ETRIII
REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW Lecture Series
Lecture
Outline No. 5
OUTLINE/ LECTURE ON
EXAMINATION & IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
By: Atty. Eduardo T.
Reyes, III
(Prepared for Law 3-A,
Univ. of San Agustin Law School, SY
2016-2017)
A. Examination of Witnesses
in OPEN COURT
A.1. Two-Fold Purpose
of Requirement that Examination be done in Open Court
-“The
reason for the requirement … is to enable the court to judge the credibility of
the witness’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, and their appearance. It
is unquestionably the safest and most satisfactory method of investigating
facts, and affords the greatest protection to the rights and liberties of the
citizen. Another reason is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of
cross-examination.[1]”
-According to Chief Justice Appleton:
“The
witness’ presence, the promptness and unpremeditatedness of his answers or the
reverse, their distinctness and particularity or the want of these essentials,
their incorrectness in generals or particulars, their directness or
evasiveness, are soon detected . . . The appearance and manner, the voice, the
gestures, the readiness and promptness of the answers, the evasions, the
reluctance, the silence, the contumacious silence, the contradictions, the
explanations, the intelligence or the want of intelligence of the witness, the
passions which more or less control – fear, love, hatred, envy, revenge – are
all open to observation, noted and weighed by jury. (5 Wigmore on Evidence p.
136)[2].
A.1.2. Exception to
Examination in OPEN COURT.
a.1.2.1.
Depositions
a.1.2.2. Cases governed by rules on
summary procedure; Witness only submits judicial affidavits
B. MANNER OF
EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES IN GENERAL. –“Examination
of witnesses in open court is by means of oral questions and answers. Such
questions should, of course, be directed to the eliciting of testimony which,
under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to, and competent to prove,
the issue joined but there is no set or artificial method for asking questions
or witnesses. In the examination of a witness the question put should be proper
in form, and questions not proper in form should be excluded. Questions should
be concise and directed to a definite object, not rambling or scattered. The
mode of examination is a matter addressed largely to the discretion of the
trial judge and is subject to his direction and control, having due regard to
the rights of the parties litigant. It may be said that in examination of
witnesses the courts give considerable latitude and indulgence to
characteristics of counsel, who are allowed, for the most part, to follow dictates
of common sense and to choose their own methods of effective presentation of
their side of the case, but subject always to the control of the trial judge”[3].
C. FORM AND NATURE OF
QUESTIONS.
a) Preliminary
Questions. Questions
which do not directly relate to a relevant matter may be allowed where they are
preliminary in their nature, and do not necessarily call for illegal or
inadmissible evidence. So, questions that are purely ancillary, and which only
form part of some predicate and lead up to the matters at issue, are not
subject to the objection that they are immaterial, unless they contain
something hurtful within themselves. A preliminary question asked for the
purpose of laying the foundation for the admission of material evidence is
proper.
b) General
questions. While a
large discretion should be allowed the trial court in permitting questions
objected to as not being properly confined to a particular issue and time, it
is nevertheless the rule that a question which is too general or too broad, or
is so general that irrelevant or illegal evidence would be responsive thereto,
is properly excluded.
c) Indefinite
and Uncertain questions. Questions
which tend to confuse the issues in the case are improper. Hence, except where
it is impractical to frame a more definite question on a matter competent for
inquiry, a question which is indefinite and uncertain should not be allowed;
nor should a question which is confusing or unintelligible, or is not clear as
to who or what is being referred to, or is incomplete, or is too vague to bring
out proper evidence of the matter being inquired into.
d) Questions
containing more than single proposition. Questions
containing more than one proposition to which different answers might be given
are improper. Accordingly, a question calling for a yes or no answer which
embodies several separate questions is improper.
e) Ambiguous
Questions. The
testimony of witnesses is elicited by interrogation or the propounding of
questions, a primary requirement in this respect being that a question which is
asked of a witness be direct and free from vagueness, uncertainty or ambiguity.
