ETRIII
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture
Outline No. 6
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
JUDICIAL NOTICE, JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS &
ADMISSIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND
THE RES
INTER ALIOS ACTA RULE
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
(Prepared for Law 3-B,
Univ. of San Agustin
Law School,
SY 2017-2018)
A. JUDICIAL NOTICE
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 1. Judicial notice, when
mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the
measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)
Section 2. Judicial notice, when
discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or ought to
be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (1a)
Section 3. Judicial notice, when
hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. (n)
Section 4. Judicial admissions. —
An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. (2a)
A.1.
Judicial Notice in General. “It is a
well-entrenched part of the judicial system that the judge sees only with
judicial eyes and knows nothing respecting any particular case of which he is
not informed judicially. X x x There are however, many facts which need not be
proved, since they are judicially noticed by the court. Judicial notice of
such facts takes the place of proof and is of equal force. It displaces
evidence since it stands for the same thing.[1]”
“Judicial
notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and
act on without proof because they already know them.[2]”
“It
is said that the term ‘judicial notice’, means no more than that the court will
bring to its aid and consider, without proof of the facts, its knowledge of
those matters of public concern which are known by all well-informed persons”[3].
“Judicial
notice is generally defined as a judge’s utilization of knowledge other than
that derived from formal evidentiary proof in the pending case.[4]”
A.2. Matters subject
to mandatory judicial notice.-
A.2.1.existence and territorial extent of states,
A.2.2.their political history,
A.2.3.forms of government
A.2.4.symbols of nationality,
A.2.5.the law of nations
-“It is well-settled
that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they
must be alleged and proved.[5]”
A.2.5.1. Foreign
judgments
This was the same conclusion
that the Court arrived at in deciding the case of Meropa Enriquez Vda. De Catalan
v. Louella Catalan-Lee[6]
“Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first
be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is
given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18,
1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its
admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code
is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws
after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal
act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak
of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines
and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law
falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a
foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original
of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts;
thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound
discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a
fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since
the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our
jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis
supplied)”
A.2.6.the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
A.2.7.the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
A.2.8.the official acts of legislative, executive and judicial
departments of the Philippines,
-
“As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial knowledge
of the contents of the record of other cases, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, even though the trial judge in fact knows or remembers the
contents thereof[7]
or even when said other cases have been heard or are pending in the same court
and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are really
pending before the same judge.[8] However, in the
absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives
as read into record of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the
opposing party, reference is made to it for the purpose by name and number or
in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated, or when the
original record of the former case or any part of it is actually withdrawn from
the archives by the court’s direction at the request or with consent of the
parties and admitted as a part of their record of the case then pending[9].
-
“In some instances also, courts have taken judicial notice of
proceedings in other causes because of their close connection with the matter
in controversy;[10]because
‘there may be cases so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to
invoke’ a rule of judicial notice in one suit or the proceedings in another
suit.[11] The court may
properly resort to an inspection of its records in other cases where the
interests of the public in ascertaining the truth are of paramount importance,
as also cases where the court is seeking to determine what is a reasonable
exercise of its discretion,[12] or whether the
present proceeding is a moot one[13] or whether or not a
previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration.[14]
-
“In a case on trial, the court will take judicial notice of its records
and of the facts which the record establishes, including the record of the
preliminary investigation in a criminal case before a Court of First Instance”[15].
-
“While it is an accepted rule that an appellate court cannot consult the
record in another case to ascertain a fact not shown by the record of the case
before it[16]
such appellate court can go to its decisions in another case for the law that
is determinative of or applicable to the case under review.[17]”
-
Recently adopted
rule. “While courts may take judicial notice of its own acts and records in
the same case, as a rule, courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that
both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge.[18]”
-
Exceptions. i. “in the
absence of objection and with knowledge of opposing party, the contents of said
other case are clearly referred to by title and number in a pending action and
adopted or read into the record of the latter; ii. When the original record of
the other case or any part of it is actually withdrawn from the archives at the
court’s discretion upon the request, or with the consent, of the parties, and
admitted as part of the record of the pending case[19].”
A.2.9.the laws of nature,
A.2.10.the measure of time,
A.2.11.and the geographical divisions
A.3.
When Judicial Notice Discretionary
“A
court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions.[20]”
“But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the
judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
as the basis of his action[21]”.
B.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
“Sec.
4. Judicial admissions. – An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require
proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made”.
Requisites.
“First, the same must
be made by a party to the case. Admissions of a non-party do not fall within
the definition of Sec. 4, Rule 129.
Second, the
admission, to be judicial, must be made in the course of the proceedings in the
same case. Thus, an admission made
in another judicial proceeding will not be deemed a judicial admission in
another case where the admission was not made. Instead, it will be
considered an extrajudicial admission for purposes of the other proceeding
where such admission is offered.
It has been held that “… To be considered
as a judicial admission, the same must be made in the same case in which it is
offered” (Programme Incorporated v. Province of Bataan, 492 SCRA 529; Camitan
v. Fidelity Insurance Corporation, 551
SCRA 540.)
Third, Sec.
