.B.L. Reyes,
Observations”.
[27] 10 Phil., 319 cited in Compania Agricola De Ultramar
v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No. L-32778, November 14, 193-
[41] See Fabio Cahayag and Conrado Rivera v. Commercial
Credit Corporation, G.R. no. 168078 & 168357, January 13, 2016
[44] Sps. Antonio S. Pahang et al v. Hon. Augustine A.
Vestil, et al., G.R. No. 14895, July 12, 2004
[45] 680 Home Appliances Inc. v. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 206599, September 29, 2014
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