A dispute to the form of a question is to be resolved in view of the discretion
with which the court vested. It is not permissible on direct examination to put
to a witness a question which assumes erroneously that a material fact in issue
has been proved or that the witness has given certain testimony.
f) Misleading
questions. A question
which might tend to mislead the witness, or is so framed as to produce in the
minds of the jury an impression not warranted by the evidence, should be
excluded. Permitting such questions to be answered may be rendered harmless by
cross-examination of the witness on the matter.
g) Questions
must not be indefinite or uncertain.
The question must not be so indefinite as to fail to put the adverse party on
notice of the testimony sought to be elicited and preclude him from objecting
to the question in such specific manner as to prevent any improper answer, and
to leave it almost entirely to the discretion of the witness as to what matter
he shall elucidate.
h) Questions
must be relevant. Questions
should be framed to elicit testimony which tends to prove the issue involved.
Stated otherwise, the general rule is that questions put to a witness on direct
or redirect examination in both civil and criminal case must be relevant to the
issue in the case. Accordingly, a question calling for evidence irrelevant or
immaterial to the issues should be, and is, properly excluded. The materiality
of a question must appear or be shown at the time the question is asked.
i) Question
must not be argumentative. A
question which is in the nature of a mere argument with the witness should not
be allowed as for example, a supposed question in the form of an argumentative
statement. A question is argumentative when it seeks to elicit the answer of
the witness to the argument presented. The ruling of the trial judge on the
objection that a question is argumentative is peculiarly within his province.
It is not the function of counsel to argue with the witness or through the
witness to the court.
j) Question must not call for a conclusion of
law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law. Among
such conclusions of law legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A
witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be asked or permitted to testify as
to whether or not a party is responsible to the law, or whether certain facts
constitute in law an agency. Law in the sense here used embraces whatever
conclusions belong properly to the court.
k) Question
must not call for opinion or hearsay evidence. A witness cannot testify to those facts only
which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perception, except where a case is a proper one for the introduction of opinion
evidence or calls for a testimony which falls within the exceptions to the
hearsay rule.
l) Question
must not call for illegal answer. Where
a witness is prohibited by law from furnishing certain information, he cannot
be compelled to do so by his answer.
m) Question
must not call for self-incriminating testimony. There are courts which hold that it is
improper to propound questions calling for self-incriminating answer.
n) Question
must not be leading. –See
Section 10, Rule 132.
o) Question
must not be misleading. –See
Section 10, Rule 132.
p) Question
must not tend to degrade the reputation of the witness.
q) Repetitious
questions. – The
repetition of a question after the witness has disavowed knowledge, or has
satisfactorily or substantially answered is properly disallowed, whether the
later ques4tion is identical with the former or merely the same in substance,
especially where the answer already given straightforward and not evasive. On
the other hand, where the answer given to a question is reluctant, and evasive,
it is proper for the court to permit the repetition of such question. [4]“
D.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF A WITNESS
a)
To answer questions although his answer may
tend to establish a claim against him;
b)
RIGHT not
to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an offense;
c)
To be
protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from harsh or
insulting demeanor;
d)
Not to be
examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;
e)
Not to be
detained longer than the interest of justice requires; and
f)
Not to
give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be the very
fact at issue or to a fact from which in issue would be presumed.[5]
E. EXAMINATION OF
CHILD WITNESS (Rule on Examination of Child Witness).
-
When the
child is testifying, the court may exclude the public and persons who do not
have a direct interest in the case, including members of the press. The order
shall be made if the court determines on the record that to testify in open
court would cause psychological harm to him, hinder the ascertainment of truth,
or result in his inability to effectively communicate due to embarrassment,
fear or timidity. The court may also motu proprio exclude the public from the
courtroom if the evidence to be produced during trial is of such character as
to be offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, on motion of
the accused, exclude the public from trial, except court personnel and the
counsel of the parties.[6]
-
The court
may order that the testimony of the child be taken by live-link television if
there is a substantial likelihood that the child would suffer trauma from
testifying in the presence of the accused, his counsel or the prosecutor as the
case may be. The trauma should be of a kind which would impair the completeness
or truthfulness of the testimony of the child. [7]
-
Leading question to a child witness; allowed.
Sec. 20 of the Rule
on Examination of a Child Witness allows leading questions to be asked of a
child witness “in all stages of examination of a child under the condition that
the same will further the interest of justice”.