4, Rule 129 does not require a particular form for an admission. Such form is
immaterial because the provision recognizes either a verbal or written
admission.”[22]
· Stipulation of facts at pre-trial
· Admissions in pleadings and motions
· Admission of genuineness and due execution of
actionable document
· “It has been held that the admissions in a
superseded pleading are to be considered as extrajudicial admissions which must
be proven. The Supreme Court declared that pleadings that have been amended
disappear from the record, lose their status as pleadings, and cease to be
judicial admissions, and to be utilized as extrajudicial admissions, they must,
in order to have such effect, be formally offered in evidence (Torres v. Court
of Appeals, 131 SCRA 24; Ching v. Court of Appeals, 331 SCRA 16[23]).
· Admissions
by counsel. General
Rule- “admissions by a counsel are generally conclusive upon a client(DE Garcia
v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 129). Even the negligence of counsel binds the
client (Sarraga v. Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, 393 SCRA 566).
· Exception. “In
cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due
process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of
the client’s liberty or property, or when the interests of justice so require,
relief is accorded the client who suffered by reason of the lawyer’s gross or
palpable mistake or negligence (Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 459;
Silot v. de la Rosa, 543 SCRA 533)[24]”.
Admissions
v. Presumption of Law
More
significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's evidence utterly
failed to show that Manzano personally received the P2,800,000.00 from
petitioner with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to the
latter. In fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he did not even know who
actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano's name did not appear in
the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax. 47 This admission clearly contradicts the
disputable presumption under Section 3 ( q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
i.e., that the ordinary course of business has been followed, which petitioner
adamantly relies on to support its claim. A presumption is an assumption of
fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to be assumed from
another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action. 48
It is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are
permitted to draw from proof of other facts. 49 However, a presumption is not
evidence,50 but merely affects the burden of offering evidence.51 Under Section
3, Rule 131, disputable presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but
may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence, as in this case.
Apart from Rafael's admission, petitioner further admitted that: (!!) Moreland
directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did not actually
see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check;52 (!!.) it did not ask
Moreland to issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly in the name
of the BIR;53 (.£) it would not have dealt with Manzano had she not been
Metroland' s employee;54 and (ff) it has several lawyers and an accountant at
its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in fact, in the real estate
business and is familiar with brokerage transactions. 55 46 Rollo, p. 50. 47
Rollo, p. 54. See also TSN, August 24, 2000, pp. 22-23; and May 2, 2001, pp.
11-12. 48 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1067 citing Uniform Rule 13; NJ Evidence
Rule 13. 49 See Delgado vda. de Da la Rosa v. Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian, 516 Phil. 130, 145 (2006). 50 See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture
Series), (2009), p. 427, citing California Evidence Code in Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1167. 51 See Riano, Evidence (The Bar Lecture Series),
(2009), p. 427, citing 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Sec. 64. 52 TSN,
September 22, 1999, pp. 41-42; and October 26, 2000, p. 4 53 TSN, October 26,
2000, pp. 11-12 54 TSN, October 26, 2000, pp. 10-12. 55 TSN, September 22,
1999, pp. 43-44; and August 24, 2000, pp. 2-4 and 13. ~ Decision 8 G.R. No.
192391 With these admissions and under these circumstances, it is thus safe to
conclude that the parties deliberately deviated from the ordinary course of business,
and that - at the very least - Manzano did not deal with it in bad faith. By
and large, petitioner failed to prove even by preponderance of evidence56 the
existence of any act or omission of Manzano that would support its claim of
civil liability ex delicto. In consequence, the present petition must fail. As
a final point, it deserves mentioning that in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law are
addressed. It is not the Court's function to analyze or weigh the evidence
(which tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to the
appellate court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined to the review
of errors of law that may have been committed in the judgment under review.57 "The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brou
-
ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR.,
represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR,- versus - ROSARIO L. MANZANO, G.R. No. 192391, JUNE
19, 2017
C. ADMISSIONS &
CONFESSIONS
“Admission
distinguished from confession. – The
term admission is distinguished from that of confession. The former is applied
to civil transactions and to matters of fact in criminal cases not involving
criminal intent, the latter to acknowledgments of guilt in criminal cases. X x
x The courts are confronted with the question of what is a confession, and what
is the difference between it and an admission. A confession is defined as an
acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which constitute
the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
A statement by the accused showing how the crime was committed by other
persons, he being present but denying that he took part in it, is an admission
and not a confession. A statement by accused which admits the commission of the
act charged against him but denies that it was done with criminal intent is an
admission and not a confession. An offer by the accused to compromise the
charge against him by paying money is not a confession, but is admissible as an
admission.[25]”
“Admission
distinguished from declaration against interest. – An admission is distinguishable from a
declaration against interest in several respects. The admission is primary
evidence and is receivable, although the declarant is available as a witness;
it is competent only when the declarant, or someone identified in legal
interest with him, is a party to the action; and need not have been considered
by the declarant as opposed to his interest at the time when it was made. The
declaration against interest is in the nature of secondary evidence, receivable
only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness; it is competent in any
action to which it is relevant, although the declarant is not a party to, or in
privity with, any party to the action; and it must have been, when made, to the
knowledge of the declarant, against his obvious and real interest.”
“Admission
distinguished from self-contradiction. – An
admission is for a party-opponent what a self-contradiction is to a witness – a
statement made somewhere else, and inconsistent with his allegations of claim
or defense in the case on trial. His two statements being inconsistent, one or
the other must be incorrect; hence, a doubt is thrown on his present
allegation. He may be able to explain away the other and inconsistent
statement; but unless he does so, the present allegation remains discredited.
