ETRIII
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture
Outline No. 2
(CONTINUATION )
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
OBJECT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
F. Authentication and Proof of Documents
Meaning. “The concept of ‘authentication’ occupies a vital place in the
presentation of evidence. Not only objects but also documents introduced in
evidence need to be authenticate3d. It is the preliminary step in showing the
admissibility of an evidence[1]”.
Case law[2]
teaches on the distinction between PRIVATE
and PUBLIC documents
particularly on the manner of their “authentication” as a pre-requisite for
admissibility as evidence. Thus:
“Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public document and a private
document for the purpose of their presentation in evidence, viz:
Section
19. Classes
of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,
documents are either public or private.
Public
documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments, and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required
by law to be entered therein.
All
other writings are private.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue
of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged
before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official
with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a
private writing authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no
further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court.In
contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed
by a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person
legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved or set
forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the
solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication in
the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its acceptance as evidence in court. The
requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four
instances, specifically: (a)
when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,[28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b)
when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;[29](c)
when thegenuineness and authenticity of the document
There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because private
individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or
uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions,
they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against petitioner without
the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the manner provided
in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:
Section
20. Proof
of private documents. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence
of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any
other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to
be.
The Prosecution attempted to have Go authenticate the signature of
petitioner in various receipts, to wit:
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts
which you mentioned which do not tally with the original receipts, do you have
copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy
of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to
present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you assure this
(Next Page)
ATTY ABIERA (continuing):
Honorable Court that you
will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also
familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna Lerima
Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you
familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see
her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I
have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or
offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but
for purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point to you a certain
signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from Cirila
Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable Court
whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her
signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a
signature above the printed word collector.
(Next Page)
ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only
receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the accused in this case
appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original
receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we will just
forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the
same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this
signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be marked,
Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy and present the
same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this is only for the
purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the same, the receipt which
has just been identified awhile ago be marked as our Exhibit A You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit
A.
ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be
bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.
(Next Page)
COURT:
Bracket the signature
&mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of that receipt?
ATTY. ABIERA:
x x x
As the
excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner
on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked
as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as
Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the
document was a meremachinecopy,
not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its failed attempt, the
Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the originalsof the
receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts. But that
promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the Prosecution
offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned out in the end, the effort to
have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441
and the signature of petitioner on that receipt was wasteful because the
machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions
Offer of Documentary Evidence.
It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96
No. 20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the
Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the
same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature of
petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by
the fact that the Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature
for the machine copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for
all intents and purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to
referinstead toan entirely differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered
by ANA LERIMA PATULA w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March
16-20, 1997.
In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two
receipts based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible
family name of Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw
infecting the documentary evidence against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan
could not honestly identify petitioners signature on the receipts either
because she lacked familiarity with such signature, or because she had not seen
petitioner affix her signature on the receipts, as the following excerpts from
her testimony bear out:
ATTY.
ZERNA to witness:
Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the
confirmation sheet, will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by
the customer. The other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the
last payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY.
ZERNA:
We
pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit B-3,
receipt number 20441.
(Next
Page)
COURT:
Mark
it.
ATTY.
ZERNA:
The
signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of
the collector, are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY.
ZERNA:
We
pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit B-3-a
COURT:
Mark
it.
ATTY.
ZERNA:
The
other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the signature as
Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark
it.[33]
xxx
ATTY.
ZERNA:
Q. Ms.
Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to one Divina
Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this is the receipt of your
office?
A.Yes.
Q.There
is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature is this?
A.Ms.
Patula.
Q.How
do you know that this is her signature?
A.Because
we can read the Patula.[34]
We
also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the
ledgers the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the
amountspetitioner hadallegedly received from the customers and the amounts she
had actually remitted to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively relied on the
entries of the unauthenticated ledgersto support her audit report on
petitioners supposed misappropriation or conversion, revealing her lack of
independent knowledge of the veracity of the entries, as the following excerpts
of her testimony show:
ATTY.
ZERNA to witness:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office
records showed that this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75?
ATTY.
DIEZ:
The
question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let
the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and showed it to the customers
for confirmation.
ATTY.
ZERNA to witness:
Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a
follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that amount in the
ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers, what was the result when you
had it confirmed by the customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has
still a balance of P10,971.75.
ATTY.
ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the
balance of this customer is still P10,971.75
(Next
Page)
ATTY.
ZERNA (continuing):
[i]n
your office?
COURT:
That
was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
(Continuation
of the Direct Examination of
Karen
Guivencan on August
13, 2002)
ATTY.
ZERNA to witness:
Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the
original and the duplicate, will
you please enlighten the Honorable Court on that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in
this case of Cirila Askin, she
has already fully paid. Her
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while
in the original
(Next
page)
WITNESS
(continuing):
[r]eceipt
she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-one Pesos and
Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is
indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was
already forwarded to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the
ledger showing that it has already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the
office, in the original receipt she has still a balance.
x x x
ATTY.