F. KINDS OF
EXAMINATION.
a)
Direct
examination – By the direct examination of a witness is meant that
examination in chief of a witness that is, the initial examination by the party
calling him.
b)
Cross-Examination-
Cross
examination has been defined as the examination of a witness by the party
opposed to the party who called such witness, the latter party having examined,
or having been entitled to examine, such witness in chief. Cross-examination, generally speaking, is the function of counsel
and not of the court. Although the right of the trial court to examine a
witness cannot be denied, it should stay out of it as much as possible, neither
interfering nor intervening in the conduct thereof.[8]
NOTE: Under the Judicial
Affidavit Rule, (A.M. 12-8-8-SC), Judges were given a greater role in the
examination of a witness. Thus,
“X x x
Section.
7. Examination of the witness on his judicial affidavit. – The adverse party
shall have the right to cross-examine the witness on his judicial affidavit and
on the exhibits attached to the same. The party who presents the witness may
also examine him as on re-direct. In every case, the court shall take active
part in examining the witness to determine his credibility as well as the truth
of his testimony and to elicit the answers that it needs for resolving the
issues.
b.1.Purpose
of Cross-Examination. “The
office of cross-examination is to test the truth of statements of a witness
made on direct examination. Cross examination serves as the safeguard to combat
unreliable testimony, providing a means for discrediting a witness’ testimony,
and is in the nature of an attack on his truth or accuracy.
X x x
Longnecker in his book on “Hints on Trial of
a Lawsuit, summarizes the objects of cross-examination as follows:
ü To test the knowledge of the witness
ü To test the competency of the witness to
testify
ü To test the truth of the direct testimony
ü To test the recollection of the witness
ü To explain or enlarge testimony brought out
in direct examination
ü To show the motive, interest or animosity of
a witness
ü To ascertain the opportunity the witness had
to gather the facts he testified about
ü To weaken his testimony given in direct
examination
ü To test the source of his knowledge and
determine if it is competent and not hearsay
ü To test the relevancy of the testimony
ü To test the materiality of the testimony.
c) Re-direct Examination. After a witness has been cross-examined, the next stage in the proceeding is his re-examination by the party calling him. This further interrogation by a party of his own witness after the cross-examination is known as re-direct examination[9].
Purpose: (1) To explain or (2) supplement his answers
given during the cross-examination. “According to Corpus Juris Secundum,
the proper function of re-direct examination is to explain, rebut, or avoid the
effect of testimony elicited on cross-examination and to clear up confusion of
the witness”.
e.g. Let’s suppose that the prosecutor forgot to
ask the eye-witness to identify the accused while conducting the direct
examination? Can he be allowed to belatedly do so on re-direct
examination?
d)
Re-cross
examination. Is the operation of examining a witness who has finished
his examination in chief, cross-examination, and re-direct examination, by the
lawyer who cross-examined.[10]
-SCOPE.
After
the re-direct examination of the witness has been concluded, the adverse party
may re-cross-examine the witness (1) on matters stated in his re-direct
examination and (2) on such other matters as may be allowed by the Court in its
discretion[11].
“thus, it is proper to allow
re-cross-examination on a subject which was opened upon on direct examination,
or as to new matter which was brought out on redirect examination, or which
is designed to test the credibility of the witness or of testimony elicited on
redirect examination. X x x
It is proper to exclude questions as to
matters which were not opened up, or brought out, on redirect examination,
or as to matters with respect to which the witness was examined on direct
examination, or as to matters with respect to which he was cross-examined, or
as to which there was an opportunity to cross-examine him, where there is no
claim of oversight and no reason stated why the matter was not inquired into on
the cross-examination proper.[12]”
G.
RECALLING A WITNESS. “if a
witness has been examined by both sides, the witness cannot be recalled without
leave of court. Recalling a witness is a matter of judicial discretion. In
the exercise of its discretion, the court shall be guided by the interests of
justice.[13]
H. IMPEACHMENT OF
WITNESS;
Sec. 11, Rule 132-
Impeachment of adverse party’s witness.
