ETRIII
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture
Outline No. 2
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
OBJECT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
(Prepared for Law 3-A,
Univ. of San Agustin
Law School,
SY 2016-2017)
Subject Index
A. Object Evidence
B. Documentary Evidence
C. Best Evidence Rule
D. Parol Evidence Rule
E. Authentication and Proof of Documents
The grouping of these concepts on
evidence fall under the classification of OBJECT and DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE as
distinguished from TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE which will be the subject matter of the
next lecture outline.
A. Object Evidence;
Synonymous with Real, Demonstrative or Physical Evidence
Section 1,
Rule 130. Object as evidence.- Objects as evidence are those addressed to the
senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
A.1. Versus Testimonial Evidence. As opposed
to TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, which pertains to the “perception” of the witness
which he/ she relates to the Court, OBJECT EVIDENCE is addressed to the senses
of the Court. Thus, in a sense, while testimonial evidence is a “second-hand,
recycled and vicarious” kind of evidence, object evidence is “first-hand”
knowledge of the court.
Thus, it was held, that “Physical
evidence is evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a
hundred witnesses”[1].
A.2. Scope
or extent. “Object evidence is not visual alone. It covers the entire range
of human senses: hearing, taste, smell, and touch. In a case where the issue is
infringement of a musical composition, the court may listen to the composition
involved. The court may not only look at but also touch the blade of a knife to know whether or not it could have
produced the incision characteristic of sharp blades”[2].
"Harry Potter Case"
"Harry Potter Case"
J.K.
Rowling, the author of the phenomenal “Harry Potter” book series was sued for
copyright infringement. The judge had to read the entire book series and after
doing so, arrived at the conclusion that the “feel and context” of Rowling’s
book particularly its plot and theme are so far removed from the complainant’s book
thus warranting the dismissal of the case.
"O.J. Simpson case"
Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the accused O.J. Simpson to put on the gloves which he did before the spectators in the courtroom and the jury and the judge. But regrettably, OJ struggled to put it in and it appeared too small for his humongous hands. This prompted famous attorney, the late Johnnie Cochran, to argue in his closing arguments that, “If it does not fit, you must acquit”. (Rumor has it that the gloves were really those of OJ except that they were leather gloves and since they were kept in custody by the prosecution for quite sometime, they shrunk. OJ Simpson, for his part, not only being a famous athlete but has also dabbled in acting, dramatized his struggle to put on what appeared to be gloves too small for his hands).
Ironically, the prosecutor, in a case of “over-proving a case”, compelled the accused O.J. Simpson to put on the gloves which he did before the spectators in the courtroom and the jury and the judge. But regrettably, OJ struggled to put it in and it appeared too small for his humongous hands. This prompted famous attorney, the late Johnnie Cochran, to argue in his closing arguments that, “If it does not fit, you must acquit”. (Rumor has it that the gloves were really those of OJ except that they were leather gloves and since they were kept in custody by the prosecution for quite sometime, they shrunk. OJ Simpson, for his part, not only being a famous athlete but has also dabbled in acting, dramatized his struggle to put on what appeared to be gloves too small for his hands).
A.3.
Requisites for Admissibility of object (real) evidence. “An object
may be exhibited, examined or viewed by the court when (1) it is relevant to
the fact in issue, and (2) the present condition of the object be the same at
the time in issue”.
A.3.1. “As a general rule, it seems essential
that articles shown to the court should be connected, at least prima facie,
with the crime in issue. An article of personal property, the relevancy of
which has been shown by its identification with the subject matter of the
crime, may be exhibited in the courtroom, whether as direct evidence of a
relevant fact, or to enable them to understand the evidence or to realize more
completely its cogency and force, or to assist the court in solving a material,
controverted or doubtful point. Admission of visual, exhibitive or
demonstrative evidence is much within the discretion of the court, and the
extent of identification of such articles necessary before admission varies
with circumstances. The court may inspect and smell the contents of a bottle
properly identified and admitted in evidence. Comparison of materials may also
be made by the court, aided by the evidence of expert witnesses. So, in case
the quality of an article, or its adaptability to a specific use or purpose, is
in issue, a sample may be shown to the court, together with a specimen of a
like material which is shown to be of good quality or adapted to the required
purpose, and the court may then make a comparison to ascertain possible points
of difference.