ZERNA:
The
confirmation sheet ---
COURT:
The
confirmation sheet was
the one you referred to as the receipt in your earlier testimony? Is that what
you referred to as the receipts, the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you
said showed that that particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already
entered in the ledger?
In the
face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come
as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the
RTC mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present
the unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:
(Continuation
of the Direct Examination of
Witness
Karen Guivencan on September
11, 2002)
ATTY. ZERNA:
CONTINUATION
OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION
Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us
several ledgers. Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina
Cadilig, how much is her account in your office?
ATTY.
DIEZ:
Your
Honor please before
the witness will proceed to answer the question, let me interpose our objection
on the ground that this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person
who made the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay matters because
the supposed ledger was not identified to by the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those
ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were already
duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it was she who brought
them to court
(Next
Page)
COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their
office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That
is correct, Your Honor, but the
person who made the entries is not this witness, Your Honor. How do we know
that the entries there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their
office.
COURT:
Precisely,
she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The
one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY.
ZERNA:
She is
an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the auditor of
Footluckers.
COURT:
I
think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries
were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
x x x
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your
Honor please, to avoid delay, may I
interpose a continuing objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those
ledgers on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.
COURT:
Okey(sic).
Let the continuing objection be noted.
Q (To Witness) The clerk who
allegedly was the one who prepared the entries on those ledgers, is she still
connected with Footluckers?
A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,
COURT:
Alright proceed.
(Next
Page)
ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course
of business. So, exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.
The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of
the rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court,which
contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a
judicial proceeding, as follows:
Section
22. How
genuineness of handwriting proved. The
handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and
has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted
or treated as genuine by the
party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the
aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits
B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were inescapably bereft of probative
value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just result, as the Court held in Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation:[38]
On the
first issue, petitioner
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay
because she had no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents
supporting respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of lading, SGS
Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle
and monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts which
gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts, even
though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets received
by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the weight of steel
billets actually shipped and delivered.
At the
outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is founded on breach of
insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported steel billets. To hold
petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its importation of
10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at P67,156,300.00,
and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and received by the importer,
namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King, who was assigned to handle
respondents importations, including their insurance coverage, has personal
knowledge of the volume of steel billets being imported, and therefore
competent to testify thereon. Her
testimony is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court.However, she is
not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of the imported steel
billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the actual steel billets
received. Even though she prepared the summary of the received steel billets,
she based the summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her
testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative value even
if not objected to at the trial.
On the
second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly authenticate
respondents documentary
evidence. Under
Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be
authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person before whom its
execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or
who after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In
this case, respondent
admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel
billets actually received had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this
point could not be taken at face value.
xxx
Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or
private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the
enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of the
same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they can be
admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the summary of the weight of the
steel billets imported, respondent presented no supporting evidence concerning their
authenticity. Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the
insured cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum,
we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.
That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner
decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her
contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled
the seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony bypetitioners counsel due to
the hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether
objected to or not, had no probative value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were
fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects
that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to
rebutcould not set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of
petitioners objections imbue the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.
Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the
application of the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were
prepared in the regular course of business.[40]Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of
the Rules
of Court, to wit:
Section
43. Entries in the course of
business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position
to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of
duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to
show the concurrence of the several requisites
before entries in the course of business could be excepted from the hearsay
rule. The requisites are as follows:
(a) The
person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;
(b) The
entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated
in the entries;
(d) The
entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty,
whether legal, contractual, moral, or religious;
The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish
her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of
every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in
order to ensure that such evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility
before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.
The failure of the judge to do so herein nullified the guarantee of due of
process of law in favor of the accused, who had no obligation to prove her
innocence. Here acquittal should follow.
IMPORTANT NOTE: On “Ancient Documents per Section 21, Rule 132, read Article in Blog entitled;
“The Law on Evidence, Christmas, and the Bible: A Christmas Tribute” December
10, 2016
G. PROOF OF GENUINENESS OF HANDWRITING
“With respect to the first
assigned error, petitioners argue that since the administratrix did not deny
the testimony of Jade nor present any evidence to controvert it, and neither
did she deny the execution and genuineness of the checks issued by the deceased
(as well as the check return slips issued by the clearing bank), it was error
for the Court of Appeals to find the evidence of the Montinolas insufficient to
prove their claims.