A witness may be
impeached through the following modes:
a. By contradictory
evidence
NOTE: But you cannot
ask impeach the witness by asking him to comment on
(i)the assertions of
another witness which is contradictory
(ii) Documents which
may embody contradictory propositions but over which execution the witness had
no participation in
b. By evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad; or
c. By evidence that
he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony.
Sec. 13, Rule132- How
witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements
H.1. Rules on
Impeaching a Witness
Accused-appellant
Winston de Guzman was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Branch
5, Davao Oriental[1] with the crime of rape in an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 2584, and which alleged:
That on or about June 9, 1994, in the Municipality of Governor Generoso,
Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd designs, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one JOVELYN A. GERAM, a (sic) against her will.[2]
Appellant
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on the aforequoted indictment on September 5,
1994,[3] and the case then went to trial.
The
evidence for the prosecution reveals that 14-year old complainant, Jovelyn A.
Geram,[4] was alone in their residence at Barangay Monserrat, Governor Generoso, Davao
Oriental when the crime was committed in the afternoon of June 9, 1994 by
appellant who had managed to gain entry into the house.
Complainant
was sleeping at around two oclock that afternoon when she was awakened by the
weight of something on top of her. Upon
opening her eyes, she saw herein appellant naked and sitting on her thighs. Complainant instinctively tried to
shout for help but appellant covered her mouth and nose with his hand and
warned her not to resist or she would be killed.A struggle between the two
ensued thereafter. The strength
of appellant and the strain of complainants efforts at resistance took its toll
on the latter, causing her to feel weak and faint.
On
recovering her senses, complainant discovered that she was already undressed
and she saw blood on her vagina. She
also noticed some white fluid on her abdomen and thighs.Complainant felt pain
on her genitals and other parts of her body. Appellant
was no longer around, and the hapless complainant was left crying over the
tragedy which had befallen her.
In the
evening of the same day, a neighbor, Florami Bayno, arrived in the house of the
Gerams to watch television. Complainant
went with Florami when the latter went home. They
proceeded to the house of Mauricia and Hugo Bayno, close friends of the Gerams
and Floramis parents-in-law. In
front of the couple, complainant recounted her ordeal at the hands of
appellant.
In the
morning of June 10, 1994, complainant went to the house of another neighbor,
Genesis Delgado, and confided her misfortune to the latter. Later, she went to the house of the
Baynos and waited for her parents who were in Barangay Tambo attending to their fishing
enterprise. Complainants mother,
Evelyn Geram,[5] arrived shortly thereafter. Mother
and daughter could only cry as the latter related the incident to the former.
Complainant
and her mother subsequently went to the barangay captain of Monserrat who advised them
to report the matter to the police authorities of Sigaboy, Governor
Generoso.After complainant had narrated the incident to the police, she and her
mother proceeded to the municipal hospital for the physical examination of the
former.
Dr.
Divina Lopez,[6] a resident physician of the Municipal District Hospital of Governor
Generoso, issued a medical certificate detailing the result of her examination
of complainant, as follows:
FINDINGS:
1) Positive (+) BLOOD CLOTS BOTH ON
LABIA MINORA
2) POSITIVE (+) RUPTURED
HYMEN
3) REDNESS AROUND THE
VULVAR AREA[7]
Prosecution
witness Genesis Delgado[8] declared that he saw appellant going inside the house of complainant on
June 9, 1994 at around two oclock in the afternoon. Apparently, appellant entered through
the kitchen door at the rear portion of the house. Two hours later, appellant went out of
the house through the same kitchen door. Delgado
noticed all of these while he was watching television inside their house
located just beside the Gerams residence.
Later,
at the rebuttal stage, Enecita[9] dela Cruz Torion,[10] a teacher in Monserrat Elementary School, also testified that she saw
appellant, together with two companions, sitting at the front porch of the
house of the Gerams at about one oclock in the afternoon of June 9, 1994. Enecita was then on her way from the
school which was located in front of the house of the Gerams.
The
defense of appellant is denial and alibi. Aside
from the intrinsic weakness of this shopworn excuse, we are not persuaded to
grant any credence thereto since the facts relied on to make out appellants
story obviously appear too pat as to have clearly been contrived. The only persons presented to
corroborate appellants story are his own parents, despite the availability of
other persons whose lack of relationship to him would not have engendered
suspicion of connivance.