The propriety of justice of permitting
articles and implements such as deadly weapons, lanterns, masks,
counterfeiters’ tools, gambling apparatus and the like, used by criminals, but
which are not shown to be connected with the accused, to be exhibited to the
court may well be doubted. Such a practice, under the pretext of illustrating
or explaining evidence, is well calculated to prejudice the court against the
accused. Generally, where the sole purpose is to arouse prejudice, pity or
other passion, and no legitimate aim is served, it is error to admit articles
thus offered. Lack of some sort of identification or connection with the crime,
a plea of guilty, failure to shed light on an issue, or failure to show
condition unchanged, are other grounds for barring articles from admission as
evidence”[3].
A.3.1.1. Indecency or impropriety as ground for disallowing the introduction of
object evidence.
Gen.
Rule- When the object produced as evidence is indecent, or improper, it should
be excluded, unless the same is necessary for ascertaining the truth[4].
Exception-
“But when justice and the discovery of
the truth, are at stake, the ordinary canons of modesty and delicacy of feeling
cannot be allowed to impose a prohibition upon necessary measures. If such
matters were not unshrinkingly discussed and probed, many kinds of crimes would
remain unpunished. Nevertheless, needless spectators having no responsibility
for the course of justice, may well be avoided. Where it is a question of what
would otherwise be an indecency, two limitations seems appropriate: (a) there
should be a fair necessity for inspection, the trial court to determine; (b)
the inspection should take place apart from the public courtroom, in the sole
presence of the tribunal and the parties[5]”.
A.3.2. Authentication
of Object Evidence. “It must be emphasized that every evidence, whether it
be a document or an object, needs a witness. Even object evidence requires
statements from a witness to make its way into the realm of admissible
evidence. In short, testimonial evidence provides the foundation for all types
of evidence.[6]”
A.3.3. Extraction
of DNA Samples and the Right Against Self-Incrimination.
“This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in
Holt v. United States, 218 US 245, …is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him…” It is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the accused’s own lips,
against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement
but an object evidence. Wigmore, in 4 Wigmore, 2263, discussing the
question now before [the Court] in his treatise on evidence, thus, said: ‘… it
is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, … but testimonial
compulsion”[7].
A.3.4. Demonstrative
Evidence. This is now deemed included within the ambit of “object”
evidence. Maps, diagram, a photograph and a model, fall under this category.
A.3.4.1. Photographs. – “The courts take judicial notice that all civilized
communities rely on photographic pictures for presenting resemblances of
persons and animals, scenery, natural objects, buildings, and other artificial
objects. It is accordingly well established that photographs of persons,
things, and places, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful representations of the subjects as
of the time in question, are, in the discretion of the trial court,
admissible in evidence as aids to it in arriving at an understanding of the
evidence or the condition of objects or premises, the circumstances of an
accident, or the condition or the identity of a person when any such matter is
relevant to the issues being litigated”[8].
A.3.4.2. Maps. “The draftsman of the map must testify as to its accuracy,
but any other witnesses may refer to it while testifying, to illustrate his
testimony. It is not material by whom the map or diagram was prepared providing
that he can testify that the man or diagram was prepared providing that he can
testify that the map or diagram is accurate and is based on knowledge derived
from his own investigation[9]”.
A.3.5. DNA
EVIDENCE. A.M. No. 06-11-05-SC. Deoxyribonucleic acid.
In Agustin v. CA[10],
it was ruled that A person’s DNA is
the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime;
the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat,
bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue and vaginal
or rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical
twins”.
Why identical twins?
Rule on
Right Against Self-Incrimination in Extraction of Samples.
Guidelines.
ü
How samples were collected.
ü
How they were handled
ü
Possibility of contamination of samples.
Liquid samples?
ü
Procedure followed in analyzing samples
ü
Proper standards and procedure followed in
conducting tests
ü
Qualification of analyst who conducted the
test
DNA
Profile.