The administratrix counters
that the due execution and authenticity of the checks-exhibits of the
Montinolas were not duly proven since Jade did not categorically state that she
saw the filling up and signing of the checks by the deceased, hence, her
testimony is self-serving; besides, as Jade had identical and unitary interest
with her husband and mother-in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of the
Dead Mans Statute.[24]
The administratrixs
counter-argument does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been
recognized as an adverse factor in determining either the credibility of the
witness orsubject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is here
presentthe admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship
to a party, or bias, may indicate the need for a little more caution in the
assessment of a witness testimony but is not necessarily a negative element
which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.[25]
Jades testimony on the
genuineness of the deceaseds signature on the checks-exhibits of the Montinolas
is clear:
x x x
Q: Showing to you this
check dated July 16, 1989, Far East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262, in
the amount of P100,000.00, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: There appears a
signature in the face of the check. Whose signature is this?
A: That is the signature of
Mr. Sy.
Q: Why do you know
that this is the signature of Mr. Sy?
A: Because he signed this
check I was . . . I was present when he signed this check.
x x x
Q: Showing to you this
check dated September 8, 1989, is this the check you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know that
this is his signature?
A: I was there when he
signed the same.
x x x
Q: Showing to you this Far
East Bank and Trust Company Check No. 84262 dated July 6, 1989, in the amount
of P50,000.00, in the name of Eduardo Montinola, are you referring to this
check?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Whose signature is this
appearing on the face of this check?
A: Mr. Sys signature.
Q: Why do you know that it
is his signature?
A: I was there when he
signed the same.
x x x[26] (Emphasis supplied)
The genuineness of the
deceaseds signature having been shown, he is prima facie presumed
to have become a party to the check for value, following Section 24 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law which reads:
Section 24. Presumption
of Consideration. Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every
person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.
(Underscoring and italics in the original; emphasis supplied),
Since, with respect to the checks issued to
the Montinolas, the prima facie presumption was not rebutted
or contradicted by the administratrix who expressly manifested that she was
dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims, it has
become conclusive.
As for the administratrixs
invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule
renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3)
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
x x x
The rule is exclusive and
cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify
persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in
the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation
or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active
part therein.
x x x[27] (Underscoring supplied)
Jade is not a party to the case. Neither
is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In
transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are
commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their
testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their
relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the
transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of
the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the
basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.
As to the second assigned
error, petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as
witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead
Mans Statute;[28] besides,
the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined
them.
The administratrix, on the
other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
The more logical
interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like
interest, from testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to
the death of the deceased.
Since the law disqualifies
parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between
testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be
disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of parties
or assignors of parties to a case. Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson
and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under
the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis
supplied)
But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the
same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with
respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect
to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others
transaction.
In any event, what the Dead
Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence
upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The
incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony.[29] Since the separate
claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence,
their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
This brings this Court to
the matter of the authenticity of the signature of the deceased appearing on
the checks issued to Sanson and Celedonia. By Celedonias account, she
knows the signature of the deceased.
x x x
Q: Showing to you these
checks already marked as Exhibit A to E, please go over these checks if you
know the signatures of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy? on these checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Insofar as the amount
that he borrowed from you, he also issued checks?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And therefore, you know
his signature?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[30]
Sanson testified too that
he knows the signature of the deceased:
x x x
Q: I show you now checks
which were already marked as Exhibit A to G-1 Saquin, please go over this if
these are the checks that you said was issued by the late Juan Bon Fing Sy in
favor of your sister?
A: Yes, these are the same
che[c]ks.
Q: Do you know the
signature of the late Juan Bon Fing Sy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And these signatures are
the same signatures that you know?
A: Yes, sir.
x x x[31]
While the foregoing
testimonies of the Sanson siblings have not faithfully discharged the quantum
of proof under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which
reads:
Section 22. How
genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person
because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired
knowledge of the handwriting of such person. x x x,
not only did the administratrix fail to
controvert the same; from a comparison[32] with the
naked eye of the deceaseds signature appearing on each of the checks-exhibits
of the Montinolas with that of the checks-exhibits of the Sanson siblings all
of which checks were drawn from the same account, they appear to have been
affixed by one and the same hand.
In fine, as the
claimants-herein petitioners have, by their evidence, substantiated their
claims against the estate of the deceased, the burden of evidence had shifted
to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same
when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence
against the claim”.[3]
H. PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF NOTARIZED DOCUMENT
“Generally, a notarized document carried the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favour the
presumption of regularity which may be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence. However, the presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be
affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was
regular. A defective notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private document. Consequently, when there is a
defect in the notarization of a document, the clear and convincing evidentiary
standard normally attached to a duly-notarized document is dispensed with, and
the measure to test the validity of such document is preponderance of evidence.[4]”
[2] Ana Lerima Patula v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
[3] [G.R. No. 127745. April 22, 2003] FELICITO G. SANSON,
CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., petitioners-appellants, vs.HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH DIVISION and MELECIA T. SY, as Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of the Late Juan Bon Fing
Sy, respondents-appellees.
[4] Spouses Charito M.
Reyes and Roberto reyes et al v. Heirs of Benjamin Malance, G.R. No. 219071,
August 24, 2016
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