Appellant,[11] who is also a resident of Monserrat, asserted before the trial court
that he was in Davao City at the time of the commission of the felony. He allegedly went there on June 6,
1994 with his mother to attend to his sister-in-law who was confined in the
Davao Medical Center due to an incomplete abortion.[12] After sister-in-law was discharged from the hospital in the afternoon of
June 8, they went to the house of Christy, his sister who was residing at Sasa,
Davao City. He stayed in the
house and cleaned it the whole day of June 9. At
4:30 in the morning of June 10, he and his mother left Davao City for
Monserrat, arriving at their house between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M.
Aside
from merely repeating the position of appellant, his father, Raul De Guzman,[13] tried to convince the trial court that he saw complainant in the
afternoon of June 9, 1994.According to this witness, Jovelyn went to their
store on that date to borrow a VHS cassette tape featuring Robo Vampire. Appellants mother, Violeta De Guzman,[14] also sought to support his story by claiming that it was her decision to
bring appellant along to Davao
City so that he could help minister to her daughter-in-law.
After
considering the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, the lower
court gave credence to the testimony of Jovelyn and disregarded the defense of
denial cum alibi presented by appellant.
The
trial court considered the immediate revelation made by Jovelyn of the crime
committed against her, and her steadfast efforts to bring her violator to
justice, as indicative of the veracity of her charge. It rejected the defense put up by
appellant in light of the positive identification made by Jovelyn and the
categorical declarations of the other prosecution witnesses placing him within
the vicinity of the locus
criminis at the time of the
commission of the crime.
Accordingly,
appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify Jovelyn in the amount of P40,000.00,
and to pay the costs.[15]
Appellant
now pleads for the reversal of the judgment of the trial court, contending that
said court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jovelyn and in finding
him guilty on the basis thereof.[16]
Appellant
adverts to the fact that complainant stated in her complaint[17] and in her testimony[18] given during the preliminary investigation that he committed the crime
of rape through the application of odorous chemicals over her nose and mouth
which caused her to sleep. This
fact was not repeated by complainant in the trial court but she merely claimed
the crime was consummated by appellant through force and intimidation. Such inconsistency, according to
appellant, destroys Jovelyns credibility, thus warranting a reversal of the
lower courts judgment of conviction.
The
records disclose that at the trial, counsel for appellant tried to utilize the
testimony of complainant given in the preliminary investigation before Judge
Rodolfo A. Castro to impeach her through statements therein supposedly
different from what she gave in court.[19] Alluding to her answer to Judge Castros questions numbered 28 and 29,[20] appellants counsel asked complainant if she first reported the rape to
one Dioneson Bayno. Complainant
duly corrected that statement and clarified that it was Mauricia and Hugo Bayno
whom she first told about the incident.[21]
However,
complainant was never confronted during the proceedings in the trial court with
her answers allegedly given in the same testimony at the preliminary
investigation regarding appellants resort to sleep-inducing chemicals. In fact, no sub-markings for such
particular answers as exhibits were made in the records of her testimony in the
preliminary investigation, much less offered by the counsel of appellant for
that purpose during the trial of the case.
It is
universally accepted that a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of
contradictory or prior inconsistent statements until the proper foundation or
predicate has been duly laid by the party against whom said witness was called.[22] The American rule on laying the predicate is embodied in Rule 132 of our
own Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 13. How witness
impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. - Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent
with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the
circumstances of the times and places and the persons present, and he must be
asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they
must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him concerning them.
Although
the whole record of the testimony of complainant at the preliminary examination
was offered in evidence by the defense and admitted by the trial court,[23] complainant cannot now be discredited through any of her extrajudicial
statements which were not brought to her attention during the trial. Thus, it has been held that granting arguendo the alleged contradictions, previous
statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of a witness
unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he was then
given an opportunity to explain them.[24]
In People vs. Resabal,[25] this Court explicitly ruled that the mere presentation of the prior
declarations of a witness without the same having been read to the
witness while he was testifying in court is insufficient for the desired
impeachment of his testimony. As
explained therein, the apparent contradiction between the declarations of the
witness before the former justice of the peace court and those before the then
court of first instance was insufficient to discredit him since he was not
given ample opportunity, by reading to him his declarations before the lower
court, to explain the supposed discrepancy.