12
Universally- accepted Markers.
A.3.6.
Chain of Custody Rule
RA 9165;
Chain of Custody
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 213221 - versus - BIYAN MOHAMMAD y ASDORI a.k.a.
"BONG BIYAN" and MINA LADJAHASAN y TOMBREO, Accused, MINA LADJAHASAN
y TOMBREO, Present: CARPIO,* VELASCO, JR.,** J., Chairperson, PERALTA*** '
PEREZ, and REYES,JJ. Promulgated: Accused-Appellant. Novemb_er 9, 2016 x- - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~;or~_
Contrary to the position of
Ladjahasan, there is proof directly linking her in the illegal sale of shabu.
We are in full accord with the factual findings of the lower courts. The RTC
held: 4 The said testimony of PO 1 Santiago also illustrates the participation
of accused Mina Ladjahasan in selling of Shabu. She was the one who opened the
door and this must be her role in their drug trafficking operation - answer the
knock on the door and verify the intention of [the one] knocking. In this case,
when she learned that PO 1 Santiago, acting as poseurbuyer, intended to buy
Shabu, she went back inside the room. Thereafter, it was accused Mohammad that
emerged and transacted with PO 1 Santiago. Clearly, when accused Ladjahasan
went back inside the room, she relayed to Mohammad the intention of PO 1
Santiago, then, Mohammad took over by transacting with Santiago who was a
prospective buyer of Shabu. CA ro/lo, pp. 45-46. Rollo, pp. 43-44. c7 Decision
- 6 - G.R. No. 213221 If Ladjahasan was not part of the operation, she would
have turned away PO 1 Santiago as he would only be intruding into their
intimate space, instead, she just went in as if it was a normal occurrence in
the usual course of their business. When inside, she informed Mohammad that there
is a buyer outside. These circumstances when put together warrant an
inescapable conclusion that both accused Mohammad and Ladjahasan were animated
by a common purpose of engaging in drug trafficking. 5 On the other hand, the
CA opined: Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner in which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused
themselves when such acts point to a point purpose and design, concerted
action, and community of interests. It is clear from the testimony of POI
Santiago that Ladjahasan and Mohammad were of one mind in selling shabu to him
as shown by their series of overt acts during the transaction, to wit: (1) when
POI Santiago knocked on the door of the room occupied by the accused, it was
Ladjahasan who responded by slightly opening the door; (2) after opening the
door, Ladjahasan then asked PO 1 Santiago of their intention, to which the
latter replied that he wanted to buy P200.00 worth of shabu; (3) after hearing
the intention of POI Santiago, Ladjahasan closed the door; (4) a few seconds
later, Mohammad came at the door, got the money from POI Santiago and handed to
the latter the shabu. No other logical conclusion would follow from the
concerted action of both Mohammad and Ladjahasan except that they had a common
purpose and community of interest. Their modus operandi was for Ladjahasan to
screen the buyer while Mohammad does the actual sale. Conspiracy having been
established, Ladjahasan is liable as co-principal regardless of her participation.6
As to the contention that the buy-bust team failed to observe the chain of
custody rule, this Court similarly discharged in People v. Ros: 7 6 The
appellants cannot be allowed to belatedly question the police officers' alleged
noncompliance with Section 21 for the first time on appeal. The issue on the
chain of custody was neither raised nor mentioned with specificity during the
trial. In no instance did the appellants manifest or at least intimate before
the trial court that there were lapses in the handling and safekeeping of the
seized marijuana that might affect its admissibility, integrity and evidentiary
value. This emission is fatal to the case of the defense. Whatever
"justifiable ground" that may excuse the prosecution from complying
with the statutory requirements on chain of custody will remain unknown in
light of the apparent failure of the appellants to challenge the custody and
safekeeping or the issue of disposition and preservation of the subject drugs
before the RTC. This Court cannot now dwell on the matter because to do so
would CA rollo, p. 42. Id. at 108. G.R. No. 201146, April 15, 2015, 755 SCRA
518. tfl Decision - 7 - G.R. No. 213221 be against the tenets of fair play and
equity. As We stressed in People v. Sta. Maria: The law excuses noncompliance
under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds that may
excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation x x x from
complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not
question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the
police officers' alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No.