Though logically the effect of an
admission and of a self-contradiction are the same, yet there are certain
differences that arise, owing to the difference between the status of witness
and of party-opponent.
a) The party-opponent need not himself have
taken the stand. The reason is that all material assertions of party’s witnesses
are impliedly offered by the party to help his case; hence, when it comes to
discrediting them, it is as though he made them, whether or not he took the
stand himself.
b) The usual warning required to be given to a
witness (Rule 132, Section 13) need not here be given; for the party-opponent
may not be a witness.
c) The party-opponent’s admission is receivable
even though he had no personal knowledge on the subject; because his present
claim in the case need not have been based on his personal knowledge.
d) The party-opponent’s admission may be made by
an agent, just as his present claim may be based on a transaction of an agent.
e) The
party-opponent’s admission need not have been against his interest at the time
(though often that requirement is assumed in judicial opinions); it is enough
if it is inconsistent with his present claim or defense.[26]”
Section 26. Admission of a party.
— The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him. (22)
Section 27. Offer of compromise not
admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of
any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised,
an offer of compromised by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted
offer of a plea of guilty to lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence
against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital
or other expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as
proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
Section 28. Admission by third party.
— The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. (25a)
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or
agent. — The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the
party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the
partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the
partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor,
or other person jointly interested with the party. (26a)
Section 30. Admission by conspirator.
— The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
Section 31. Admission by privies.
— Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or
omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property,
is evidence against the former. (28)
Section 32. Admission by silence.
— An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is
such as naturally to call for action or comment if not true, and when proper
and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence against him. (23a)
Section 33. Confession. — The
declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of
any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
(29a)
4. Previous Conduct as Evidence
Section 34. Similar acts as evidence.
— Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge;
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like. (48a)
Section 35. Unaccepted offer. — An
offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written
instrument or specific personal property is, if rejected without valid cause,
equivalent to the actual production and tender of the money, instrument, or
property.
Kinds of Admission.
a) Admission by Act
“Any
conduct or utterances of a party may, in the circumstances of the case, be open
to the inference that the party thereby expressed a belief in the truth of some fact, and is then
receivable as an implied admission.
What a
litigant says or does out of court contrary to his position in the law suit is
admissible as an admission. It is not necessary to lay a foundation, as to the
time, place, and circumstances, in order to introduce an extrajudicial
statement of a party contrary to the position he is taking in a lawsuit.[27]”
b) Admission by
Declaration-
§ Admissions made in letters
§ Telegrams
§ Documents or memoranda
§ Tax returns and assessments- unless clothed with
statutory privilege against disclosure
§ Admissions made in previous case
§ As impeaching evidence
c) Admission by Omission-
§ Failure to include claims which he might properly present
in connection therewith may be taken as an implied admission that such claims
lack merits.
§ Failure to correct book of accounts kept by a person (or by him jointly
with another) constitute an admission of the facts stated therein an are
admissible to show such admission
§ Failure to answer letters – is evidence tending to show
that the statements in the letter sent to him are true.
§ Delay in enforcement of claims- Undue delay in the
enforcement of a right is strongly
persuasive of a lack of merit in the claim, since it is human nature for a
person to assert his righta most strongly when they are threatened or invaded.
§ Delay in commencement of criminal actions. – Delay in
instituting a criminal prosecution unless satisfactorily explained, creates
suspicion about the motive of the supposed offended party and gives rise to
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant.[28]
d)
Admission by SILENCE
Requisites. i) That he
heard and understood the statement; ii) that he was at liberty to interpose a
denial; iii) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his
rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an
answer; iv) that the facts were within his knowledge; and v) that the facts
admitted or the inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the
issue.
-“A
husband was on trial for a murder of which his wife had been convicted. While
they were in prison, the wife was bemoaning her fate and said to the husband
that he had forced her to take the entire responsibility, whereas he knew that
he made her kill the deceased, which charge the husband did not deny, but
merely endeavored to soothe the wife. In holding the admission in evidence of
such conversation as improper the court said: ‘It is not always conducive to domestic peace for a husband to
contradict the statements of his wife, and ordinarily the wise husband attempts
to soothe and placate his irate spouse, rather than to question her statements,
however, wide of the truth they may be. A few husbands are brave or foolhardy,
and at all hazards risk the consequences; but the law does not fix rules for
the guidance of the superman, but all rules are adopted for the average.
Speaking for the average man, we are of the opinion that appellant was not
called upon to deny the statement of his wife made under the circumstances
surrounding them at the time. His failure to deny, dispute, or hedge meets with
our idea of what a normally prudent and sensible man would naturally have done,
and therefore the evidence had no probative value, but was probably damaging to
him with the jury”[29].
Adoptive Admission Doctrine and The President Estrada
Diary
Generally, “diaries are inadmissible
because they are self-serving in nature, unless they have the nature of books
of account; but it has also been held that an entry in a diary being in the
nature of a declaration, if it was against interest when made, is admissible.[30]”
Exception: “Statements constituting part of res gestae are not rendered
inadmissible by the fact that they are also self-serving, but a party himself
cannot bolster his case by testifying to his own self-serving declarations
although they are part of the res gestae.[31]”
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO,
in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND
CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondents.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
R
E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in G.R. No.
146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001.
In G.R. Nos. 146710-15, petitioner
raises the following grounds:
I. IT DISREGARDED THE CLEAR AND
EXPLICIT PROVISIONS OF ART. XI, SECTION 3 (7) OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE THEREON.
II. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER CAN BE
PROSECUTED NOW, FOR THIS RULING WOULD VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION, CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER WAS ACQUITTED IN THE IMPEACHMENT
PROCEEDINGS.
III. IT HELD THAT PETITIONER IS NO
LONGER ENTITLED TO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT.
IV. IT HELD THAT PETITIONERS DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS TO A FAIR TRIAL HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY PRE-TRIAL PUBLICITY.
V. IT HELD THAT THERE IS NOT ENOUGH
EVIDENCE TO WARRANT THE COURT TO ENJOIN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE
INCUMBENT OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER HAVING FAILED TO PROVE THE IMPAIRED CAPACITY OF
THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER A BIASED FREE DECISION.
In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises
and argues the following issues:
1. WHETHER PETITIONER RESIGNED OR
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED RESIGNED AS OF JANUARY 20, 2001;
2. WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS
INADMISSIBLE FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE: HEARSAY,
BEST EVIDENCE, AUTHENTICATION, ADMISSIONS AND RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;
3. WHETHER RELIANCE ON NEWSPAPER
ACOUNTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE HEARSAY RULE;
4. WHETHER CONGRESS POST FACTO CAN DECIDE
PETITIONERS INABILITY TO GOVERN CONSIDERING SECTION 11, ARTICLE VII OF THE
CONSTITUTION; and
5. WHETHER PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY
HAS AFFECTED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL.
We find the contentions of petitioner
bereft of merit.
I
Prejudicial Publicity on the Court
Petitioner insists he is the victim of
prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails the Decision for adverting
to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences to reach the conclusion
that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the totality test to arrive
at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to and
analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are
facts which are well-established and cannot be refuted. Thus, we
adverted to prior events that built up the irresistible pressure for the
petitioner to resign. These are: (1) the expose of Governor Luis Chavit
Singson on October 4, 2000; (2) the I accuse speech of then Senator Teofisto
Guingona in the Senate; (3) the joint investigation of the speech of Senator
Guingona by the Blue Ribbon Committee and the Committee on Justice; (4) the
investigation of the Singson expose by the House Committee on Public Order and
Security; (5) the move to impeach the petitioner in the House of
Representatives; (6) the Pastoral Letter of Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
demanding petitioners resignation; (7) a similar demand by the Catholic Bishops
conference; (8) the similar demands for petitioners resignation by former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Fidel V. Ramos; (9) the resignation of
respondent Arroyo as Secretary of the DSWD and her call for petitioner to
resign; (10) the resignation of the members of petitioners Council of Senior
Economic Advisers and of Secretary Mar Roxas III from the Department of Trade
and Industry; (11) the defection of then Senate President Franklin Drilon and
then Speaker of the House of Representatives Manuel Villar and forty seven (47)
representatives from petitioners Lapiang Masang Pilipino; (12) the transmission
of the Articles of Impeachment by Speaker Villar to the Senate; (13) the
unseating of Senator Drilon as Senate President and of Representative Villar as
Speaker of the House; (14) the impeachment trial of the petitioner; (15) the
testimonies of Clarissa Ocampo and former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu in
the impeachment trial; (16) the 11-10 vote of the senator-judges denying the
prosecutors motion to open the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held a P3.3 billion deposit in a secret bank account
under the name of Jose Velarde; (17) the prosecutors walkout and resignation;
(18) the indefinite postponement of the impeachment proceedings to give a
chance to the House of Representatives to resolve the issue of resignation of
their prosecutors; (19) the rally in the EDSA Shrine and its intensification in
various parts of the country; (20) the withdrawal of support of then Secretary
of National Defense Orlando Mercado and the then Chief of Staff, General Angelo
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services; (21) the same
withdrawal of support made by the then Director General of the PNP, General
Panfilo Lacson, and the major service commanders; (22) the stream of
resignations by Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries
and bureau chiefs; (23) petitioners agreement to hold a snap election and
opening of the controversial second envelope. All these prior events
are facts which are within judicial notice by this Court. There was no
need to cite their news accounts.The reference by the Court to certain
newspapers reporting them as they happened does not make them inadmissible
evidence for being hearsay. The news account only buttressed these facts
as facts. For all his loud protestations, petitioner has not singled out
any of these facts as false.
We now come to some events of January
20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo. We used
the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to
distill a persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday,
courts ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last
wills and testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other
similar cases. As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is
not prohibited by the hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of
the inferences arrived at by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but
that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.
We did not stop with the
contemporaneous events but proceeded to examine some events posterior to the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Specifically, we analyzed the all
important press release of the petitioner containing his final
statement which was issued after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo
as president. After analyzing its content, we ruled that petitioners
issuance of the press release and his abandonemnt of Malacaang Palace confirmed
his resignation.[1] These
are overt acts which leave no doubt to the Court that the
petitioner has resigned.
In light of this finding that
petitioner has resigned before 12 oclock noon of Janaury 20, 2001, the claim
that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent Arroyo took her
oath of office at half past noon of the same day has no leg to stand on.