The rule which
requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence
of inconsistent statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is
essential to protect the character of a witness. His memory is refreshed by the
necessary inquiries, which enables him to explain the statements referred to,
and to show that they were made under a mistake, or that there was no
discrepancy between them and his testimony.[26]
It would
be unjust to complainant at this stage to be declared an incredible witness as
a result of the unauthorized procedure adopted by appellant. It is evidentiarily proscribed to
discredit a witness on the bases of purportedly prior inconsistent statements
which were not called to the attention of that witness during the trial,
although the same are supposedly contained in a document which was merely
offered and admitted in its entirety without the requisite specifications.
Through
such a somewhat underhanded recourse, a party can expediently offer in evidence at the trial the whole document containing
allegedly variant statements and then point out much later on appeal the supposed contradictory statements
which were not specified, intentionally or otherwise, in the same trial. That sub
silentio gambit would
necessarily deprive a witness of the chance to explain the seeming
divergencies, which is the paramount consideration of the rule mandating the
laying of the proper predicate.
Complainant
is undoubtedly the person best suited and mandated by the rule to explain the
supposed differences in her statements. Without
such explanation before us, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis
to evaluate and assess her credibility on the rationale that it is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.[27] As things stand before us and the court a quo, therefore, complainants
credibility remains unimpeached.
On the
foregoing considerations, we confirm the validity of the doctrine articulated
by the Court of Appeals in Villaruel
vs. Bascon[28] that, unless the proper predicate is laid during the trial by calling
the attention of a witness to his alleged inconsistent statements given outside
of his testimony in court and asking him to explain the contradiction, the
supposed inconsistencies cannot be pointed out on appeal for the purpose of
destroying the credibility of the witness. This
pronouncement was actually based upon and in line with the holdings of this
Court in Escosura[29] and People vs. Lim
Quingsy.[30]
We now
take up the other document relied upon by appellant, that is, the complaint
executed by complainant. A
reading of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that said complaint was
never introduced in evidence for the consideration of the trial court nor shown
to complainant during the trial so that she could explain the alleged
discrepancies in accordance with the foregoing rule. The complaint is not even included in
the folder of exhibits as part of the documents admitted in evidence by the
trial court. It is only attached
to the original record of this case together with the other records of the
preliminary investigation forwarded to the trial court. Under the revision in the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, those records of the preliminary investigation do not form
part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.[31]
Again,
it is undeniable that the proper basis was not laid for the impeachment of
complainant through the statements contained in her complaint. Coupled with the basic principle that
courts shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered or whose
purpose has not been specified,[32] the complaint cannot also be taken into account for impeaching
complainant. If appellant was
really prepared to attack complainants credibility based on the statements in
her complaint, he should necessarily have asked complainant about them during
the trial, offered the complaint as his evidence, and specified the purpose for
its submission. Appellant utterly
failed in all of these mandatory evidential requirements.
Hence,
no impeaching evidence having been properly brought before it for its
consideration during trial, the lower court was perfectly justified in
disregarding the supposed inconsistent statements of complainant in her
complaint and her testimony during the preliminary investigation. Her testimony at the trial, therefore,
stands unassailed and entitled to full credit, together with the corroboration
afforded thereto by the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, in
stark contrast to the effete and puerile defense offered by appellant.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of
the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the indemnity to be paid by
accused-appellant Winston de Guzman is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
the present case law thereon.[14]”
H.2. Calling an Adverse
Party as Witness; Effect Thereof
“Petitioner contends that
her case was unduly prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel as
part of her evidence. Petitioner argues that the adverse witness testimony
elicited during cross-examination should not be considered as evidence of the
calling party. She contends that the examination of respondent as adverse
witness did not make him her witness and she is not bound by his testimony,
particularly during cross-examination by his own counsel.[29] In
particular, the petitioner avers that the following testimony of the respondent
as adverse witness should not be considered as her evidence:
(11.a) That RESPONDENT-Appellee became owner
of the HAGONOY LUMBER business when he bought the same from Chua Sioc Huan
through a Deed of Sale dated August 1, 1990 (EXH.H);
(11.b) That the HAGONOY LUMBER, on the other
hand, was acquired by the sister Chua Sioc Huan, by virtue of Extrajudicial
Partition and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in favor of a Co-Heir (EXH. I);
(11.c) That the 3 lots on which the
HAGONOY LUMBER business is located were acquired by Lu Pieng from
the Santos family under the Deed of Absolute Sale (EXH. J); that Lu
Pieng sold the Lots to Chua Suy Lu in 1976 (EXHS. K, L, & M.); that Chua
Siok Huan eventually became owner of the 3 Lots; and in 1989 Chua Sioc Huan
sold them to RESPONDENT-Appellee (EXHS. Q and P); that after he acquired the 3
Lots, he has not sold them to anyone and he is the owner of the lots.[30]
We do not agree that
petitioners case was prejudiced by the RTCs treatment of the respondents
testimony during cross-examination as her evidence.