9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the
first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial
court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected
their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the
evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such
objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal. The
appellants could have also moved for the quashal of the Information at the
first instance, but they did not. Hence, they are deemed to have waived any
objection on the matter. 8 Moreover, it has been consistently held that strict
compliance on the chain of custody rule is not required and that the arrest of
an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from him rendered
inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Art. II of RA
No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. The most important factor
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the preservation
of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.9 Here, the
prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty and prove to the court
beyond reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs (and drug paraphernalia)
presented to the trial court as evidence are the same items confiscated from
the accused, tested and found to be positive for dangerous substance.”
B. Documentary Evidence.
“Section
2. Rule 130. Documentary Evidence.- Documents as evidence consist of writings
or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other
modes of written expressions offered as proof of their contents”.
Sec.
1(h), Rule 2 of Rules on Electronic Evidence. “Electronic document” refers to
information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or
other modes of written expressions described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be
proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed
documents and any print-out or output, readable by sight or other means, which
accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
purposes of these Rules, the term ‘electronic document’ may be used
interchangeably with ‘electronic data message’”.
B.1. Nature. Consists of writings or any material
containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.
B.2. Admissibility of documentary evidence.
– “Documentary evidence is subject to the same basic rules of evidence or
tests with respect to relevancy and materiality as are other types of evidence.
Subject to the application of exclusionary rules and trial court discretion,
where such discretion is fitting, admissibility of documentary evidence, as
with other evidence, is determined by the issues in the particular case.
A proper foundation must be laid
for the admission of documentary evidence; that is, the identity and
authenticity of the document must be reasonably established as a pre-requisite
to its admission. However, a party who does not deny the genuineness of a
proferred instrument may not object that it was not properly identified before
it was admitted in evidence”.
e.g.
Failure to contest actionable documents. Sec. 8,
Rule 8, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. “When an action or defense is founded
upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading
as provided in the preceding section, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth
what he claims to be the facts; but he requirement of an oath does not apply
when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is
refused.”
B.3. Requisites for Admissibility of
Documentary Evidence.
a)
The
document must be relevant;
b)
The
evidence must be authenticated;
c)
The
document must be authenticated by a competent
witness; and,
d)
The
document must be formally offered in
evidence.[11]
Important Rules on
Documentary Evidence. – “Rules
on documentary evidence which a lawyer must thoroughly familiarize himself to
the end that a proper and effective presentation of documents in evidence may
be made are:
ü The Best evidence rule- Secs. 3-4, Rule 130
ü The Rule on Secondary Evidence- Secs. 5-8,
Ibid
ü The Parol Evidence Rule- Sec. 9, Ibid
ü The Rule on Authentication and Proof of
Documents- Sec. 19-33, Rule 132
ü Documents written in unofficial language must
be translated to English or Filipino- Section 33, Rule 132
C. The Best Evidence Rule; Applicability. “Stated
in simple form, the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest
grade or evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact.”
Reason: to prevent fraud. Because if a party is in
possession of such evidence and withholds it; and seeks to substitute inferior
evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose
and defeat.
C.1. Primary Evidence. The highest or best evidence which,
from the abstract nature of the facts to be proved, is procurable, and which,
under circumstances of the particular case, affords the greatest certainty of the
fact, that is, renders the probability of its existence most evident to the
understanding. It is that evidence which does not indicate the existence of
other evidence nearer the facts to be proved.[12]
C.2. Not Applicable when subject of inquiry does not
pertain to contents of document
“The best evidence rule as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section
3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when
the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any
other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need to account
for the original. Moreover, production of the original may be dispensed with,
in the trial courts discretion, whenever the opponent does not bona
fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose
will be served by requiring production.
Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to
the instant case. Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed;
hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds. The
petitioner never even denied their due execution and admitted that she signed
the Deed of Partition. As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect,
admitted its genuineness and due execution when she failed to specifically deny
it in the manner required by the rules. The petitioner merely claimed that
said documents do not express the true agreement and intention of the parties
since they were only provisional paper arrangements made upon the advice of
counsel. Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these
deeds but alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer
of Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.[13]”
-
Both cases were for prosecution of Bouncing
checks law where only photocopies of checks were offered in evidence
-
First case, check was offered to prove
“execution or existence of the document or the circumstances surrounding its
execution
-
Second case, check was offered to prove
“contents, names of drawer, drawee, date, amount and dishonor
C.3. Best
evidence rule not applicable when document is merely collateral to issue. “When a document is involved in the inquiry
but the document is only collaterally in issue, the best evidence rule does not
apply. A document is collaterally in issue when the purpose of introducing
the document is not to establish its terms, but to show facts that have no
reference to its contents like its existence, condition, execution or delivery[16].
C.4. What
constitutes as Original Document.
“The best evidence rule is the rule which requires
the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact. Although
there are certain recognized exceptions when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself.
However, in the instant case, contrary to petitioners contention, the
receipt presented by SMP is deemed as an original, considering that the
triplicate copy of the provisional receipt was executed at the same time as the
other copies of the same receipt involving the same transaction. Section 4,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of the
document is one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two
or more copies executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all
such copies are equally regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated
in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as
originals.[17]”
C.4.1.
Original of an Electronic Document. – An electronic document shall be regarded
as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is
a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the
data accurately. (Section 1, Rule 4 of Rules on Electronic Evidence).
D. SECONDARY
EVIDENCE. Requisites for Introduction in Case of Loss, Destruction or
Unavailability of Original
“The burden of proof rests upon petitioner,
as plaintiff, to establish its case based on a preponderance of evidence. It is
well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden
of proving it. Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an
obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the
photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court were
inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would
still have had little probative value.
The original copies of the sales invoices are
the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are
mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because
petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided
under Section 3[ of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the
inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents
obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the
original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony
of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case,
before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of
the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad
faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. The
correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and
contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be
changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of
the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies and the
testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the originals and
reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not met,
because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable.Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show
that he had subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy
exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost,
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be
given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the
other originals.
In Santos v. Santos the Court upheld the pronouncement of
the CA that before the appellees therein could be allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original, they had to prove -- with the
requisite quantum of evidence -- the loss, the destruction or the
unavailability of all original copies of the document.
In the present case, triplicates were
produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice only
once. During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone
to respondent, another to the merchant, and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an
original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs
against petitioner[18]”.
E. Parol Evidence Rule; Applicability
“Rule 130, Section 9 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence embodies the parol evidence rule and states:
SEC.
9. Evidence of written agreements.When the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of
the written agreement.
However,
a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection
in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors-in-interest after the execution of the written
agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction
of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony or other evidence purporting
to show that different terms were agreed upon by the
parties, varying the
purport of the written contract.[9]
This principle notwithstanding, petitioner would have the Court rule
that this case falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This
argument is untenable.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the
meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose
of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous
conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been
fraud or mistake.[10] Evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.[11]
The Vehicle Sales Invoice[12] is the best evidence of the transaction. A
sales invoice is a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are
those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions.[13] Business forms, e.g.,
order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in
ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very
least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact
transpired.[14]These documents are not mere scraps of
paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial
transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of
contracts.[15]
The terms of the subject
sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex
200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not,
however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by
Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her
signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and
is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.[16]
Oral testimony on the
alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of
the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written
or documentary evidence.[17]
Hence, petitioners
contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence
rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the
contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading
of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of
the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts
and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be
received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.
Even assuming there is a
shred of truth to petitioners contention, the same cannot be made a basis for
holding respondents liable therefor.
As pointed out by the CA,
Rodriguez is a person separate and independent from Autocorp. Whatever
obligations Rodriguez contracted cannot be attributed to Autocorp and vice
versa. In fact, the obligation that petitioner proffers as its defense under
the Lease Purchase Agreement was not even incurred by Rodriguez or by Autocorp
but by Uniline.