We also reject the contention that
petitioners resignation was due to duress and an involuntary
resignation is no resignation at all.
x x
x [I]t has been said that, in determining whether a given resignation is
voluntarily tendered, the element of voluntariness is vitiated only when the
resignation is submitted under duress brought on by government action. The three-part
test for such duress has been stated as involving the following
elements: (1) whether one side involuntarily accepted the others terms; (2)
whether circumstances permitted no other alternative; and (3) whether such
circumstances were the result of coercive acts of the opposite side. The
view has also been expressed that a resignation may be found involuntary if on
the totality of the circumstances it appears that the
employers conduct in requesting resignation effectively
deprived the employer of free choice in the matter. Factors to be
considered, under this test, are: (1) whether the employee was given some
alternative to resignation; (2) whether the employee understood the nature of
the choice he or she was given; (3) whether the employewe was given a
reasonable time in which to choose; and (4) whether he or she was permitted to
select the effective date of resignation. In applying this totality of the
circumstances test, the assessment whether real alternatives were offered must
be gauged by an objective standard rather than by the employees purely
subjective evaluation; that the employee may perceive his or her only
option to be resignation for example, because of concerns about his or her
reputation is irrelevant. Similarly, the mere fact that the choice is
between comparably unpleasant alternatives for example, resignation or facing
disciplinary charges does not of itself establish that a resignation was
induced by duress or coercion, and was therefore involuntary. This is
so even where the only alternative to resignation is facing possible termination
for cause, unless the employer actually lacked good cause to believe that
grounds for termination existed. In this regard it has also been said that
a resignation resulting from a choice between resigning or facing proceedings
for dismissal is not tantamount to discharge by coercion without procedural
view if the employee is given sufficient time and opportunity for deliberation
of the choice posed. Futhermore, a resignation by an officer charged with
misconduct is not given under duress, though the appropriate authority has
already determined that the officers alternative is termination, where such
authority has the legal authority to terminate the officers employment under
the particular circumstances, since it is not duress to threaten to do what one
has the legal right to do, or to threaten to take any measure authorized by law
and the circumstances of the case.[2]
In the cases at bar, petitioner
had several options available to him other than resignation. He
proposed to the holding of snap elections. He transmitted to the Congress
a written declaration of temporary inability. He could not claim he was
forced to resign because immediately before he left Malacaang, he asked
Secretary Angara: Ed, aalis na ba ako? which implies that he still had a choice
of whether or not to leave.
To be sure, pressure was exerted for
the petitioner to resign. But it is difficult to believe that the pressure
completely vitiated the voluntariness of the petitioners resignation. The Malacaang ground was then
fully protected by the Presidential Security Guard armed with tanks and
high-powered weapons. The then Chief of Staff, General Angelo Reyes, and
other military officers were in Malacaang to assure that no harm would befall
the petitioner as he left the Palace. Indeed, no harm, not even a scratch,
was suffered by the petitioner, the members of his family and his Cabinet who
stuck it out with him in his last hours. Petitioners entourage was even
able to detour safely to the Municipal Hall of San Juan and bade goodbye to his
followers before finally going to his residence in Polk Street, Greenhills. The
only incident before the petitioner left the Palace was the stone throwing
between a small group of pro and anti Erap rallyists which resulted in minor
injuries to a few of them. Certainly, there were no tanks that rumbled
through the Palace, no attack planes that flew over the presidential residence,
no shooting, no large scale violence, except verbal violence, to justify the
conclusion that petitioner was coerced to resign.
II EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Petitioner devotes a large part of his
arguments on the alleged improper use by this Court of the Angara Diary. It
is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the
state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the
rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.
We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the
Angara diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara
Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Petitioner cannot
complain he was not furnished a copy of the Angara Diary. Nor can he feign
surprise on its use. To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to
by the parties in their pleadings.[3] The
three parts of the Diary published in the PDI from February 4-6, 2001 were
attached as Annexes A-C, respectively, of the Memorandum of private respondents
Romeo T. Capulong, et al., dated February 20, 2001. The second and third
parts of the Diary were earlier also attached as Annexes 12 and 13 of the
Comment of private respondents Capulong, et al., dated February 12, 2001. In
fact, petitioner even cited in his Second Supplemental Reply Memorandum both
the second part of the diary, published on February 5, 2001,[4] and
the third part, published on February 6, 2001.[5] It
was also extensively used by Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez in his oral
arguments. Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of
the Diary but unfortunately failed to do so.
Even assuming arguendo that the Angara
Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered bythe hearsay
rule.[6] Evidence
is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the
competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness by whom it is
sought to produce it.[7] There
are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross
examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of the oath.[8] Not
at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the
years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their
relevance, trustworthiness and necessity.[9] The
emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is
well-explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
x x
x
On
the other hand, we all make decisions in our everyday lives on the basis of
other persons accounts of what happened, and verdicts are usually sustained and
affirmed even if they are based on hearsay erroneously admitted, or admitted
because no objection was made. See Shepp v. Uehlinger, 775 F 2d 452,
454-455 (1st Cir. 1985) (hearsay evidence alone can support a verdict). Although
volumes have been written suggesting ways to revise the hearsay rule, no one
advocates a rule that would bar all hearsay evidence. Indeed, the
decided historical trend has been to exclude categories of highly probative
statements from the definition of hearsay (sections 2 and 3, infra), and to
develop more class exceptions to the hearsay rule (sections 4-11, infra). Furthermore,
many states have added to their rules the residual, or catch-all, exceptions
first pioneered by the Federal Rules which authorize the admission of hearsay
that does not satisfy a class exception, provided it is adequately trustworthy
and probative (section 12, infra).