If there was an error
committed by the RTC in ascribing to the petitioner the respondents testimony
as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own counsel, it constitute a
harmless error which would not, in any way, change the result of the case.
In the first place, the
delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one party or the
other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose shoulders
lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence needed to
discharge the burden. In civil cases, that burden devolves upon the plaintiff
who must establish her case by preponderance of evidence. The rule is that the
plaintiff must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the defendants evidence. Thus, it barely matters who with a piece of evidence is
credited. In the end, the court will have to consider the entirety of the
evidence presented by both parties. Preponderance of evidence is then
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled
from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[31]
That the witness is the
adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling party will not be
bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at his instance
that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Unlike an ordinary
witness, the calling party may impeach an adverse witness in all respects
as if he had been called by the adverse party,[32] except
by evidence of his bad character.[33] Under
a rule permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling
party does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.[34]
A party who calls his
adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the latters testimony only
in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing other evidence to prove
a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.[35] A
rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound
by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper
weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting
his testimony or from impeaching him.[36] This,
the petitioner failed to do.”[15]
I. Section 14, Rule
132. EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF WITNESS. – Evidence of the good character of a witness
is not admissible until such character has been impeached.
-
But a study in
contrast is the rule on Character Evidence involving not an ordinary witness
but the ACCUSED himself, thus:
Character
evidence was discussed in full in the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NOEL LEE, accused-appellant[16].
“Character evidence is governed
by Section 51, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz:
Section 51. Character evidence not generally
admissible; exceptions:--
(a) In Criminal Cases:
(1) The
accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the moral
trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless
in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral character which is
pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(3) The
good or bad moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to
establish in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the
offense charged.
x x x x
x x x x x.
Character is defined to be the
possession by a person of certain qualities of mind and morals, distinguishing
him from others. It is the opinion generally entertained of a person derived
from the common report of the people who are acquainted with him; his
reputation.[32] Good moral character includes all the
elements essential to make up such a character; among these are common honesty
and veracity, especially in all professional intercourse; a character that
measures up as good among people of the community in which the person lives, or
that is up to the standard of the average citizen; that status which attaches
to a man of good behavior and upright conduct.[33]
The rule is that the character or
reputation of a party is regarded as legally irrelevant in determining a
controversy, so that evidence relating thereto is not admissible. Ordinarily,
if the issues in the case were allowed to be influenced by evidence of the
character or reputation of the parties, the trial would be apt to have the
aspects of a popularity contest rather than a factual inquiry into the merits
of the case. After all, the business of the court is to try the case, and not
the man; and a very bad man may have a righteous cause.[34] There are exceptions to this rule
however and Section 51, Rule 130 gives the exceptions in both criminal and
civil cases.