The Lease Purchase
Agreement clearly shows that the parties thereto are two corporations not
parties to this case: Focus Point and Uniline. Under this Lease Purchase
Agreement, it is Uniline, as lessee/purchaser, and not Rodriguez, that incurred
the debt to Focus Point. The obligation of Uniline to Focus Point arose
out of a transaction completely different from the subject of the instant case.
It is settled that a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its individual
stockholders or members, and is not affected by the personal rights,
obligations and transactions of the latter. The corporation may not be
held liable for the obligations of the persons composing it, and neither can
its stockholders be held liable for its obligation.
Of course, this Court has
recognized instances when the corporations separate personality may be
disregarded. However, we have also held that the same may only be done in cases
where the corporate vehicle is being used to defeat public convenience, justify
wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime.[23] Moreover, the wrongdoing must be
clearly and convincingly established. It cannot be presumed.
To reiterate, the
transaction under the Vehicle Sales Invoice is separate and distinct from that
under the Lease Purchase Agreement. In the former, it is Seaoil that owes
Autocorp, while in the latter, Uniline incurred obligations to
Focus. There was never any allegation, much less any evidence, that
Autocorp was merely an alter ego of Uniline, or that the two corporations
separate personalities were being used as a means to perpetrate fraud or
wrongdoing.
Moreover, Rodriguez, as
stockholder and director of Uniline, cannot be held personally liable for the
debts of the corporation, which has a separate legal personality of its own.
While Section 31 of the Corporation Code lays down the exceptions to the
rule, the same does not apply in this case. Section 31 makes a director
personally liable for corporate debts if he willfully and knowingly votes for
or assents to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. Section 31 also
makes a director personally liable if he is guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the corporation. The bad faith or
wrongdoing of the director must be established clearly and convincingly. Bad
faith is never presumed.
The burden of proving bad
faith or wrongdoing on the part of Rodriguez was, on petitioner, a burden which
it failed to discharge. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to have
dismissed the third-party complaint against Rodriguez on the ground that he was
not a party to the sale of the excavator.
Rule 6, Section 11 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure defines a third-party complaint as a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
The purpose of the rule is
to permit a defendant to assert an independent claim against a third party
which he, otherwise, would assert in another action, thus preventing
multiplicity of suits. Had it not been for the rule, the claim could have
been filed separately from the original complaint.
Petitioners claim against
Rodriguez was fully ventilated in the proceedings before the trial court, tried
and decided on its merits. The trial courts ruling operates as res
judicata against another suit involving the same parties and same
cause of action. This is rightly so because the trial court found that
Rodriguez was not a party to the sale of the excavator. On the other hand,
petitioner Seaoils liability has been successfully established by respondent.
A last point. We reject
Seaoils claim that the ownership of the subject excavator, having been legally
and completely transferred to Focus Point International, Inc., cannot be
subject of replevin and plaintiff [herein respondent Autocorp] is not legally
entitled to any writ of replevin.[30] The claim is negated by the sales
invoice which clearly states that [u]ntil after the vehicle is fully paid
inclusive of bank clearing time, it remains the property of Autocorp Group
which reserves the right to take possession of said vehicle at any time and
place without prior notice.[31]
Considering, first, that
Focus Point was not a party to the sale of the excavator and, second, that
Seaoil indeed failed to pay for the excavator in full, the same still
rightfully belongs to Autocorp. Additionally, as the trial court found, Seaoil
had already assigned the same to its contractor for the construction of its
depot in Batangas. Hence, Seaoil has already enjoyed the benefit of the
transaction even as it has not complied with its obligation. It cannot be
permitted to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of another.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises
considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2004 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 72193 is AFFIRMED.[19]”
PURPOSE OF PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
“The appellate
court is correct in declaring that under the parole evidence rule, when the
parties have reduced their agreement into writing, they are deemed to have
intended such written agreement to be the sole repository and memorial of
everything that they have agreed upon. All their prior and contemporaneous
agreements are deemed to be merged in the written document so that, as
between them and their successors-in-interest, such writing becomes exclusive
evidence of the terms thereof and any verbal agreement which tends to vary,
alter or modify the same is not admissible.