Moreover, some
commentators believe that the hearsay rule should be abolished altogether
instead of being loosened. See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation
of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1786, 1804-1805, 1815 (1980) (footnotes
omitted):
The
Federal Rules of Evidence provide that [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Under this structure, exclusion is justified by fears of
how the jury will be influenced by the evidence. However, it is not
traditional to think of hearsay as merely a subdivision of this structure, and
the Federal Rules do not conceive of hearsay in that manner. Prejudice
refers to the jurys use of evidence for inferences other than those for which
the evidence is legally relevant; by contrast, the rule against hearsay
questions the jurys ability to evaluate the strength of a legitimate inference to be drawn
from the evidence. For example, were a judge to exclude testimony because
a witness was particularly smooth or convincing, there would be no doubt as to
the usurpation of the jurys function. Thus, unlike prejudices recognized
by the evidence rules, such as those stemming from racial or religious biases
or from the introduction of photographs of a victims final state, the exclusion
of hearsay on the basis of misperception strikes at the root of the jurys
function by usurping its power to process quite ordinary evidence, the type of
information routinely encountered by jurors in their everyday lives.
Since
virtually all criteria seeking to distinguish between good and bad hearsay are
either incoherent, inconsistent, or indeterminate, the only altenative to a
general rule of admission would be an absolute rule of exclusion, which is
surely inferior. More important, the assumptions necessary to justify a
rule against hearsay seem insupportable and, in any event, are inconsistent
with accepted notions of the function of the jury. Therefore, the hearsay
rules should be abolished.
Some
support for this view can be found in the limited empirical research now
available which is, however, derived from simulations that suggests that admitting
hearsay has little effect on trial outcomes because jurors discount the value
of hearsay evidence. See Rakos & Landsman, Researching the Hearsay
Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 655 (1992); Miene, Park, & Borgidas, Jury Decision Making and
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 683 (1992); Kovera, Park,
& Penrod, Jurors Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76
Minn.L.Rev. 703 (1992); Landsman & Rakos, Research Essay: A Preliminary
Empirical Enquiry Concerning the prohibition of Hearsay Evidence in American
Courts, 15 Law & Psychol. Rev. 65 (1991).
Others, even if they concede that
restrictions on hearsay have some utility, question whether the benefits
outweigh the cost:
The
cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its contribution to
justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And
of course this is not just a cost voluntarily borne by the parties, for in our
system virtually all the cost of the court salaries, administrative costs, and
capital costs are borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for
the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a
hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes other
costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the
hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises. In some law schools,
students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the
intricacies of the hearsay rule, and enormous academic resources are expended
on the rule.
Allen,
Commentary on Professor Friendmans Article: The Evolution of the Hearsay
Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.L.Rev. 797, 800 [1992] (but would abolish
rule only in civil cases). See also Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic,
Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992).[10]
A complete analysis of
any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether
the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A
more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do
not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section
26 of Rule 130 provides that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.[11] It
has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are
hearsay. Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites
the various authorities who explain why admissions are not covered by
the hearsay rule:[12]
Wigmore, after pointing out that the partys
declaration has generally the probative value of any other persons
asssertion, argued that it had a special value when offered against the
party. In that circumstance, the admission discredits the partys
statement with the present claim asserted in pleadings and testimony, much like
a witness impeached by contradictory statements. Moreover, he continued, admissions
pass the gauntlet of the hearsay rule, which requires that extrajudicial
assertions be excluded if there was no opportunity for the opponent to
cross-examine because it is the opponents own declaration, and he does
not need to cross examine himself. Wigmore then added that the Hearsay Rule
is satisfied since the party now as opponent has the full opportunity to put
himself on the stand and explain his former assertion.(Wigmore on evidence,
Sec. 1048 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972), cited in Sec. 154, McCormick)
According
to Morgan: The admissibility of an admission made by the party
himself rests not upon any notion that the circumstances in which it was made
furnish the trier means of evaluating it fairly, but upon the adversary theory
of litigation. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to
cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of credence save when speaking
under sanction of an oath.
A
mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are
admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).
The Angara
Diary contains direct statements of petitioner which can be
categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap
presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he
only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his
statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened
by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont
want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the
bureaucracy, the intrigue). I just want to clear my name, then I will go. We
noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the
meltdown is obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
It is, however, argued that the Angara
Diary is not the diary of the petitioner, hence, non-binding on him. The argument overlooks the
doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a
partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is
reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something
stated or implied by the other person.[13] Jones
explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions made
vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by
the party of the statements which the other person had made.[14] To
use the blunt language of Mueller and Kirkpatrick, this process of
attribution is not mumbo jumbo but common sense.[15] In
the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle
when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief. Thus,
Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise
petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.Petitioner
did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the
country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as an admission by him.[16]
Petitioner further contends that the
use of the Angara diary against him violated the rule on res
inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter
provided.
Again, petitioner errs in his
contention. The res inter
alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of
them is provided in section 29 of Rule 130 with respect toadmissions by a
co-partner or agent.