In criminal cases, sub-paragraph
1 of Section 51 of Rule 130 provides that the accused may prove his good moral
character which is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged. When the accused presents proof of his good moral character, this
strengthens the presumption of innocence, and where good character and
reputation are established, an inference arises that the accused did not commit
the crime charged. This view proceeds from the theory that a person of good
character and high reputation is not likely to have committed the act charged
against him.[35] Sub-paragraph 2 provides that the
prosecution may not prove the bad moral character of the accused except only in
rebuttal and when such evidence is pertinent to the moral trait involved in the
offense charged. This is intended
to avoid unfair prejudice to the accused who might otherwise be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he is a person of bad character.[36] The offering of character evidence on
his behalf is a privilege of the defendant, and the prosecution cannot comment
on the failure of the defendant to produce such evidence.[37] Once the defendant raises the issue of
his good character, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, offer evidence of the
defendants bad character. Otherwise, a defendant, secure from refutation, would
have a license to unscrupulously impose a false character upon the tribunal.[38]
Both sub-paragraphs (1) and (2)
of Section 51 of Rule 130 refer to character evidence of the accused.[39] And this evidence must be pertinent to
the moral trait involved in the offense charged, meaning, that the character
evidence must be relevant and germane to the kind of the act charged,[40] e.g., on a charge of rape,
character for chastity; on a charge of assault, character for peacefulness or
violence; on a charge for embezzlement, character for honesty and integrity.[41] Sub-paragraph (3) of Section 51 of the
said Rule refers to the character of the offended
party.[42] Character evidence, whether good or
bad, of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish in any
reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense charged. Such
evidence is most commonly offered to support a claim of self-defense in an
assault or homicide case or a claim of consent in a rape case.[43]
In the Philippine setting, proof
of the moral character of the offended party is applied with frequency in sex
offenses and homicide.[44] In rape and acts of lasciviousness or
in any prosecution involving an unchaste act perpetrated by a man against a
woman where the willingness of a woman is material, the womans character as to
her chastity is admissible to show whether or not she consented to the mans
act.[45] The exception to this is when the
womans consent is immaterial such as in statutory rape[46] or rape with violence or intimidation.[47] In the crimes of qualified seduction[48] or consented abduction,[49]the
offended party must be a virgin, which is presumed if she is unmarried and of
good reputation,[50] or a virtuous woman of good
reputation.[51] The crime of simple seduction involves
the seduction of a woman who is single or a widow of good reputation, over
twelve but under eighteen years of age x x x.[52] The burden of proof that the
complainant is a woman of good reputation lies in the prosecution, and the
accused may introduce evidence that the complainant is a woman of bad
reputation.[53]
In homicide cases, a pertinent
character trait of the victim is admissible in two situations: (1) as evidence
of the deceaseds aggression; and (2) as evidence of the state of mind of the
accused.[54] The pugnacious, quarrelsome or
trouble-seeking character of the deceased or his calmness, gentleness and
peaceful nature, as the case may be, is relevant in determining whether the
deceased or the accused was the aggressor.[55] When the evidence tends to prove
self-defense, the known violent character of the deceased is also admissible to
show that it produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the
accused and a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was
necessary.[56]
In the instant case, proof of the
bad moral character of the victim is irrelevant to determine the probability or
improbability of his killing. Accused-appellant has not alleged that the victim
was the aggressor or that the killing was made in self-defense. There is no
connection between the deceaseds drug addiction and thievery with his violent
death in the hands of accused-appellant. In light of the positive eyewitness
testimony, the claim that because of the victims bad character he could have
been killed by any one of those from whom he had stolen, is pure and simple
speculation.
Moreover, proof of the victims
bad moral character is not necessary in cases of murder committed with
treachery and premeditation. In People v. Soliman,[57] a murder case, the defense tried to
prove the violent, quarrelsome or provocative character of the deceased. Upon
objection of the prosecution, the trial court disallowed the same. The Supreme
Court held:
x x x While good or bad moral character may
be availed of as an aid to determine the probability or improbability of the
commission of an offense (Section 15, Rule 123),[58] such is not necessary in the crime of murder
where the killing is committed through treachery or premeditation. The proof of
such character may only be allowed in homicide cases to show that it has
produced a reasonable belief of imminent danger in the mind of the accused and
a justifiable conviction that a prompt defensive action was necessary (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., Vol. 3, p. 126). This rule does not
apply to cases of murder.[59]”
[14] [G.R. No. 122740. March 30, 1998] PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. WINSTON DE GUZMAN, accused-appellant.
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