Here, the terms
of the subject promissory note and the deed of chattel mortgage are clear and
explicit and devoid of any conditionality upon which its validity depends. To
be sure, Allied Bank was not a party to SEC Case No. 2042 where the management
committee was ordered created; hence, it would not be correct to presume that
it had notice of the existence of the management committee which, incidentally,
was still to be created when the subject promissory note was executed on 12
August 1981. Notably, while the parties in SEC Case No. 2042 agreed to form the
management committee on 27 July 1981, it was only on 14 August 1981 when the
committee was actually created and its members appointed. Clearly then, the
subject promissory note was outside the realm of authority of the management
committee. Corollarily, the chattel mortgage accessory to it is likewise valid.
We thus declare
and so hold that Allied Banks foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted
over the vessel Jean III was justified. On this score, we also rule that the
loss of the mortgaged chattel brought about by its sinking must be borne not by
Allied Bank but by the spouses Cheng. As owners of the fishing vessel, it was
incumbent upon the spouses to insure it against loss. Thus, when the vessel
sank before the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed, uninsured as it is, its
loss must be borne by the spouses Cheng”[20].
E.1. Applicability of
Parol Evidence Rule Does not Require A Particular form
“REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE; DOES NOT SPECIFY THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.- Clearly, the rule does not specify that
the written agreement be a public document. What
is required is that the agreement be in
writing as the rule is in
fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is so much more
certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it
would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in
writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show
that the parties intended a different contract from that expressed in the
writing signed by them" [FRANCISCO, THE RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p. 179] Thus,
for the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted
by parol or extrinsic evidence.”[21]
E.2. Not Applicable
to Labor Cases
“In determining arbitral
awards then, aside from the MOA, courts considered other factors and documents
including, as in this case, the financial documents[6] submitted by respondent as well as its previous bargaining history and
financial outlook and improvements as stated in its own website.[7]
The appellate courts ruling that giving credence to the Pahayag and
the minutes of the meeting which were not verified and notarized would violate
the rule on parol evidence is erroneous. The
parol evidence rule, like other rules on evidence, should not be strictly
applied in labor cases. Interphil
Laboratories Employees Union-FFW v. Interphil Laboratories, Inc. [8] teaches:
[R]eliance on the parol evidence rule is
misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of
law or equity are notcontrolling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and
technical sense in labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)”[22]
Right of Repurchase and the
Statute of Frauds
A.“Since a right to repurchase is a part of the
contract of sale, it is governed also by the Statute of Frauds. However, when
the contract of sale has been reduced in writing, parol evidence may be adduced
to prove the agreement allowing the right of repurchase the property sold,
since the deed of sale and the verbal agreement allowing the right of
repurchase should be considered as an integral whole, then the deed of sale
relied upon by the seller “is in itself the note or memorandum evidencing the
contract” which would take the case outside the provisions of the Statute
of Frauds”[23].
B. Waiver; Estoppel
1.4. Basically, in Nool v. CA,[24]
the doctrine was laid down that a right of repurchase must be part and parcel
of a contract of sale and cannot be embodied in a separate contract.
[1] People v. Suunpongco,
163 SCRA 222; People v. Pardella, G.R. No. L-45266, November 24, 1988; People
v. Bardaaje, 99 SCRA 388; People v. Estrebella, 164 SCRA 114.
[3] See Francisco on
Evidence, pp. 105-106, Volume VII Part I, 1997 Edition citing Underhill’s
Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 196-197
[9] Underhill;s Criminal
Evidence, 5th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 228, 229, 230-231, cited on p. 119,
Francisco, Ibid.
[19] Seaoil Petroleum
Corporation v. Autocorp Group and Paul L. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 164326, October
17, 2008
[20] Allied Banking
Corporation v. Cheng Yong and Lilia Gaw, G.R. Nos. 151040 & 154109, October 6, 2005
[22] Cirtek Employees Labor
Union- Federation of Free Workers v. Cirtek Electronics, Inc. G.R. No. 190515,
June 6, 2011
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