Executive Secretary Angara as such was
an alter ego of the petitioner. He was the Little
President. Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for
him in the critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace. Thus,
according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara:
Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. (Since the start of the campaign, Ed, you
have been the only one Ive listened to. And now at the end, you still
are.)[17] This
statement of full trust was made by the petitioner after Secretary Angara
briefed him about the progress of the first negotiation. True to this
trust, the petitioner had to ask Secretary Angara if he would already leave
Malacaang after taking their final lunch on January 20, 2001 at about 1:00 p.m. The Angara
Diary quotes the petitioner as saying to Secretary Angara: ed,
kailangan ko na bang umalis? (Do I have to leave now?)[18] Secretary
Angara told him to go and he did. Petitioner cannot deny that Secretary
Angara headed his team of negotiators that met with the team of the respondent
Arroyo to discuss the peaceful and orderly transfer of power after his
relinquishment of the powers of the presidency. The Diary shows
that petitioner was always briefed by Secretary Angara on the progress of
their negotiations. Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the
petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath
as President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts and
declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions
of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner).[19] Jones
very well explains the reasons for the rule, viz: What is
done, by agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere
instrument. So, whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract
for his principal, or at the time and accompanying the performance of any act
within the scope of his authority, having relation to, and connected with, and
in the course of the particular contract or transaction in which he is then
engaged, or in the language of the old writers, dum fervet opus is,
in legal effect, said by his principal and admissible in evidence against such
principal.[20]
Moreover, the ban on hearsay
evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are
statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or
not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those
statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which
are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second
class includes the following:[21]
a. Statement of a person showing
his state of mind, that is, his mental condition, knowledge,
belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;
b. Statements of a person which
show his physical condition, as illness and the like;
c. Statements of a person from
which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another,
that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. of the latter;
d. Statements which may identify
the date, place and person in question; and
e. Statements showing the lack of
credibility of a witness.
Again, Jones tells us why these
independently relevant statements are not covered by the prohibition against
hearsay evidence:[22]
1088. Mental
State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.- There are a number of comon issues,
forming a general class, in proof of which hearsay is so obviously necessary
that it is not customary to refer to its admissibility as by virtue of any
exception to the general exclusionary rule. Admissibility, in such cases,
is as of course. For example,where any mental state or condition is in
issue, such as motive, malice, knowledge, intent, assent or dissent, unless
direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as conclusive of his
state of mind, the only method of proof available is testimony of
others to the acts or statements of such person. Where his acts or
statements are against his interest, they are plainly admissible within the
rules hereinabove announced as to admissions against interest. And even
where not against interest, if they are so closely connected with the event or
transaction in issue as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy, they
become admissible of necessity.
As
afore-discussed, The Angara Diary contains statements of the
petitioner which reflect his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of
his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from
which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are
admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. This has long
been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to foment a
belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
Petitioner also contends that the rules
on authentication of private writings and best evidence were violated in our Decision,
viz:
The
use of the Angara diary palpably breached several hornbook rules of evidence,
such as the rule on authentication of private writings
x
x x
A. Rule
on Proof of Private Writings Violated
The
rule governing private documents as evidence was violated. The law
provides that before any private writing offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: a) by
anyone who saw the document executed or written, or b) by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
x
x x
B. Best
Evidence Rule Infringed
Clearly,
the newspaper reproduction is not the best evidence of the Angara
diary. It is secondary evidence, of dubious authenticity. It was
however used by this Honorable Court without proof of the unavailability of the
original or duplicate original of the diary. The Best Evidence Rule should
have been applied since the contents of the diary are the subject of inquiry.
The
rule is that, except in four (4) specific instances, [w]hen the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself.[23]
Petitioners contention is without
merit. In regard to the Best Evidence rule, the Rules of Court
provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:
Sec.
2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any
material containing letters, words, numbers, figures or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.
Sec.
3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When
the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When
the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When
the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When
the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
Sec.
4. Original of document. (a) The original of a document is one the contents of
which are the subject of inquiry.
(b)
When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time,
with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c)
When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are
likewise equally regarded as originals.
It is true that the Court relied not
upon the original but only copy of the Angara Diary as
published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In doing
so,the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore,
in his book on evidence, states that:
Production
of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever
in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.[24]
x
x x
In
several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been abandoned,
for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This
measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption
(post, sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if
the opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it. (empahsis
supplied)
Franciscos opinion is of the same tenor,
viz:
Generally
speaking, an objection by the party against whom secondary evidence is sought
to be introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into application;
and frequently, where secondary evidence has been admitted, the rule of
exclusion might have successfully been invoked if proper and timely objection
had been taken. No general rule as to the form or mode of objecting to the
admission of secondary evidence is set forth. Suffice it to say here
that the objection should be made in proper season that is, whenever it
appears that there is better evidence than that which is offered and before the
secondary evidence has been admitted. The objection itself should be
sufficiently definite to present a tangible question for the courts
consideration.[25]
He adds:
Secondary
evidence of the content of the writing will be received in evidence if no
objection is made to its reception.[26]
In
regard to the authentication of private writings, the Rules of
Court provides in section 20 of Rule 132, viz:
Sec. 20. Proof
of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a) By
anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other
private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
On the rule of authentication of
private writings, Francisco states that:
A proper
foundation must be laid for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the
identity and authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a
pre-requisite to its admission. (Rouw v. Arts, 174 Ark. 79, 294 S.W. 993,
52 A.L.R. 1263, and others) However, a party who does not deny the
genuineness of a proffered instrument may not object that it was not properly
identified before it was admitted in evidence. (Strand v. Halverson,
220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266, 103 A.L.R. 835).[27]
Petitioner cites the case of State
prosecutors v. Muro,[28] which
frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts. In that case, Judge
Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a newspaper account in
dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos. There
is a significant difference, however, between the Muro case and the cases at
bar. In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases
against Mrs. Marcos on the basis of a newspaper account without
affording the prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the
matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument. . .(this is) not only a
blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably
indicative of bad faith and partiality. In the instant cases, however,
the petitioner had an opportunity to object to the
admissibility of theAngara Diary when he filed his Memorandum dated
February 20, 2001, Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001, Supplemental
Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and Second Supplemental memorandum dated
February 24, 2001. He was therefore not denied due process. In the
words of Wigmore, supra,
petitioner had been given an opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but
did not object to its admissibility. It is already too late in the day to
raise his objections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diaryhas
been used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.”
D. RES INTER ALIOS
ACTA RULE. Two kinds:
d.1. The rule that the rights of a
party cannot be prejudiced by any act, declaration, or omission of another
(Sec. 28, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Exceptions.
a)
Admission
by a co-partner or agent (Sec. 29, Rule 130)
Section 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. —
The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of
his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be
given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown
by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the
act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party
§ Reason for
the Rule. – “As a
general rule parties are not chargeable with the declarations of their agents,
unless such declarations or statements are made during the transaction of
business by the agent for the principal and in relation to such business, and
while within the scope of the agency. In other words, what is so done, by an
agent, is done by the principal through him, as through a mere instrument. So
whatever is said by an agent, either in making a contract for his principal, or
at the time and accompanying the performance of any act within the scope of his
authority, having relation to, and connected with, and in the course of, the
particular contract or transaction in which he is then engaged, or, in the
language of the old writers, dum fervent opus, is, in legal effect, said by his
principal and admissible in evidence against such principal.[32]”
§ A condition to the introduction of the
declarations of one who is alleged to have been an agent is that the agency
must be proved ALIUNDE and not by the declaration themselves. The declarations of the alleged agent
are not competent to prove the existence of of the relation of principal or
agent although they are accompanied by acts purporting to be acts of agency.
But, of course, such declarations and acts are competent if there is proof of
former similar acts or declarations which have been recognized or approved by
the principal.[33]
b)
Admission
by a co-conspirator (Sec. 30, Rule 130)
Section 30. Admission by conspirator. — The act or
declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.
§ Requisites.
– In order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his co-conspirator, it is
necessary (a) that the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the
admission itself; (b) that the admission relates to the common object; ( c )
that it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
§ “The conspiracy must be shown by independent evidence to admit the
declarations of the conspirators against the defendants not present when the
declarations were made. The general rule is that the existence of a conspiracy
and the defendant’s connection therewith must be proved, at least prima facie
to the satisfaction of the judge, before the acts and declarations of one
conspirator made in defendant’s absence can be received against the defendant.
The conspiracy may be shown as a predicate for the reception of acts and
declarations of one conspirator against another, even though the indictment or
information does not allege a conspiracy between them. Where a conspiracy is
charged, direct and positive evidence thereof is not required in order to admit
the declaration of one conspirator against another. And proof of the conspiracy
need not be conclusive or beyond a reasonable doubt, prima facie proof in the
judgment of the court being all that the law requires”[34].
c)
Admission
by privies (Sec. 31, Rule 130).
Section 31. Admission by privies. — Where one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the
title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former
§ Privity & Privies defined. Means mutual
succession of relationship to the same rights of property. “Privies” are those
who have mutual or successive relationship to the same right of property or
subject matter, such as “personal representatives, heirs, devisees, legatees,
assignees, voluntary grantees or judgment creditors or purchasers from them
without notice of the facts.[35]
d.2. The rule that evidence of
previous conduct or similar acts at one time is not admissible to prove that
one did or did not do the same act at another time (Sec. 34, Rule 132, Rules of
Court).
-“Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence.
– Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at
another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge,
identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like”.
E. OFFER OF
COMPROMISE.
e.1.
Civil Case. An offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is
not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
e.2.
Criminal case. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules of Court).
Except: Quasi-offenses and cases allowed by law to be compromised.
[5] The collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., G.R. No. L-116.2; Fisher v et al v. The
Collector of Internal Revenue, et al.,, 1 SCRA 93; Yao Kee, et al v.
Sy-Gonzales, et al., G.R. No. L-55960, November 4, 1988 as cited on p. 72,
Evidece Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition by Francisco
[18] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Yatco Agricultural Enterprises,
G.R. No. 172551, January 15, 2014
[19] Tabuana v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 650
[20] Section 2, Rule 132, Rules of Court
[21] State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505
[22] See p.87, EVIDENCE (The Bar Lectures Series) by Riano, 2016
[23] p. 93, Ibid.
[24] Id.
[25] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol II, pp. 962,
963, 966, 967. As cited on p. 303, EVIDENCE, Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition by
Francisco
[26] Wigmore on Evidence, (Stud. Textbook), 197 as cited on p. 304, Ibid.
[27] Francisco p. 305, Ibid.
[28] See Evidence by Francisco pp. 305-310, Ibid
[29] Reley v. State, 107 Miss. 600, 607, 65 S. 882, L.R.A. 1915A, 1041
[30] People v. Alvero, G.R. No. L-820, April 9, 1950
[31] 31 C.J.S. 956.
[32] 2 Jones on Evidence sec. 944, cited on Evidence by Francisco p.
339, Ibid.
[33] 1 Jones on Evidence, 4th Ed., pp. 485-486
[34] Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. III, pp.
1942-1945
[35] p. 357, Francisco, Ibid. citing
Greenleaf Evidence, sec. 524; Story Eq., sec. 165; henry v. Woods, 77 Mo. 277;
Haley v. Bagley, 37 Mo. 363
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